Localism Bill First Reading

After all the huffing and puffing of the last few weeks (and no-one can huff and puff like the Secretary of State), the “Decentralisation and Localism Bill” finally got its formal First Reading in the House of Commons at 6.00 p.m. today (Monday 13 December).

When asked by the Deputy Speaker what date is fixed for the Second Reading debate, I thought I heard the Secretary of State say “Tomorrow”, which considerably surprised me, particularly since the order of business for tomorrow (Tuesday 14 December) makes no mention of the Bill, and the House seems to have a full programme for the day already.

The opposition have asked, understandably, that all stages of what is undoubtedly an extremely important Bill should be taken on the floor of the House, but (again if I understood correctly what the Secretary of State said earlier in the afternoon) the government intends to send the Bill ‘upstairs’ i.e. to a Standing Committee, when it reaches the Committee Stage.

At the time of writing I have still not managed to clap eyes on the text of the Bill, but I am still hunting for it on various websites. It must be out there somewhere!

[14 Dec: I must be getting rusty on my parliamentary procedure. I did not mis-hear what Uncle Eric said. Hansard records: "Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow, and to be printed (Bill 126) with explanatory notes (Bill 126-EN)", yet there is no mention in today's Commons Order Paper (14 Dec) of a second reading debate on this Bill. So is there some sort of fast-track procedure which dispenses with a Second Reading debate? When it comes to the point, I would not expect a second reading debate to be particularly enlightening - it just gives the politicians on both sides of the House the opportunity to exchange jibes about the need for the Bill, the purpose which it is intended to serve (more waffle from Uncle Eric) and so on. I propose to concentrate on the contents of the Bill when I have a chance to examine them in detail.]

[15 Dec: Notwithstanding Tuesday's announcement that the Second Reading of the Bill would be "tomorrow" (i.e. 14 December), the timetable for the Bill on the House of Commons website makes it clear that no date has yet been fixed for the Second Reading debate. As I previously expected, this means that in practice it is unlikely to be until some time after the Christmas/New Year recess.]

[17 Dec: The Leader of the House announced in Business Questions yesterday that the Second Reading debate on the Localism Bill will be held on Monday 17th January.]



© MARTIN H GOODALL

Another case on reasons

Some topics keep on coming up in the Courts. One of these is the requirement for a local planning authority to give a summary of its reasons for granting planning permission. I have commented on several previous cases which deal with this issue.

The most recent is the Court of Appeal decision in R (Siraj) v Kirklees Metropolitan Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1286. This was a case involving a site in the Green Belt. The appellant seeking to quash a grant of planning permissions by the Council is a local resident, who, together with other local residents, objected to the proposed development. The planning officer's report had recommended that planning permission should be granted, explaining that the application had been referred to the relevant subcommittee by officers "due to the sensitive nature of the proposal in the Green Belt". The officers’ report stated (among other things) that "It is appreciated that this application is a departure from green belt policy but hope that weight is given to the efforts the business has made to find more suitable land / premises and the need for this business to be retained in this area for the reasons outlined." The officers conceded that “The proposal is without question inappropriate development in the Green Belt. UDP policy D8 states that such development will not be granted in the Green Belt unless very special circumstances can be demonstrated by the applicant. This is reflected in PPG 2 which states that very special circumstances to justify inappropriate development will not exist unless the harm by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, is clearly outweighed by other considerations.”

The officers’ recommendation was accepted and the sub-committee granted planning permission. The decision notice said that: "The applicant has demonstrated the specialist nature of his operation, the operational requirements of customers, the difficulties of remaining in his present location and the lack of other suitable alternative sites all of which are considered to comprise very special circumstances to justify this inappropriate development in the Green Belt. Further the design and materials would not be harmful to the character of the area nor would the use be harmful to road safety."

One limb of the legal challenge related to ‘very special reasons’ justifying a grant of planning permission for inappropriate development (as defined by PPG2) in the Green Belt. However, the challenge on this ground failed.

The other limb of the challenge related to the adequacy of the summary reasons given for granting planning permission. However the Court of Appeal was careful to distinguish between the reasons which the Secretary of State must explain in determining a called-in application or a planning appeal compared with the summary reasons for the grant of planning permission required by Art 22 of the GDPO (now Art. 31 of the DMPO).

In the view of the Court, against the background of the officer's report, it was not in the least surprising that the summary reasons for granting planning permission did not repeat the appropriate test (which had been fully and correctly set out in the officers’ report) or refer to PPG 2 but simply referred to the fact that, in the members' view, the applicant for planning permission had demonstrated the existence of four factors which comprised "very special circumstances to justify the inappropriate development in the Green Belt". Had the summary reasons merely stated that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of the four factors, there might have been some support for the appellants’ contention that the members had merely considered whether those factors had been established and had not gone on to consider whether they were very special circumstances which clearly outweighed the harm done by reason of inappropriate development in the Green Belt or that, if they did go on to consider that question, it was not sufficiently clear from the summary reasons that they had done so. But the summary reasons did not stop there. They made it clear that the members considered that those four factors comprised "very special circumstances to justify this inappropriate development in the Green Belt".

There was no force in the appellant's submission that the summary reasons did not explain why the four factors amounting to very special circumstances outweighed the objection to inappropriate development in the Green Belt. This was a summary. In that summary the respondent was not required to give reasons for reasons. Indeed it was difficult to see what more could sensibly have been said. Provided the four factors were capable of amounting to very special circumstances clearly outweighing the harm caused by inappropriate development in the Green Belt, the question for the members was: did they or did they not clearly outweigh that harm? The conclusion that they did sufficiently explained, particularly in summary form, why planning permission was granted. Further analysis in the summary reasons was not required.

It is perhaps surprising that the cases on which I commented in previous posts some time ago were not referred to in the judgment. However, this judgment affirms the general approach of the courts which is not unduly demanding as to the summary of reasons required to comply with what is now Art. 31 of the DMPO.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Proceeds of crime again

I drew attention some time ago to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Basso & anor v. R. [2010] EWCA Crim 1119 confirming the power of the Crown Court to make confiscation orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2004 in planning enforcement cases. (See "Another weapon in the enforcement armoury" posted on 1 June 2010.)

At the time, I was not aware of another case in which a local planning authority had successfully applied for a confiscation order earlier in the year. In this case, Hounslow LBC used the powers available under POCA to recover money earned by Kuldeep Singh Deol from the illegal conversion of two residential properties into flats.

Mr Deol had without planning permission converted a single dwelling into four self contained flats, and the dwelling next-door into three self contained flats. In addition, he had built an unauthorised rear extension at one of the properties and an unauthorised front extension at the other. Planning permission to continue using the two properties as seven flats was refused by the council in February 2005. Following this, four separate enforcement notices were served in relation to these changes of use and the unauthorised operational development. The notices required the cessation of the use of the properties as separate flats and the removal of the unauthorised extensions. Mr Deol eventually pleaded guilty to failure to comply with the enforcement notices at Kingston Magistrates Court on 10 November 2008.

The case was presumably sent up to the Crown Court for sentence. (Magistrates Courts do not have the power to make a confiscation order under POCA.) On 21 January 2010 the case came before HH Judge Barnes at Kingston Crown Court, when the Council sought a confiscation order in respect of the proceeds of the crime. (See my previous post on 1 June 2010 for details of the applicable rules.) The judge found that Mr Deol had financially benefitted from his offences in the sum of £186,680 and a confiscation order was made for that amount. Mr Deol was fined £750 for the offences and was also ordered to pay £2,000 towards the council’s costs. It is understood that Mr Deol has now complied with the enforcement notices.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Agricultural permitted development

One of the traps for unwary planning officers is the time limit within which a local planning authority must respond to prior notification of development which is PD but over which the LPA has a potential measure of control under the GPDO. The best known cases of failure to respond in time are those which relate to telecommunications development, but a similar elephant trap awaits planning officers in relation to agricultural PD under Part 6. A recent case which illustrates the problem is the Court of Appeal decision in Murrell v. SSCLG [2010] EWCA Civ 1367 in which judgment was given on 3 December.

The appellants proposed to erect a cattle shelter on their farm, which was permitted development within Class A of Part 6. As required by the GPDO, the appellants applied to the LPA for a determination as to whether the prior approval of the authority would be required to the siting, design and external appearance of the building. The council determined that prior approval was needed and in the same decision it refused approval. An appeal against that refusal was dismissed and an application to the High Court under s.288 also failed. The matter then came before the Court of Appeal.

The main issue was whether the council's determination was made more than 28 days from the date of receipt of a valid application (the period specified in the GPDO), with the consequence that deemed permission for the development became automatic on the expiry of the 28 day period, so that the subsequent refusal of prior approval was of no legal effect.

The notice to the Council applying for a determination as to whether prior approval would be required in respect of the erection of the cattle shelter was dated 28 November 2008. The application form was date-stamped as received by the council on 1 December 2008. Receipt of the fee was noted in manuscript on the top of the form, but on the same day the council wrote to the appellants, stating that the application was invalid because it was on a superseded form and did not contain the necessary number of copies of the drawings. The letter did nevertheless assign an application number to the application.

In response to the Council’s letter, the appellants completed an application in the new form together with the requested elevations and plans and the requested number of copies. The new form was dated 4 December 2008 and was date-stamped as received by the council on 9 December. The form was endorsed on receipt by the council with the application number given in the letter of 1 December. It was also endorsed with a manuscript note referring to the payment of the fee of £70 on 1 December. The council acknowledged receipt of the new form by letter dated 9 December 2008. The letter gave the application number assigned on 1 December and stated that the application was validated on 09/12/2008, and that every effort would be made to reach a decision within the statutory 28-day period which (the letter said) would expire on 5 January 2009.

The statutory period (in accordance with paragraph A2(2)(cc) of Part 6) ends on "the expiry of 28 days following the date on which the application was received". If a valid application was made on 1 December 2008, the period expired on 29 December. The appellants heard nothing further until they received a written determination dated 31 December 2008, by which the council decided that prior approval was required and that such approval was refused, on the ground that the proposed development did not comply with a number of planning policies referred to in the determination. One of the points noted in the course of the determination was that no detailed landscaping scheme had been provided.

The appellants appealed against the council's decision on the grounds that (1) the council had not made a determination as to the need for prior approval within the statutory 28-day period and permission for the development was therefore granted within the terms of the GPDO; (2) the appellants had been given no opportunity to submit further details, in particular about landscaping, because the council had combined the decision that prior approval was needed with the decision refusing it [a point which was not subsequently pursued in the courts]; and (3) the proposed development was consistent with the relevant policies and approval should be granted.

On appeal, the Inspector accepted that use of the new standard form was not required for prior approval applications but considered that "the Council needed sufficient details to judge the design, siting and appearance of the proposed building" and had acted reasonably in requesting the additional information referred to in the letter of 1 December. She was not persuaded that it was impermissible for the council to combine in one decision its determination that prior approval was required and its refusal of approval. She observed that there had been nothing to prevent landscaping details being submitted at any time before the council made its decision. The Inspector also dismissed the appeal on the substantive ground that the development was visually unacceptable in the proposed location.

The subsequent application to the High Court failed on the substantive ground, because the judge at first instance felt that the Inspector had adequately dealt with the planning merits. He dismissed the procedural challenge (relating to the 28-day period) on the basis that it was ‘technical’.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellants' case on the procedural issue was perfectly straightforward, namely that the application received by the council on 1 December 2008 met the requirements in paragraph A2(2)(ii) and was a valid application. The council had not been entitled to require the completion of the new standard form or the submission of further material before treating the application as valid; the 28 day period specified in paragraph A2(2)(iii)(cc) therefore expired on 29 December; and the permission granted by the GPDO accrued or crystallised on the expiry of that period without a determination having been made or notified.

The Court of Appeal accepted this submission. The original application received on 1 December complied with the statutory requirements and was a valid application. The statutory 28-day period for consideration of the need for prior approval ran from that date. The mistakes made by the council in the handling of the application, and the fact that the appellants submitted a new form and further plans in accordance with the council's request, did not stop the clock running or otherwise affect the position. On the expiry of the statutory period, on 28 December, permission for the development accrued under the GPDO. The council's determination of 31 December came too late to have any legal effect.

This is a point that LPAs would do well to take on board. The prior approval procedure for Class A permitted development, as set out in paragraph A2(2) and explained in Annex E to PPG7 requires the minimum of formalities and should be simple to operate. The application for determination as to whether prior approval is required does not need to be in any particular form and does not need to be accompanied by anything more than a written description of the proposed development and of the materials to be used and a plan indicating the site, together with the required fee (see paragraph A2(2)(i) and (ii)). In practice the Court felt it would be advisable to use an up-to-date standard form and to provide the information referred to in the standard form, because that will facilitate the council's consideration of whether prior approval is needed and, if so, whether it should be given, and will minimise the need for the provision of further information at a later stage. It is not, however, mandatory to use the standard form or to provide any information beyond that specified in paragraph A2(2)(ii).

When an application is submitted, it engages a two-stage process, the nature of which is set out clearly in Annex E (see, in particular, paragraphs E12-E20). The first stage involves consideration of whether prior approval is required. If the council determines that it is not required, it should notify the applicant accordingly. If it determines that prior approval is required and notifies the applicant of the decision, it moves into the second stage, in which it has 8 weeks or such longer period as may be agreed in writing to decide whether to give approval (see article 21 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, which applied to applications for approval other than those under Part 24 of Schedule 2 to the GPDO; now replaced by article 30 of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2010). The existence of a discrete second stage is underlined by the requirement in paragraph A2(2)(iv) as to the display of a site notice where the local planning authority has given notice that prior approval is required.

The council can request further details at any time, though Annex E appears to contemplate that they will generally be called for only at the second stage, after it has been determined that prior approval is required. The appellants' original application received on 1 December clearly complied with the requirements of the GPDO and was a valid application. Each of the points made in the council's letter of 1 December was a bad one. The GPDO does not require an application to be accompanied by proposed elevations or a block plan. It does require a location plan, although a location plan was in fact provided with the application. It does not require multiple copies of any documents. Since use of the new standard application form is not mandatory, the council was mistaken in stating that these were the only forms they could accept and in requesting the appellants to complete and return, in quadruplicate, the new standard form. Accordingly, the council's assertion that the application was invalid was wrong in law.

Since the application was valid, the 28 day period referred to in paragraph A2(2)(iii)(cc) began to run on 1 December, despite the council's assertion to the contrary. The Secretary of State sought to rely on the absence of any challenge at the time to the council's "decision" that the application was invalid. The GPDO, however, does not make the running of time dependent on a decision by the local planning authority to accept an application as valid. Whether there was a valid application or not is an objective question of law.

Nor was the running of time affected by the fact that the appellants complied with the council's request to submit the new forms and further information. The submission of that material did not constitute a fresh application superseding or amounting to an implied withdrawal of the original application. The new form was given the same application number as that assigned on 1 December to the original application. No further fee was paid; the new form was endorsed with a reference to the fee received with the original application. Nothing was said by the appellants to suggest that they were withdrawing the original application or that the new form superseded it. They simply sent to the council the further material requested. It was the decision of the council alone to treat the receipt of that further material on 9 December as the point at which a valid application was made and time began to run.

The judge at first instance had said that the council was entitled to ask for the additional material it requested in the letter of 1 December and that this had the effect of stopping the clock. The Court of Appeal agreed that the council was entitled to ask for further information. It was not, however, entitled to refuse to treat the application as a valid application until that further information was received. The clock carried on ticking from 1 December until the expiry of the statutory period on 29 December.

The appeal decision was quashed, and on redetermination it must clearly be allowed on the procedural ground. The appeal on the actual planning issue clearly does not fall to be determined. In point of fact, it seems to me that the appellants might have saved themselves the time and trouble of taking this case to appeal and then on to the High Court and Court of Appeal by simply proceeding with the development after the expiry of the 28-day period. This would admittedly have been a high risk strategy in the circumstances but, armed with this Court of Appeal judgment, that is precisely what a farmer faced with this situation in the future might best be advised to do.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Overriding an enforcement notice

There are two ramifications of the law on enforcement notices which seem to be imperfectly understood by planning officers. The first is the effect of under-enforcement, which is governed by Section 173(11), and on which I have commented on at least two previous occasions in this blog. The second is the operation of Section 180, which provides that where, after the service of an enforcement notice planning permission is granted for any development carried out before the grant of that permission, the notice shall cease to have effect so far as is inconsistent with that permission.

It seems that Wandsworth LBC failed to understand the effect of this provision when they decided to use their powers under Section 178 to take action in default of the owners of a property not complying with an enforcement notice. The resulting dispute came before the High Court in Rapose v. Wandsworth LBC [2010] EWHC 3126 (Admin) in which judgment was given by Lindblom J on 3 December.

The enforcement notice had alleged the erection of a three-storey side extension and required the removal of the extension and all materials from the property and the restoration of the property to its condition before the breach took place. Having lost an appeal against the notice and having also failed to have the appeal decision quashed in High Court proceedings, Mr. Rapose then applied for planning permission for the redevelopment of the site to provide a three-storey building on an enlarged site comprising a restaurant and six residential units.

Planning permission was granted, but it seems that the Council’s decision to permit the unauthorised extension at the rear of the property was made (or intended to be made) on the basis that it was to be incorporated as part of a comprehensive redevelopment of the larger site, so that the reasons for the enforcement action to secure its removal were largely overcome. The enforcement notice was subsequently put on hold because this planning consent (if actioned) would have permitted the extension to remain as part of the comprehensive development of the larger site. However, the Council now claimed that the planning consent could no longer be actioned because of the compulsory acquisition of the other part of the site by the Council and so the extension must now be taken down.

The Council therefore resolved to use its powers under s.178 to secure the removal of the three-storey extension, apparently on the ground that the planning permission had not been implemented and that following the compulsory purchase of the remainder of the property it was no longer capable of being implemented. The Council’s position was that the application made by Mr Rapose, and the permission granted in June 2003, was significantly different from a scheme which might have been submitted to retain the unauthorised extension by itself. The June 2003 Permission only granted permission as an opportunity to regularise the position as part of a single comprehensive development of a larger site. The June 2003 Permission (they claimed) did not permit the freestanding retention or construction of the unauthorised extension at the property but only permitted development as part of a comprehensive scheme across a combination of three sites, which could no longer take place.

Lindblom J considered the case of Havering LBC v. SSE [1983] J.P.L. 240 in which Hodgson J. had held that a planning permission would be effective to override an enforcement notice, even though it did not go precisely to the matters covered by the enforcement notice and even though it contained conditions, as long as it covered the same area of land and the use permitted by the permission embraced the use enforced against. In that case, which concerned enforcement action against a material change of use and a planning permission which had been granted for effectively the same use, it had been submitted that what is now s.180 of the 1990 Act only applied where the planning permission was to do precisely that which was enforced against, and if the permission had conditions attached to it the section did not apply, at least to the extent that the conditions affected the use. Hodgson J. rejected that proposition and also held that the section plainly deals with the "granting", not the so-called "implementation", of planning permission, and so it is not possible to read it as meaning that the enforcement notice shall only cease to have effect when all the conditions in the permission have been complied with. In Cresswell and Cresswell v. Pearson (1998) 75 P. & C.R. the Divisional Court, endorsing the construction adopted by Hodgson J. in the Havering case, rejected the argument that an enforcement notice would merely be put into suspense while a temporary planning permission subsisted.

On the other hand, the effect of section 180 is not that the enforcement notice ceases to have effect altogether, but only that it ceases to have effect to the extent that its requirements are inconsistent with the subsequent grant of planning permission (see R. v. Chichester Justices, ex p. Chichester District Council (1990) 60 P. & C.R. 342).

In Lindblom J’s judgment, the main question to be considered here was not, as the Council appeared originally to contend, whether the 2003 planning permission did or did not permit the unauthorised extension to be retained on its own, but whether there were elements of development common to both the permission and the enforcement notice. As counsel for the developer submitted, if there is fabric which forms part of the development which the planning permission approved, the enforcement notice cannot thereafter be relied upon to attack that much of the development. Conversely, however, the enforcement notice continues to be effective against so much of the fabric as is not approved by the planning permission.

The Council's resolution under challenge in these proceedings authorised direct action against the whole of the extension. It seems that, when it passed that resolution, the committee did not appreciate what the consequences of the operation of section 180 of the 1990 Act would be for its enforcement notice, given the grant of the 2003 permission. It was advised that the development in that permission had not been commenced (which was in fact irrelevant). This may have distracted the committee from examining the extent to which the originally unauthorised extension had been granted planning permission as part of the development approved by the 2003 planning permission. This failure in itself was sufficient to vitiate the Council's decision to proceed with action under sections 178 and 179 of the 1990 Act. The question of whether the enforcement notice was inconsistent with the planning permission, and the precise extent to which it was, were matters of fact and degree for the Council as local planning authority to determine, subject to review by the Court on normal public law principles, but there was enough in the material before the Court to demonstrate that such an exercise was not undertaken in this case. The Council's decision therefore had to be quashed.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Flexible Help for Lawyers

As I have mentioned before, this blog was never intended to be a vehicle for advertising or marketing my professional services, but...........

It occurred to me recently that whilst I have explained my role as a consultant in Keystone Law (see “My Day Job” on the top bar) and have included a link to the firm’s website on the sidebar, I have not previously mentioned CONSULTANT LAWYERS DIRECT (CLD), with whom I am also a consultant.

CLD is a practice which offers its services exclusively to other law firms and to in-house legal teams. I am one of over 80 solicitors within CLD covering a very wide range of commercial legal practice.

CLD helps firms to plug gaps in their expertise (whether these are of a purely temporary nature or are simply areas of the law in which the firm does not normally practise) so that the client firm can improve profit and reduce risk by offering a full service.

CLD client firms have complete discretion as to how to present a CLD solicitor. For instance I could be presented as a regular member of that firm, an independent consultant or could simply work behind the scenes. All CLD solicitors have their own fully operational offices but, if preferred, they are available to work directly alongside the client firm’s team from that firm’s offices.

CLD does not look for any long-term contract or commitment. Instructions are accepted on a case-by-case basis. The intention is to provide flexible support for law firms (and equally for in-house legal teams) as and when required. This enables law firms to provide a service to their clients in fields in which that firm does not usually practise, so as to offer an extended professional service without disturbing existing client relationships.

I have now added a link on the sidebar to CLD’s website in addition to the Keystone Law website.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Where is the Localism Bill?

Today (9 December) was the day the much-trumpeted “Decentralisation and Localism Bill” was finally expected to emerge from the bowels of the DCLG, but after several previously promised dates had passed by with no Bill, it seems that today will be yet another occasion when the Bill fails to make its promised appearance. Those clowns in DCLG, headed by Chief Clown, Eric Pickles (who you must admit looks the part), just don’t seem to be able to get their act (or should that be Act?) together, and are becoming the laughing stock of Whitehall.

When pressed about the failure of the Bill to appear on any of the successive promised dates, DCLG won’t admit that they had ever fixed a date, despite the fact that the previously expected dates for the Bill’s appearance had emanated from within the Department, and publication of the Bill before now was in the Department’s ‘Business Plan’.

The precise reasons for the Bill’s continued failure to put in an appearance has been the subject of much speculation and rumour. It has been suggested that there are some inter-departmental ‘issues’ within Whitehall over the Bill’s contents, with accusations of lack of consultation and secretiveness on the part of DCLG.

I would expect a Bill as important as this one to be introduced in the Commons but, as you will have seen from one of my earlier posts, there may be difficulty in fitting it into the government’s legislative timetable, which may result in its being introduced in the Lords. As I observed in that earlier post, starting such a controversial bill in the Lords would be tendentious, to put it mildly.

Whichever route the Bill takes on its parliamentary passage, it is going to be January at the earliest before a Second Reading debate can be arranged in either House (whichever is chosen). Someone from DCLG was glibly predicting a few months ago that the Bill would attain Royal Assent by Easter. I observed at the time that they were living in Cloud-Cuckoo-Land if they thought that this was even remotely possible. It was always going to take until nearly the end of 2011 before the Bill was finally passed, and with the continuing delay in its appearance, it looks as though even that might be over-optimistic, and that it could now be 2012 before it finally emerges as an Act.

What’s the betting that Uncle Eric won’t be the Secretary of State after Cameron’s first cabinet reshuffle? That is likely to be in the summer recess next year, unless the coalition falls apart in the interim (unlikely in my view – I think the Lib Dems have decided to hang together rather than be hanged singly). If I were the Prime Minister I would clear out the whole of the DCLG’s ministerial team and start again, even with the Bill still going through parliament.

[UPDATE: The First Reading of the "Decentralisation and Localism Bill" is now listed for next Monday's parliamentary business in the Commons (i.e. Monday 13 December). This is a purely formal step, involving no debate, not even a ministerial statement, although we can no doubt expect some political blather in a press release from DCLG timed to coincide with the formal introduction of the Bill. In the Commons on Monday, the Clerk will simply read the name of the Bill and it will be ordered to be printed. I can't remember off-hand whether the date of the Second Reading debate will be announced at this stage. The text of the Bill may not be published for a few more days, but it should appear later in the week.]

© MARTIN H GOODALL