Setting of a listed building – CA overturns Steer

On Monday, 26 June 2017, I reported on the judgment of the High Court (Lang J) in the case of Steer v SSCLG [2017] EWHC 1456 (Admin), in which a very wide interpretation of the “setting” of a listed building was adopted by the Court for the purposes of section 66 of the Historic Buildings Act. However, that decision has now been overturned by the Court of Appeal sub nom. - Catesby Estates Ltd v Steer [2018] EWCA Civ 1697. The Secretary of State also appealed in a conjoined appeal, and Historic England was heard in the appeals as an Intervener. Judgment in the Court of Appeal was given by Lindblom LJ, with whom the other two judges agreed without comment.

The original High Court judgment led to some concern among planning professionals, and one correspondent in this blog observed that while Historic England would be pleased, virtually the whole land surface of the England could be argued to be the setting of some heritage asset or other, including buried archaeology! He suggested that a balanced and proportionate approach is required, but was not entirely sure this was it.

Lindblom LJ summarised the point at issue in a single sentence, namely whether the Inspector whose decision was challenged erred in law in his understanding of the concept of the “setting” of a Grade I listed building.

The site is farmland, about 1.7 kilometres to the south-east of Kedleston Hall, which is a Grade I listed building, and about 550 metres from the Grade I listed Kedleston Hall registered park and garden and the Kedleston Conservation Area, whose boundary on its south-eastern side extends to the edge of the park. About 1.5 kilometres to the north of the site are the Grade II* listed Kedleston Hotel and the Quarndon Conservation Area. The site itself was part of the manorial land owned by Sir Nathaniel Curzon, the first Lord Scarsdale, when, in 1761, he set about reconstructing his house and laying out the park. The land was beside the main road from Derby, by which most visitors to Kedleston Hall would arrive. From it one could see the park. And from the park there were views of the house. Kedleston Hall is widely acknowledged to be of exceptional historic and architectural interest, and is described in Pevsner as “one of the most magnificent apartments of the C18 in England” and “the most splendid Georgian house in Derbyshire, in extensive grounds”. The park was largely the creation of the architect Robert Adam.

In an effort to summarise this briefly, I will not quote from the materials cited by the court, but reference was made to the definition of the “Setting of a heritage asset” in the “Glossary” to the NPPF and to the guidance document entitled “The Setting of Heritage Assets – Historic Environment Good Practice Advice in Planning: 3” (“GPA3”), a revision of which was published in July 2015. (A second edition was published in December 2017, but it was the first edition that was current at the time of the original appeal.)

At the inquiry, there was a significant body of evidence, from Historic England, the National Trust, the Gardens Trust, the Development Control Archaeologist at Derbyshire County Council, and the experts called on behalf of the local community, Kedleston Voice, that the appeal site was part of the setting of both the Grade I listed Hall and the park, as well as the conservation area, even though the proposal would not intrude upon views to and from the Hall. The thrust of that evidence was that the appeal site was part of the setting of the Hall because it had formed part of the estate, managed historically as an economic and social entity, and it remained in its historic agricultural use, with hedges and mature trees characterising the field boundaries. From the Hall and the park, the surrounding rural context was important in preserving a sense of a parkland landscape at the centre of a managed rural estate, rather than in a suburban context. The site was on the primary visitor route to the Hall and Park and so visitors would experience the historical narrative, and the concentric influence of the Hall on its landscape, as they traversed the agricultural estate, then entered the enclosed, designed park and gardens, enjoying the drama of anticipation as a great English country house was revealed to them.

In approaching this main issue, the Inspector found it “difficult to dissociate landscape impact from heritage impact”. He observed that it was “not unreasonable to look at landscape quality and impact in purely physical or visual terms and to consider historical value and significance separately, in the context of the impact on the Hall and Park”. He concluded that (“setting aside for the moment the historical association with the Hall and Park”), the appeal site exhibited no features that could qualify it as a valued landscape in the terms of paragraph 109 of the NPPF. There was, he said, “no reason why, in physical or visual terms, harm to the landscape should compel dismissal of the appeals”, and “[the] question of its historical value may be addressed in relation to the settings of Kedleston Hall and its registered Park and Garden”.

Turning to “The settings of the heritage assets and the statutory and policy context”, the Inspector addressed himself to the definition of setting in the NPPF (the “surroundings in which a heritage asset is experienced”) and observed that the extent of a setting “is not fixed and may change as the asset and its surroundings evolve”. Setting is not itself a heritage asset but elements of a setting “may make a positive or negative contribution to the significance of an asset”. The Inspector pointed out that paragraphs 126-141 of the NPPF make it clear that, in considering a development proposal, what has to be assessed is the effect there would be, not on the setting, but on the significance of the heritage asset concerned.

Again, for the sake of brevity, I shall not attempt to summarise the Inspector’s observations upon considering the setting of each heritage asset, in turn. In his overall conclusions on the main issue, the Inspector acknowledged that “Kedleston Hall and its Park are heritage assets of the greatest importance” and that “[any] harm to their significance must carry very great weight in the balance against the public benefits of the appeal proposals required by paragraph 134 of the NPPF”. He held, however, that there was “no harm to the significance of the Hall and only very modest harm to the significance of the Park and Conservation Area”. There was a substantial tree screen planted in the 1960s and since substantially extended, but even if this tree screen were to be removed or opened out,“the harm to the significance of the Hall would be very limited indeed and the harm to the Park still no more than modest”. Against that harm the Inspector considered that there was “the very great public benefit of market and affordable housing which is much needed, especially in Amber Valley but also in Derby City”. This was, said the inspector, “more than sufficient to tip the balance in favour of the appeal proposals”. Applying the policy for the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” in paragraph 14 of the NPPF, the Inspector concluded that there was “no doubt that the adverse impacts of either development would not significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits from providing much-needed housing”.

Putting it briefly, the judge at first instance felt that the Inspector had taken too narrow a view of the “setting” of the listed building. However, Lindblom LJ observed that, although the “setting” of a listed building is a concept recognized by statute, it is not statutorily defined. Nor does it lend itself to precise definition (see R. (Williams) v Powys CC [2017] EWCA Civ 427, at paragraphs 53 to 58). Implicit in section 66 of the Listed Buildings Act, however, is that the setting of a listed building is capable of being affected in some discernible way by development, whether within the setting or outside it. Identifying the extent of the setting for the purposes of a planning decision is not a matter for the court, but will always be a matter of fact and planning judgment for the decision-maker. And as Sullivan L.J. said in R. (Friends of Hethel Ltd.) v S Norfolk DC [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1216, “the question whether a proposed development affects, or would affect the setting of a listed building is very much a matter of planning judgment for the local planning authority”.

In Williams Lindblom LJ, in the visual context that applied in that case, had distinguished between the “site” of a scheduled monument and its “setting”, which, he said, “encompasses the surroundings within which the monument may be experienced by the eye”. He went on to say that the circumstances in which the section 66(1) duty has to be performed for the setting of a listed building will vary with a number of factors – typically, “the nature, scale and siting of the development proposed, its proximity and likely visual relationship to the listed building, the architectural and historic characteristics of the listed building itself, local topography, and the presence of other features – both natural and man-made – in the surrounding landscape or townscape”, and possibly “other considerations too”, depending on “the particular facts and circumstances of the case in hand”. To “lay down some universal principle for ascertaining the extent of the setting of a listed building” would, he thought, be “impossible”. But – again in the particular context of visual effects – Lindblom LJ had observed in that case that if “a proposed development is to affect the setting of a listed building there must be a distinct visual relationship of some kind between the two – a visual relationship which is more than remote or ephemeral, and which in some way bears on one’s experience of the listed building in its surrounding landscape or townscape”.

Lindblom LJ stressed, however, that this does not mean that factors other than the visual and physical must be ignored when a decision-maker is considering the extent of a listed building’s setting. Generally, of course, the decision-maker will be concentrating on visual and physical considerations, as in Williams. But it is clear from the relevant national policy and guidance to which he had referred, in particular the guidance in paragraph 18a-013 of the PPG, that the Government recognizes the potential relevance of other considerations – economic, social and historical. These other considerations may include, for example, “the historic relationship between places”. Historic England’s advice in GPA3 was broadly to the same effect.

It has also been accepted by the Court of Appeal in previous cases that the effect of development on the setting of a listed building is not necessarily confined to visual or physical impact. As Lewison L.J. said in R. (Palmer) v Herefordshire Council [2016] EWCA Civ 1061, “[although] the most obvious way in which the setting of a listed building might be harmed is by encroachment or visual intrusion, it is common ground that, in principle, the setting of a listed building may be harmed by noise or smell”. In that case the potential harm to the setting of the listed building was by noise and odour from four poultry broiler units.

Lindblom LJ identified three general points which emerge. First, the section 66(1) duty, where it relates to the effect of a proposed development on the setting of a listed building, makes it necessary for the decision-maker to understand what that setting is – even if its extent is difficult or impossible to delineate exactly – and whether the site of the proposed development will be within it or in some way related to it. Otherwise, the decision-maker may find it hard to assess whether and how the proposed development “affects” the setting of the listed building, and to perform the statutory obligation to “have special regard to the desirability of preserving … its setting …”.

Secondly, though this is never a purely subjective exercise, none of the relevant policy, guidance and advice prescribes for all cases a single approach to identifying the extent of a listed building’s setting. Nor could it. In every case where that has to be done, the decision-maker must apply planning judgment to the particular facts and circumstances, having regard to relevant policy, guidance and advice. The facts and circumstances will differ from one case to the next. It may be that the site of the proposed development, though physically close to a listed building, has no real relationship with it and falls outside its setting, while another site, much further away, nevertheless has an important relationship with the listed building and is within its setting. Under current national planning policy and guidance in England, in the NPPF and the PPG, the decision-maker has to concentrate on the “surroundings in which [the heritage] asset is experienced”, keeping in mind that those “surroundings” may change over time, and also that the way in which a heritage asset can be “experienced” is not limited only to the sense of sight. The “surroundings” of the heritage asset are its physical surroundings, and the relevant “experience”, whatever it is, will be of the heritage asset itself in that physical place.

Thirdly, the effect of a particular development on the setting of a listed building – where, when and how that effect is likely to be perceived, whether or not it will preserve the setting of the listed building, whether, under government policy in the NPPF, it will harm the “significance”.

Applying those points to the Inspector’s decision in this case, Lindblom LJ did not find that the Inspector had erred in any of the ways that had been alleged. The Inspector recognised the relevance of those considerations to the setting of the listed building, to the impact of the development upon that setting, and its impact on the “significance” listed building as a heritage asset. He did not concentrate on physical and visual factors to the exclusion of everything else. It was clear from his decision letter that the Inspector was aware of the need to take into account not merely the visual effects of the development but also its effects on the historic value of the Hall, the park and each of the other heritage assets he had to consider.

Lindblom LJ therefore differed from the judge’s view that the inspector “adopted a narrow interpretation of setting … inconsistent with the broad meaning given to setting in the relevant policies and guidance … before him”. In his opinion the Inspector understood the relevant policies and guidance correctly, and applied them lawfully in assessing the likely effects of the development on the setting of each heritage asset. The appeal was therefore allowed, and the Inspector’s original decision was restored.

On reading this detailed and carefully reasoned judgment, it does not appear to me that Lindblom LJ was taking a significantly different view of the legal principles governing the “setting” of a listed building than those developed in previous cases. Clearly, a variety of factors are capable of being taken into account in assessing the setting of a listed building and the impact of proposed development on that setting, and not just physical or visual factors. However, if the first instance judgment may have given the impression to some people that the setting of a listed building is potentially limitless, then this decision of the Court of Appeal will serve to correct that impression. This judgment confirms that it is a question of balance, having regard to all the circumstances. The most important point is that this is ‘a matter of fact and degree’, and is thus a matter for the decision-maker, rather than the court. It would seem to me, therefore, that an Inspector’s decision with regard to the setting of a listed building would have to be Wednesbury unreasonable before it can be impugned as representing an error of law.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

More musical chairs

It was only at the end of April that I was reporting the appointment of the new Housing & Planning Minister, Dominic Raab, and yet here we are, not yet half way through July, noting his departure for pastures new to become Brexit Secretary [surely a thankless task in the current circumstances!] in place of David Davis, following Davis’s dramatic resignation late on Sunday night.

Dominic Raab’s replacement at MHCLG is Kit Malthouse (whom I confess I had not heard of until now). He is a comparative new boy, having been elected to parliament as recently as 2015 as the member for North-west Hampshire. He has recently been serving as a junior minister in the Department of Work and Pensions.

Prior to becoming an MP, Malthouse had been one of Boris Johnson’s appointed Deputy Mayors, where he was responsible for the development of business and enterprise in Greater London. He had also been a councillor in the City of Westminster, rising to Deputy Leader as well as holding the finance brief in the council’s cabinet.

As for his professional background – yes, he was one of the living dead; he became a chartered accountant.

So what does Malthouse know about housing and planning? Your guess is as good as mine. And maybe it doesn’t matter, as MHCLG’s civil servants will just get on with what they’ve always done, no matter who their ministers are. With a ministerial revolving door like this, it hardly matters who actually holds the various ministerial briefs in the office, or whether they know anything about the subjects for which they have nominal ministerial responsibility.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Further guidance on Class Q

Readers may recall that I drew attention on Tuesday, 3 April (“Class Q revisited”) to changes to Part 3 (Class Q) of the Second Schedule to the GPDO (residential conversion of agricultural buildings) that were made by the latest amendment order, with effect from 6 April 2018.

These changes included the amendment of the definition of development permitted by Class Q which still seem to have passed some people by. The objective of this amendment seems to have been to reinforce those provisions in Class Q that were intended to make it clear that where the residential conversion of an agricultural building involves building operations, the prior approval application must include those building operations.

The drafting of Class Q in the 2015 GPDO differed from the corresponding provisions in Class MB in the 1995 Order, and was obviously intended to make it clear that a prior approval application should embrace both the change of use under Class Q(a) and the building operations under what was then Class Q(b).[

I originally drew attention in a blog post on Tuesday, 21 November 2017 (“Prior approval application under Class Q(a) only”) to a continuing misunderstanding of the 2015 Order that seemed to be widespread, and was even shared by some Planning Inspectors. But quite clearly there was a significant number of readers who were not prepared to accept that applications could no longer be made under Class Q(a) alone, unless no building operations would be required (or, even more unlikely, unless the building operations would fall outside Class Q(b) altogether and would therefore be the subject of a separate planning application).

Since April of this year, there are two alternative prior approval applications – Class Q(a) for change of use only, or Class Q(b) which now embraces both the change of use and associated building operations. Prior approval applications under Class Q should no longer be made under both Class Q(a) and Class Q(b), because this would now involve pointless duplication. Where an application under both Q(a) and Q(b) was required in the past, only a prior approval application under Class Q(b) is now required.

I also explained in my blog post on 3 April the other amendments to Class Q which make it clear that an application under Class Q(b) (but not Q(a)) must be made where building operations relying on permitted development rights will be required. In these circumstances, making an application under Class Q(a) is no longer an option.

This is confirmed by a further revision of Paragraph 105 of the online PPG on 15 June, in light of the changes brought about by the 2018 amendment order in April of this year. The beginning of this paragraph now explains that the permitted development right under Class Q allows either the change of use (a), or the change of use together with reasonably necessary building operations (b) [emphasis supplied].

I won’t re-rehearse the arguments I have put forward earlier in support of my interpretation of the revised wording in Class Q, but it seems that this latest revision to ministerial planning practice guidance does say more or less the same thing.

While we are looking at the PPG, Paragraph 106 (which explains that the PD rights under Class Q are precluded where works to erect, extend or alter a building for the purposes of agriculture under agricultural permitted development rights have been carried out on the established agricultural unit since 20 March 2013) has been corrected by deleting the words: “or the installation of additional or replacement plant or machinery". The intention of the legislation, which paragraph 106 seeks to explain, is to preclude PD under Class Q where permitted development has been carried out since 20 March 2013 under either Class A(a) or Class B(a) in Part 6 of the Second Schedule the GPDO.

The inclusion in previous versions of paragraph 106 of a reference to the installation of additional or replacement plant or machinery was a mistake, because those items fall within the PD allowed by Part 6, Class B(b), which (unlike Classes A(a) and B(a)) is not precluded.

As one reader observed - “and this is meant to represent a simplification of the planning system ?(!!!)

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Planning appeals inquiries review

DHCLG has embarked on a review of the use and operation of the planning appeal inquiries procedure, claiming to make it quicker and better [pause here for collective groan]. The review will examine the process in its entirety and is expected to make recommendations that DHCLG hopes will significantly reduce the time taken to conclude planning inquiries, while maintaining the quality of decisions. [Well, it might, or it might not.]

The review will examine the rules and processes of the entire process involving inquiries, particularly focusing on major housing schemes, which for obvious reasons the government is very anxious to speed up. The role of the various players (developers, LPAs and objectors, etc.) in influencing the progress of the appeal process will be part of this. Whilst the avowed objective of the review is simply to examine whether the inquiry procedure can be made more ‘efficient’ and therefore quicker, so as to improve the handling by PINS of appeal processes generally, there is inevitably a potential threat that an attempt may be made to restrict the ability of parties to put their cases as fully and fairly before the inspector as they might wish. Issues of procedural fairness could arise.

The Review is intended to involve all parties in the inquiry processes, including appellants, local planning authorities, third parties including statutory consultees, lawyers, Planning Inspectors, and other PINS staff. It is intended to focus on the role of inquiries in major housing applications, with wider application to all inquiries. Comparisons may be made with other appeal and review processes.

In particular, ministers intend that the review should consider the circumstances in which the public inquiry procedure is favoured by appellants and whether a different procedure may be more appropriate [a further attempt to restrict the availability of the inquiry procedure?], the purpose of the inquiry procedure and whether current practice fulfils this purpose, the rules and procedures governing inquiries, the custom and practice during inquiries (including making recommendations for improvements, in particular what it would take to halve the total time currently taken from start to finish) and, finally, the specific implications for the Planning Inspectorate and appellants of any recommendations to change the inquiries procedure, including implications for other appeal procedures.

The review is being led by Bridget Rosewell OBE, and will report to the Secretary of State by the end of this year. It has not yet been made clear how participants will be involved in the review, but interested parties should begin thinking how to respond to the review. Early representations by planning professionals and others would no doubt be advisable, in view of the fact that the report is expected to be in the hands of the Secretary of State in barely six months from now.

UPDATE [9.7.18]: I am grateful to Tony Thompson MRTPI, MRICS, Head of the Planning Appeal Inquiries Review Team at MHCLG for some further information on this review.

In terms of engagement, as a first step, they plan to issue a call for evidence later this month and would welcome responses from all those who are interested, particularly from those who have first-hand experience of the inquiry process.

Any planning professionals who would like to be added to the list of those informed when the call for evidence is issued, should contact MHCLG to register their interest. The call for evidence is in any event likely to be widely publicised in the professional press, and so even if you do not request personal notification when the call for evidence is issued, everyone will have an opportunity to contribute their views. As Tony Thompson says, views based on practical professional experience of the appeal process will be of particular value to the review team.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Unless otherwise agreed

Paragraph W (12) in Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO provides that the development permitted under Part 3 must be carried out in accordance with the details approved by the LPA. Where prior approval is not required (or where the 56-day period has expired without the applicant having been notified of the LPA’s determination of the prior approval application) the development must be carried out in accordance with the details provided in the prior approval application. In both cases, the requirement for the development to comply with these details applies “unless the local planning authority and the developer agree otherwise in writing”.

The question has arisen as to what formalities, if any, are required in order to obtain the LPA’s agreement to any variation. The reference to such agreement simply being “in writing” seems to me to indicate that a formal application, such as a fresh prior approval application or a planning application (for example under section 73) is not required. However, some LPAs seem to have taken a different view.

My own view is reinforced by a parallel provision in Part 16 (relating to telecoms development). Paragraph A.3(8) in Part 16 provides that the development must, except to the extent that the local planning authority otherwise agree in writing, be carried out in accordance with the details approved in the prior approval, and in any other case, in accordance with the details submitted with the application. Paragraph A.3(9) then goes on to explain that “The agreement in writing referred to in sub-paragraph (8) requires no special form of writing, and in particular there is no requirement on the developer to submit a new application for prior approval in the case of minor amendments to the details submitted with the application for prior approval”.

Now, I appreciate that Inspectors have resisted attempts to import the provisions of one Part of the Second Schedule into another Part by analogy, but if no formality is required in seeking agreement to minor variations under Part 16, then I see no reason why any formality should be required in seeking similar agreement under Part 3.

If the GPDO had been properly drafted, the wording I have quoted from paragraph A.3(9) in Part 16 should also have appeared in paragraph W(12) in Part 3, and this is not the only example of a failure to ensure uniformity in the provisions in different Parts of the Second Schedule to the GPDO. The opportunity should be taken to correct such anomalies in the drafting of the Order. In the meantime, it is to be hoped that common sense will prevail, and that LPAs will not be difficult about accepting informal requests for the variation of approved or submitted details. The only requirement is that the actual agreement between the LPA and the developer should be “in writing”.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Implied conditions – Court of Appeal backs High Court

On Wednesday 1 November 2017, I drew attention to the case of Lambeth LBC v SSCLG [2017] EWHC 2412 (Admin). The case concerned a permission granted under section 73 which, in allowing a relaxation of one of the conditions in the original planning permission, had failed to reimpose one of the restrictions that had been contained in the original planning permission. It is well settled law that a permission under section 73 takes effect as a fresh permission, so that where this occurs any conditions that were not reimposed fall away.

The problem for Lambeth in this case was that, although in the section 73 permission they had referred in the description of the development to variation of the condition so as to allow a wider range of non-food retail uses, they had not included a condition in this new permission that expressly ruled out the retail sale of food. The landowner sought an LDC under section 192 that it would now be lawful to sell an unrestricted range of retail goods (including food). The LPA refused to grant the LDC, arguing that the section 73 permission was not intended to have this unrestricted effect, but an appeal was allowed against that refusal. The LPA sought to challenge this appeal decision in the High Court, but their claim was dismissed as noted in my previous blog post on this topic. The council then took the case on to the Court of Appeal, which gave judgment on 20 April - [2018] EWCA Civ 844.

Lambeth, in attempting to establish that the relevant restriction still applied, could not challenge the well-established legal effect of section 73, and were therefore driven back on seeking to interpret the section 73 permission more restrictively than appeared on its face.

I don’t propose to go into this case in any detail. Briefly, the council’s arguments were that the section 73 decision notice itself should be interpreted in a restrictive manner and, second, that a condition preserving the restrictive effect of the original planning permission could be implied in the permission. The LPA’s argument was that the section 73 permission should be interpreted as if it contained the missing condition, to the effect that “the use shall be carried on in accordance with the conditions attached to the 2010 permission as stated to have been varied by this permission.” My interest in this case lies solely in this argument over implied conditions.

It has always been my view that the obiter remarks of Lord Carnwath JSC in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 74 do not allow the implication of an entirely new condition in a planning permission which had been entirely omitted from that permission, as opposed to the implication of a term in a condition which the permission already contains so as to give effect to the true intention of that condition. This argument was put to the Court of Appeal by Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC in Lambeth. The Court accepted this submission, and agreed with the judge at first instance that a new condition cannot be implied as the LPA had argued.

This judgment is therefore further confirmation (if it were needed) that the effect of what was in any event an obiter observation in Trump International is limited to ‘correcting’ an existing condition, so as to give proper effect to its intention. The obvious example is a condition requiring approval of certain matters by the LPA which does not in terms require that, upon such approval being given, the development must then be carried out in accordance with those approved details. Clearly, in light of Trump International, a term can be implied in this condition requiring compliance with these approved details. Without such an implied term, the condition would not achieve its intended purpose.

UPDATE (3 May 2019): The Supreme Court is due to hear an appeal on 21 May against this Court of Appeal decision.

© MARTIN H GOODALL.

Musical chairs

Following Amber Rudd’s resignation as Home Secretary yesterday evening, Sajid Javid has been appointed as her successor. The resulting vacancy at MHCLG has been filled by James Brokenshire, who returns to the cabinet after a short period out of office due to ill health. He had previously been Northern Ireland Secretary. Now aged 50, James Brokenshire has been in the Commons since 2005. He is a solicitor, who (before he ceased to practice on pursuing his political career) specialised in company and corporate law. So far as I am aware, he has had no experience relating to housing or planning.

Whatever one may think about his suitability for the post to which he has now been appointed, I am sure we all very much hope that he has now put behind him the health problem that forced his resignation at the beginning of the year, and wish him a full and permanent return to good health.

James Brokenshire says he is honoured to have been asked by the Prime Minister to serve as Secretary of State at the Ministry of Housing Communities & Local Government, and has stressed his determination to pursue the Ministry’s tasks, especially the building of new homes. No doubt his performance, and that of the Ministry will be judged primarily by the extent to which the government’s house-building targets are achieved (or by what margin those targets turn out to have been missed by 2020).

The reshuffle of cabinet posts does not appear to have led to any changes in the ranks of ministers below cabinet level, and so it remains to be seen whether any changes will be made in the MHCLG ministerial team. So, at least for the time being, it looks as if Dominic Raab will remain in post as the Housing & Planning Minister, having been in his current post only since January. He too is a qualified solicitor, but practised as a solicitor for only a short time before pursuing a diplomatic career, with a particular interest in human rights. He entered parliament in 2010.

The latest change in the leadership of the Ministry is very unlikely to bring about any change in the policies and projects on which MHCLG is already embarked, so what we have just seen is simply a game of musical chairs, the only difference being that the game started with Amber Rudd giving up her seat at the cabinet table, rather than being left out after the music stopped.

© MARTIN H GOODALL