Lawful use – the need for continuity clarified

In my book The Essential Guide to the Use of Land and Buildings under the Planning Acts I pointed out that when an application for a Lawful Development Certificate is made in respect of an existing use, that use (in addition to having been continuous and uninterrupted throughout the 4-year or 10-year period, whichever is applicable) must also be in existence when the application is made. What I wrote (in paragraph 19.5.1 of Chapter 19) was:

“There is, however, a requirement that the use must actually subsist on the date when an application for a Lawful Development Certificate is made, although (having regard to Panton and Farmer) this does not imply that the use must have been continuous since the date on which it became lawful, following 10 years’ continuous use in breach of planning control.”

This statement is correct, but it occurs to me that I should perhaps have explained this proposition in a little more detail. The authority that I had in mind was a passage in the judgment of Robin Purchas QC in Nicholson v SSE [1998] J.P.L. 553, at page 561, where he pointed out that the need for continuity of the breach of a planning condition seemed to him to be consistent with the linked provisions in section 191 for LDCs in respect of uses and operations :

“By section 191(1)(a) the purpose of the application in respect of uses is to ascertain whether “any use of buildings or other land is lawful”. It is plain accordingly that in respect of uses the use must exist at the time of the application. The question is itself also directed to that time. Under section 191(1)(b), operations are, unsurprisingly, described with reference to the past in that generally they will already have taken place. However, the question is asked, as with “existing uses” and matters of non-compliance, in the present as at the time of the application. In the context of the section as a whole, I find no difficulty in reading that as a requirement that the operation should continue to be in existence in some physical sense, be it as a building or other structure or as may be. That seems to me to fit with the definition of lawfulness in section 191(2). As with section 191(3), lawfulness for uses and operations requires under (b) consideration whether they “do not constitute a contravention” of an enforcement notice then in force. As I have said, that seems to me to presuppose that there is something in existence at the time of the application which would be capable of contravention if there was in fact a relevant enforcement notice then in force. Equally, under (a), the requirement that “no enforcement action may then be taken” implies that there is something in existence against which enforcement action might be taken if it were not for the absence of requirement for permission or the grant of permission or the expiry of time for enforcement action. To my mind, the natural reading of section 191 in respect of uses and operations is that the section requires that the uses and operations should exist at the time of the application in the sense that I have indicated. That would be consistent with the approach that I have taken to non-compliance. Any other interpretation would seem to me somewhat to strain the language used and should only be adopted if the natural construction plainly conflicts with the object of the Act or otherwise leads to an absurd or illogical result.”

This passage was obiter but Nicholson was nevertheless cited with approval in the Court of Appeal in Swale BC v FSS [2005] EWCA Civ 1568, at para. 6 (Keene LJ), and was further discussed in Ellis v SSCLG [2009] EWHC 634 (Admin).

In paragraph 19.5.1 of The Use of Land….. I also pointed out that, having regard to Panton and Farmer v SSETR [1999] J.P.L. 461, the need for the actual existence of the use at the time of the LDC application does not imply that the use must have been continuous since the date on which it became lawful, following 4 years’ or 10 years’ continuous use in breach of planning control (whichever is applicable). The relevant passage in Panton is to be found on page 468:

“Mr Albutt's skeleton argument appeared to suggest that an "existing" use for the purposes of section 191(1) described one which was active at the time of the application. During the hearing I suggested the term "dormant use", as representing a use which had arisen by way of a material change of use, but was now inactive, possibly for a long period of time. Such decline, even cessation, of physical activity could, of course, occur in countless different circumstances. The dormant use would still exist in planning terms, in the sense that the use right had not been lost by operation of law by one of the three events referred to above.

It is clear that a dormant use, in this sense, can be an "existing" use for the purposes of section 191(1), and this position was in terms accepted by the first respondent. This becomes clear when one appreciates that the LDC provisions have to be construed in the context of the enforcement provisions as a whole. Section 191 (1) enables the grant of a certificate where a use is lawful, one example of lawfulness being immunity from enforcement through the passage of time. By section 171B(3) the relevant period of time (in relation to a use other than as a single dwelling-house) is the passage of10 years from the date of the breach. The subsection is silent on any requirement for continuation of the use. Indeed; this approach is consistent with the fundamental principles of statutory development control in relation to material changes of use. The provisions are concerned with the carrying out of development, that is to say not use, but material change of use.

Further, this approach to the term "existing", shared by the first respondent in this case, is consistent with the approach taken by the Secretary of State in relation to the former provisions. Under the previous provisions relating to established use certificates, the use had to have "continued since the end of 1963", and be "subsisting at the time of the application". In a number of appeal decisions, the Secretary of State accepted that these provisions could apply to an inactive, or dormant, use, provided that it had not been abandoned.

Finally, there is nothing inconsistent, in my view, between this approach and the judgment of Mr Robin Purchas Q.C. (sitting as a deputy High Court judge) in Nicholson v. SSE (1998) 76 P. & C.R. 191. That decision concerned the time limits for enforcement in relation to breaches of condition. Mr Purchas held that an LDC could only be granted where the non-compliance with the planning condition was current at the date of the application. As Mr Purchas pointed out, if there were a period, following non-compliance, of compliance with the condition, the breach would be at an end, and a later breach would constitute a fresh breach, in relation to which time would begin to run again under section 171B(3). As he pointed out: "In this context a failure to comply with a condition is not to be confused with the continuation or abandonment of a planning use". The learned deputy judge continued in the following terms at page 199:

"That construction seems to me consistent with the linked provisions in section 191 for lawful development certificates in respect of uses and operations ... It is plain, accordingly, ……. [the passage I have quoted above] ………. would be consistent with the approach that I have taken to non-compliance."

There is nothing inconsistent, in my view, between those remarks and the approach that I take in the present case, an approach accepted by the first respondent. The burden of Mr Purchas' s reasoning is that there must be, at the date of the application, a use or operation at the land upon which an enforcement notice could "bite". An enforcement notice is no less properly served in relation to a dormant use than in relation to one which is being carried on in an active or physical sense.”

The only other point that needs to be borne in mind when considering the judgment in Panton is that the Court of Appeal made it clear both in SSETR v Thurrock BC [2002] EWCA Civ 226 and in Swale BC v FSS [2005] EWCA Civ 1568 that the remarks in Panton regarding a use being dormant do not apply to the period before immunity from enforcement is achieved, i.e. during the 4-year or 10-year period, throughout the whole of which the use must be both active and continuous. The rule in Panton nevertheless applies once immunity has been achieved under the 4-year or 10-year rule.

Thus there is no contradiction between what I wrote in my book on The Use of Land….. and what Richard Harwood wrote in the Third Edition of Planning Enforcement, viz: “If the active use ceased after it became lawful, a CLEUD application should only be refused if the use was then abandoned or otherwise terminated”. In paragraph 19.5.1 of my book I did not intend to imply that the use has to be active at the time when an application for an LDC is made; merely that it still has to exist (in the sense of not having permanently ceased or been abandoned). I fully accept that a use, once it has become lawful may then become dormant but still remain extant. The judgment in Panton and Farmer is clear authority for this and, in these circumstances, an application for an LDC in respect of an existing use must be granted accordingly.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Confiscation orders – Panayi over-ruled

Back in April 2019, I reported on a decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Panayi [2019] EWCA Crim 413, which seemed to cut down the scope of a confiscation order that could be made under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (‘POCA’). In that case, the defendant had been charged with being in breach of an Enforcement Notice "on or about 18 February 2016". The LPA had sought a confiscation order calculated on the basis of the gross rental income from two self-contained flats occupying an unauthorised enlargement of the property in question, from the date by which the Defendant should have complied with with the Enforcement Notice (12 February 2005) to the date of conviction (26 September 2016).

However, the Court of Appeal held in that case that the offence charged had to be interpreted as relating to a criminal offence committed on a single day in February 2016, on or about the 18th of that month. That was the only criminal conduct of which the appellant was convicted. It was up to the LPA, as the prosecuting authority, to decide the period over which the conduct charged should extend. As the Court of Appeal pointed out, section 179(6) of the 1990 Act gives the option to the prosecutor of charging by reference to any day or longer period of time, but it had chosen in this case to charge the offence in respect only of a single day, and so a confiscation order had to be limited to the same period.

I expressed considerable reservations about this decision at the time, because it had previously been my understanding that a confiscation order can be made in repect of “an offence committed over a period of at least six months and the defendant has benefited from the conduct which constitutes the offence", although this provision is not satisfied unless the defendant obtains relevant benefit of not less than £5,000. It was on this basis that the Court of Appeal had previously upheld a substantial compensation order in Basso & anor v. R. [2010] EWCA Crim 1119.

I ended by confessing my confusion at the apparent inconsistency between Basso (and other similar cases) and the decision that had been reached by the Court of Appeal in Panayi, and I suggested that this apparent discrepancy raised an issue that would have to be reviewed, either by a differently constituted Court of Appeal in a future case, or by the Supreme Court.

This finally occurred when R (Haringey LBC) v Roth [2020] EWCA Crim 967 reached the Court of Appeal in July 2020. I became aware of this case within a day or two of its being decided, but other priorities in the meantime have delayed my reporting on it. In this case, the matter was treated as one of benefit from particular criminal conduct. No reliance was sought to be placed on the criminal lifestyle provisions. The relevant provision was therefore section76 (4) of POCA, which provides that: “A person benefits from conduct if he obtains property as a result of or in connection with the conduct”, and Section 76 (7) provides that: “If a person benefits from conduct his benefit is the value of the property obtained.” As in Panayi, the offence was charged in respect of a single day (in this case, 18 May 2017), whereas the enforcement notice had required that the unlawful use should cease by 9 March 2013, and the Statement of Facts accompanying the summons stated that the defendant had been in breach of the Enforcement Notice for 53 months and had gained a financial benefit from non-compliance in the sum of approximately £508,800. In the confiscation proceedings before the Crown Court, the amount of benefit was agreed at £527,887.55, and this was the amount that the Defendant was accordingly ordered to pay.

In appealing against this order to the Court of Appeal, the Defendant sought to rely on the Court’s decision in Panayi, pointing out that the offence charged was of breaching the requirements of the Enforcement Notice on just one day, i.e. 18 May 2017. In consequence, it was argued, a confiscation order reflecting a period of criminality in excess of four years was not within the Crown Court’s powers. However, Davis LJ, in giving the decision of the Court observed that such an outcome, on so literalistic a reading of the charge, could scarcely appeal to a sense of the merits, and in any event the present case was, in the Court’s opinion, plainly distinguishable from Panayi.

In Panayi the only reference dates in the charge were the date when the Enforcement Notice was actually issued (which would not be the actual time by which compliance was required to take place) and the date of the rejection of a challenge to the refusal to issue an LDC. In the present case, however, the summons did identify the date from which the (criminal) non-compliance had started: i.e. 9 March 2013. The summons, though it was undoubtedly clumsily drafted, sufficiently identified the date when the criminal conduct started (9 March 2013).

Furthermore, the accompanying Statement of Facts, also made it clear that it was the entire period which had been identified that was the subject of the summons. The gross amount of the rent receipts for the relevant period was actually agreed for the purposes of calculating benefit, and the appellant had known the case he had to meet. So, even if there were technical deficiencies in the drafting of the summons, they were not fatal. The Court also noted that where a defendant has positively assented to the counts being treated as specimen counts, even though not specifically so charged, then there is no objection to them being so treated.

The Court also referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Hodgetts v Chiltern DC [1983] 2 AC 120 (a case not referred to in Panayi). That case decided that failure to comply with an Enforcement Notice by ceasing to use the land as required by the notice constituted a continuing offence, and not a succession of individual offences occurring on each day. It was held in that case that an information charging the offence as “on and since May 27, 1980” was validly drafted and was not bad for duplicity, although Lord Roskill (with whose speech the other members of the House agreed) had gone on to say that it might be preferable if such offences were charged as having been committed between two specified dates, starting with the date when compliance with the enforcement notice became due and ending with a date not later than the date of the summons (or the date when the enforcement notice had been complied with, if this had occurred). The Court of Appeal suggested that this guidance might usefully continue to be borne in mind by those drafting summonses under section 179 of the 1990 Act. However, although this undoubtedly represents best practice, it is clearly not a legal requirement.

The Court of Appeal also rejected the appellant’s other arguments, basing themselves both on both Del Basso [2010] EWCA Crim 1119 and Hussain [2014] EWCA Crim 2344. There was no basis or reason for departing from these authorities, and on the contrary the Court endorsed them. The Court also noted that a similar approach had been taken in Evangelou [2019] EWCA Crim 1414.

It is therefore clear that the Court of Appeal has decisively rejected the approach taken to confiscation orders by a differently constituted court in Panayi, and that (provided the period of the breach of an enforcement notice is made clear in the documentation before the Court) a confiscation order can be made by the Crown Court for the gross proceeds received by the defendant throughout the period of the unremedied breach of planning control, even if the summons itself is framed in terms only of a sample charge covering a shorter period or even a single day. It is nevertheless advisable that an LPA should frame the charge to embrace the longer period, thereby obviating any disputes of the type that arose in Roth.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

The 56-day Rule – CA upholds agreed extension of time

On 5 February this year, I summarised the judgment of Holgate J in Gluck v SSHCLG - a challenge to an appeal decision in circumstances where there had been a purported extension of time for determination of the prior approval application, which the LPA alleged had been agreed with the applicant. That decision departed from the previous ruling in R (Warren Farm (Wokingham) Limited v Wokingham BC [2019] EWHC 2007 (Admin), in which a Deputy Judge had been persuaded that Article 7 of the GPDO did not permit an extension of the 56-day period in the case of a prior approval application made under Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO.

This issue has now come before the Court of Appeal, in Gluck v SSHCLG [2020] EWCA Civ 1756, which has upheld the judgment at first instance on both the points that were in contention in this case. The importance of this Court of Appeal decision is that it puts this issue beyond doubt, and resolves any lingering doubt that there might have been over any potential incompatibility of the High Court judgment in this case with the previous judgment in Warren Farm. I don’t need to rehearse the issues again here, as the Court of Appeal has endorsed the decison at first instance on both of the points that were in contention between the parties.

The position, as now confirmed by the Court of Appeal, is that:

(1) The wording of Article 7 of the GPDO, after setting a time limit for the determination of a prior approval application, allows a prior approval application under the GPDO be determined in all cases within such longer period as may be agreed by the applicant and the authority in writing.

(2) The phrase “agreed by the applicant and the authority in writing” does not require any formal document. Agreement can be sufficiently evidenced by an exchange of emails. The only requirement is that there must be sufficient evidence in writing (which may be in electronic form) to show that one party had proposed an extension of time and that the other party had assented to that proposal. The evidence of such agreement in this case was clear beyond doubt.

Mr Gluck’s appeal against the judgment of the High Court was accordingly dismissed. Time had been duly extended in the manner provided by Article 7, and so Mr Gluck was not entitled to proceed with his development in default of the determination of his prior approval application within the 56-day period.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Matters arising – More Q&A on the UCO changes

In our webinar at the end of November, I said I would try to answer some of the points we could not cover in the time available in the Q&A session at the end of the webinar.

Unsurprisingly, there is still some confusion over the effect of the transitional provisions, although I did my best to explain these, both in the Supplement to my book and in our webinar. I have selected a few of the questions that were troubling some of our delegates.

If you have a use which now falls under Class E, will that use then benefit from all permitted development changes of uses of all previous use classes which are now contained within Class E?. [Another question put it this way: I am unclear as to the Prior approval position with respect to changes from the new Use Class E (commercial) to C3 (residential) during the period to 31.8.21.]

The answer to the first of these questions is a definite ‘No’ (at least for the time being). The transitional provisions make it clear that the development permitted by the GPDO is confined to the Use Classes as they existed prior to 1 September 2020. So any PD rights in relation to an existing use are confined to the narrower classes of use specified in the GPDO. The government has, however, consulted on a possible widening of PD rights for uses in Class E, including residential conversion of a wide range of commercial premises (partially covered at present by Classes M, N and O in Part 3 plus, formerly, Class PA). This new PD right will probably not take effect until August of next year, and its precise terms remain to be settled.

This further question was then posed: Provided there is no Article 4 restriction, would it be possible to change a B8 to B1 (less than 500sqm) under GPDO so that, once implemented, the unit would then be open Class E?

In contrast to the previous answer, the answer in this case is ‘Yes’. Once a planning unit is in use in a particular Use Class (in this case, Class E), section 55(2)(f) then allows a change of use to any other use within that same use class. However, caution suggests that the use permitted by Class I(a) in Part 3 should be more than merely nominal before the further change of use that is allowed under section 55(2)(f) takes place. The rule established by Kwik Save Discount Stores v SSW might also apply, by analogy, to a change of use under section 55(2)(f). I would suggest that the use permitted by Class I(a) should be confined to a use that remains within the scope of the former Class B1 for more than six months at the very least (and preferably for a year or more) before a further change of use within Class E is then made in reliance on section 55(2)(f).

The next question was: If a planning condition prevented change to “any other use within Class D1” how would this be applied/understood, as D1 uses are now all categorised in different places?

Conditions that limit the scope of a use authorised by a planning permission will remain in full force and effect (and not only during the ‘material period’, but indefinitely). Such conditions are unaffected by the changes to the UCO. So if a PP authorised a specified use that previously fell within Use Class D1, but contained a condition that prevented a change of use to “any other use within Class D1”, it will continue to prevent a change to any other use that formerly fell within that Use Class. So, (just to take one example) if the authorised use was covered by Class D1(a) (now E(e)), the condition quoted would still prevent its use within Class E(f) (formerly D1(b)). Similarly, if the authorised use was covered by Class D1(c) (now F.1(a), this condition would still prevent its use within Class F.1(b) (formerly D1(d)), F.1(c) (formerly D1(e)), F.1(d) (formerly D1(f)), F.1(e) (formerly D1(g)), F.1(f) (formerly D1(h)) or F.1(g) (formerly D.1(i)). The quoted condition would not, however, prevent a use within any other category in the Use Class into which the authorised use now falls which did not fall within the previous Class D1.

I referred above to the Rule in Kwik Save, and one delegate asked: “With regard to the Kwik Save “colourful implementation” point, you mentioned the relevance of that for uses using PD rights from one use class to another. Does it apply to changes within the same (and now much wider) Use Class?”

Kwik Save itself dealt solely with a change of use that was formerly permitted under Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO from a specified sui generis use to a use within Class A1, and the rule clearly applies to other PD under the GPDO. I have expressed the opinion, here and elsewhere, that the rule in Kwik Save may also apply “by analogy” to changes of use within the same Use Class under section 55(2)(f). I am not aware of any judicial authority that would expressly support this proposition, but I strongly suspect that if this were to be disputed, the courts might well take the same view as they did in Kwik Save and for the same reasons. I can’t guarantee that I am right about this; it is simply my professional view, based on instinct and experience.

The questioner went on to ask whether implementation is bound by the description of development (which begs the question, they suggest, whether developers ought to apply for permission by reference to a Use Class for an use class rather than a particular use).

It is true that the initial use of a development is strictly limited by its description in the planning permission. (See Wilson v West Sussex CC and East Suffolk CC v SSE.) But a change of use within the same Use Class can then be made under section 55(2)(f), although here too I have always taken the view that the Rule in Kwik Save may well apply to the timing of such a subsequent change of use (a point I have made in the book).

On the second point, I often used to think that it might be advisable to frame a planning application by reference to a Use Class, rather than a specific use, but in practice very few planning officers would be prepared to accept this approach, and they will usually insist on a more precise description of the proposed development. In any event, permissions are frequently conditioned to limit changes of use in one way or another. The government has indicated that such conditions ought not to be imposed on new Class E uses, but I bet many LPAs simply won’t be able to resist the temptation to do so. In that event, a plethora of section 73 applications can be expected, followed by appeals if these are refused. LPAs may well find themselves at risk of an award of costs against them in such cases.

I will deal with some further questions in a future post.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

UCO and GPDO – Some joined-up thinking

It was obvious to many of us that the changes to the Use Classes Order that came into effect on 1 September were only part of a more comprehensive suite of changes that would necessarily embrace the GPDO as well, in order to maintain consistency in the overall scheme of delegated legislation. Left to their own devices, MHCLG would no doubt have co-ordinated the changes to the UCO with relevant changes to the GPDO in a single set of amending regulations, which would probably have emerged in the course of 2021. It seems, however, that the Ministry came under insistent pressure from 10 Downing Street (lately under the management of D.Cunning-Plans, Esq.) to get something out immediately, in order to demonstrate the government’s dynamic determination [sic] to shake up the planning system. The immediate result, in the form of the recent changes to the UCO, bore all the hallmarks of a rushed job, and I have pointed out both in this blog and, in more detail, in the Supplement to The Essential Guide to the Use of Land and Buildings under the Planning Acts some of the resulting anomalies and potential problems which the UCO changes have created.

The unfortunate decoupling of the UCO changes from co-ordinated amendments to the GPDO necessitated the rather clunky transitional provisions in the recent UCO amendment regulations, which preserve the old Use Classes for the purposes of permitted development under the GPDO until the end of next July, by which time the MHCLG no doubt hopes to be able to amend that Order, so that the UCO and the GPDO are once more brought into alignment.

Sooner, perhaps, than some may have expected, MHCLG has now published a consultation document outlining their initial proposals for changes to the GPDO. The consultation period has been nicely timed to start in the run-up to Christmas and to straddle the Christmas and New Year break, with a deadline for responses on 28 January. That ought to cut down somewhat on the stroppy reaction that can be expected from various planning professionals, and especially from planning officers in LPAs, whose dismay at the UCO changes will now be intensified by further blows in the GPDO to their fading hopes of preserving the vitality and viability of their town centres.

The scope of the proposed changes will occasion no great surprise, as they were perhaps predictable from the general thrust of the recent UCO amendments, particularly the creation of the very wide Commercial, Business and Service use class (Class E). It is now therefore proposed that the PD right for the residential conversion of certain commercial premises (originally from offices within Use Class B1(a) – under Class O, and then also from A1 shops, A2 financial and professional services, A5 hot food take-aways, Betting Offices, Pay day loan shops, and Launderettes – all under Class M, as well as from an Amusement Arcade or Casino – under Class N) should be expanded to enable the residential conversion of any Commercial, Business and Service premises now in Class E. [The consultation paper does not mention the existing and new sui generis uses that currently benefit from this PD right under Classes M and N, but these will presumably still be included in the new expanded PD right for residential conversions.]

It is not proposed that there should be any size limit on the buildings that can benefit from this PD right, which would allow for either the whole building or part of the building to be converted to residential use but, in order to qualify for this PD right, the premises must have been in use within Use Class E on 1 September 2020. As the consultation document points out, Use Class E applies everywhere in all cases, not just on the high street or in town centres. However, the disqualifications that currently apply would continue to apply in National Parks and AONBs, and World Heritage Sites, as well as to buildings in SSSIs, or which are listed buildings or within their curtilage, sites that are (or contain) scheduled monuments, or are in safety hazard areas or military explosives storage areas, as well as sites subject to an agricultural tenancy. On the other hand, this PD right would not be excluded (as it has been up to now) in conservation areas, although there would be a requirement in a conservation area for prior approval of the impact of the loss of the ground floor use to residential.

There would in any event be a widened range of matters requiring prior approval. In addition to flooding, transport impacts and contamination, these matters would include the impacts of noise from existing commercial premises on the intended occupiers of the development, the provision of adequate natural light in all habitable rooms, fire safety (to ensure consideration and plans to mitigate risk to residents from fire) and the impact on the intended occupiers from the introduction of residential use in an area the LPA considers is important for heavy industry and waste management. [The general prohibition on developments that do not comply with nationally prescribed space standards will also apply to the new PD right in any event.]

I don’t propose to comment on the merits or demerits of the proposals outlined above, but readers will recognise the potentially wide implications and possible impact of these changes in policy terms. If you feel strongly about this, then I recommend that you send in a robustly worded response to this consultation. You can draft it over the quiet Christmas holiday that we’re all going to have, instead of playing Monopoly or Cluedo (which Chris Whitty says you shouldn’t be doing anyway!).

So far as Part 3 of the Second Schedule is concerned, the consultation paper addresses only the residential conversion of Commercial, Business and Service premises now in Class E (previously covered, in part, by Classes M, N and O). However, it occurs to me that this change would also have the effect of reviving the lapsed Class PA, which allowed the residential conversion of light industrial premises. There will have to be other consequential changes to the GPDO to bring various PD rights into line with the new and revised Use Classes, but presumably those other changes would not involve the significant widening of those PD rights.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Keystone Law - Law Firm of the Year

Although this blog is entirely independent and free-standing, I am nevertheless proud of my association with Keystone Law, which has proved to be one of the most dynamic law firms in the country.

So I was very pleased when Keystone Law was recently named as “Law Firm of the Year” at The Lawyer Awards 2020.

It is the first time in the award’s 26-year history that the top prize has been handed to an innovative law firm of this type, having previously been won by some of the UK’s biggest firms including Clifford Chance, Pinsent Masons and Mishcon de Reya.

Keystone Law was highlighted as this year’s big winner for being a pioneer in the legal sector, which since its launch in 2002 has been on an upward growth trajectory, attracting heavyweight lawyers from traditional law firms, all the while providing complete autonomy and freedom. The judges commented that during the coronavirus pandemic “Keystone’s model has been vindicated in spades” and thanks to its innovative use of technology and modern working practices “the firm is lightyears ahead” in enabling lawyers to work remotely and provide high-quality service to clients.

The firm was also praised for its achievements over the last 12 months, which included launching operations in the Middle East, continuing its strong recruitment of high calibre lawyers from top UK law firms and achieving solid financial results, growing its revenue to £49.6 million in 2019.

The accolade follows a rigorous judging process, which included analysing The Lawyer’s proprietary data and market insight alongside input from a judging panel of industry experts.

James Knight, our CEO and founder said:

“It is a huge honour to win this coveted award. When we founded the firm, we knew we wanted to do things differently and completely rethink the law firm model. Thanks to the hard work and dedication of the team at Keystone we were able to achieve that aim and we continue to push the boundaries to provide a first-rate alternative to traditional firms. To win this award within less than 20 years of the firm’s inception is an outstanding achievement and I would like to thank everyone who has supported our journey from start-up to tech-enabled Top 100 law firm, particularly our clients and the excellent lawyers who took the jump into new law.”

The Lawyer Awards are a much sought-after accolade, singling out the leading legal teams and transactions across the legal profession and are widely recognised as the legal industry’s leading awards.

So, onwards and upwards.

MARTIN H GOODALL.

USE OF LAND book – Publication imminent

The Revised Edition of The Essential Guide to the Use of Land and Buildings under the Planning Acts and Supplement is about to go to press.

The Revised Edition (with Supplement) not only flags up the old and new Use Classes in the original text, but also brings various other legislative references up to date, and contains new material and re-cast or re-written text.

As I wrote the other day, I would strongly recommend readers to order the Revised Edition of the book, with the Supplement bound in, because the Revised Edition provides a much more useful basic text than the original edition would now do, in relating the new Use Classes to the previous Use Classes. The Supplement describes and discusses the new Use Classes (and contains numerous cross-references to the main text of the book).

The difference in price between the stand-alone Supplement and the Revised Edition of the book (including the Supplement) is only £35. So if you have already ordered the Supplement alone (for £15), or the Supplement plus webinar booking (for £40), but you now wish to upgrade your order to include the Revised Edition of the book (with bound-in Supplement), in place of the Supplement alone, you can do so by paying only £35 more. But you will need to do so almoast immediately, before orders are dispatched. Bath Publishing have kindly agreed to process any revised orders, on receipt of the extra £35. So if you wish to upgrade an existing order, you should send an email to info@bathpublishing.co.uk and they'll take it from there.

However, if you have not yet placed an order at all, the best route is go is through the Bath Publishing website (using the link on the left-hand side of this page). There is still time to place an order for either the Revised Edition (with Supplement bound in) or the Supplement alone, and to book for the webinar, if you have not yet done so.

Purchasers of the digital edition of the book (or supplement) should receive this by 26 November, and the printed edition should also become available soon afterwards. So you shouldn’t have to wait too long now for your order to arrive.

© MARTIN H GOODALL