GPDO tidied up

We have known throughout the past year that the GPDO was going to have to be amended to bring it into line with the changes to the UCO that took effect last September. Transitional provisions saved references in the GPDO to the pre-September Use Classes for the purposes of permitted development. However, these transitional provisions expire at the end of this month, and so it was essential for the government to make appropriate amendments to the GPDO to bring it into line to the revised version of the UCO. This has now been done in the form of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development etc.) (England) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2021 [SI 2021 No.814], which was made on 7 July, laid before parliament on the 9th and will come into force on 1 August.

The new order makes amendments to the provisions of Parts 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 20 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO but, for the moment, I shall confine myself to the changes made to Part 3, dealing with permitted changes of use.

Class A, in its original form permitted a change of use from A3, A4 or A5 to A1 or A2. The right to make this change of use from A4 was later removed. As now amended, Class A will in future permit a change of use from a casino, betting office, pay day loan shop or hot food takeaway to a use falling within Class E (commercial, business and service use), but will still not permit a change of use from a public house, wine bar or drinking establishment. [Change of use from a café or restaurant to some other commercial, business and service use no longer needs its own PD right, because it is no longer development at all.] The PD right under Class A is subject to the condition that, before beginning the development, the developer must notify the LPA in writing of the date on which the use of the building will change. No prior approval application is required.

Class AA, as now re-drafted, will permit a change of use from public house, wine bar or drinking establishment to the same use with expanded food provision and it will also permit the converse change.

Classes B, C, D, E and F are now formally removed from Part 3 (as they have now been rendered redundant).

Class G is amended to reflect last year’s changes to the UCO. It will now permit change of use from a use within Class E to a mixed use for any purpose within that Class and as up to two flats. This Class will also permit a change of use from a betting office or pay day loan shop to a mixed use for any purpose within Class E and as up to two flats.

There is now an added requirement in Class G, before beginning development, to apply for prior approval as to:
- contamination risks in relation to the building,
- flooding risks in relation to the building,
- impacts of noise from commercial premises on the intended occupiers of the development,
- the provision of adequate natural light in all habitable rooms of the dwellinghouses, and
- arrangements required for the storage and management of domestic waste.

Class H is similarly amended to reflect the change to the UCO. It will now permit a change of use from a mixed use for any purpose within Class E and as up to two flats, to a use for any purpose within that Class, and also a change of use from a mixed use comprising a betting office or pay day loan shop and as up to two flats to use for any purpose within Class E. The exclusion in paragraph H.1 is also re-worded to bring it into line with the revised wording of the UCO.

Class I formerly permitted changes of use from B2 or B8 to B1, or from B1 or B2 to B8 (subject to certain floorspace limits). As re-redrafted, it will be limited to the change of use of a building from any use falling within Class B2 to a use within Class B8, subject to a 500 sq m floorspace limit.

Classes J, JA and K are now removed from Part 3.

Class L, which permits a change of use from C3 to C4 and vice versa, remains unchanged.

Class M has been largely replaced by Class MA, but has been retained to deal with certain residential conversions that are not covered by Class MA. As revised, Class M will now permit the residential conversion of a launderette, betting office, pay day loan shop or hot food takeaway, and also the residential conversion of a building in a mixed use combining use as a dwellinghouse with use as a launderette, betting office or pay day loan shop (whether that use was granted permission under Class G or otherwise). Class M(a) permits only a change of use, but Class M(b) permits both the change of use itself and also building operations reasonably necessary to convert the building for residential use. This reflects the current position.

The matters requiring prior approval under Class M previously included the ‘retail impact’ of the proposed residential conversion of the building. No corresponding provision was included in the new Class MA. Thus, (as previously note in relation to Class MA), any general retail impact is no longer a matter with which the LPA can concern itself. Even the impact on the sustainability of a key shopping area is no longer relevant. With one exception, the issue of retail impact has now been similarly removed from Class M, so that it now applies only to the impact on the adequate provision of services of the sort that may be provided by a launderette (but only where there is a reasonable prospect of the building being used to provide such services).

The new Class MA, has been amended even before it had come into force. This change comprises the introduction of a requirement for fire risk assessment to be taken into account in some circumstances. In any such cases, the LPA must approve the fire safety impacts on the intended occupants of the building. (This provision is really too complicated to explain in detail here.) Where the application relates to prior approval as to fire safety impacts, on receipt of the application, the local planning authority must consult the Health and Safety Executive.

Also in Class MA, approval of highways impacts of the development must include particularly the need to ensure safe site access.

Class N is unaffected by the changes to Class 3, rare though residential conversions under this Class may be in practice.

Class O will be replaced with effect from 1 August by Class MA, but the previous amendment regulations provided that any prior approval application under Class O can be made up to 31 July 2021, and Class O will continue to operate after that date where a prior approval application had been made by that deadline. To that extent, Class O remains for the time being in Part 3, but will die a lingering death as Class O applications in the pipeline on 1 August slowly work their way through the system and are subsequently implemented, rather in the same way as the former Class P and Class PA (although the latter has in effect been revived by the introduction of Class MA).

As noted previously, Classes P and PA are now effectively redundant, except as regards the implementation of prior approvals granted under those two Classes. I note that even now there are a few late appeals under these provisions working their way through the system.

Everyone will no doubt breathe a great sigh of relief that no further amendments have been made to Class Q.

As redrafted, Class R will now permit development consisting of a change of use of an agricultural building to a flexible use falling within one or other of Classes B8, C1 or E.

Class S, will no longer permit change of use to use as a registered nursery. So, in future, this Class will permit a change of use only to a state-funded school. The scope of Class T will be similarly limited from now on. The uses from which a change of use can now be made under Class T will be C1, C2, C2A and E.

Similar changes are made to Part 4 (temporary changes of use), but I was rapidly losing the will to live by the time I got to this part of the amendment order, so I’ll leave it there for now.

I should just mention finally that there are transitional and savings provisions that are set out in the Schedule to the amendment order, which preserve for a time the effect of certain PD rights that have now been removed from the GPDO and which provide for the transition between the old and new rules. I will return to these in a later post.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Use Classes Order - “All change, please.”

The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020 No.757), which were made on 20 July and take effect on 1 September 2020, make important changes to the already much amended 1987 Use Classes Order. The changes are quite complex, because of the need to take account of various knock-on effects and the consequent requirement to include various transitional provisions to ensure a reasonably smooth move to the new and revised Use Classes.

Parts A and D of the original Schedule to the UCO are entirely revoked, which puts an end to Use Classes A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5, and Classes D1 and D2. These are replaced by new Use Classes in Schedule 2, except for those listed below that have now become sui generis uses. Class B1 is also abolished as a separate Use Class, and is also subsumed within a new Use Class in Schedule 2. Use Class B2 remains in what is now Schedule 1, in an amended form. Rather than discussing these changes piecemeal, I will summarise the new, revised and surviving Use Classes below.

Several of the uses previously within specified Use Classes have now been added to the list of sui generis uses set out in Article 3(6). These are uses:

(p) as a public house, wine bar, or drinking establishment [formerly A4],
(q) as a drinking establishment with expanded food provision [which fell awkwardly between A4 and A3],
(r) as a hot food takeaway for the sale of hot food where consumption of that food is mostly undertaken off the premises [formerly A5]
(s) as a venue for live music performance [formerly within D2, and possibly also an ancillary use in some cases within other Use Classes],
(t) a cinema [formerly D2(a)],
(u) a concert hall [formerly D2(b)],
(v) a bingo hall [formerly D2(c)],
(x) a dance hall [formerly D2(d)].

[This has a number of potential consequences. First, where several of these uses fell under one and the same Use Class in the previous version of the UCO (such as, for example, a cinema, a concert hall, a bingo hall or a dance hall - all of which fell within Use Class D2) a change of use between any of those uses would not have been development.

Now that each of these uses is a sui generis use, a change of use from one of these uses to another use, even though it was formerly within the same Use Class will now constitute development, and will require planning permission. However, these changes do not take effect until 1 September, and so (at the time of writing) there is a five-week period in which somebody wishing to make a change of use from, say, a cinema to a bingo hall can still do so without requiring planning permission. However, it might be advisable to preserve dated documentary and photographic evidence of the change of use, and even possibly to exhibit that material to a statutory declaration recording the change of use, in order to counter any allegation in future that the change of use required planning permission and was therefore a breach of planning control. After 31 August, however, it will no longer be possible to make such changes of use without planning permission (unless they are permitted by the GPDO).

The effect that this and the other changes described below may have on permitted development under the GPDO is covered (at least for the next year) by a saving provision which I will explain later in this note.]

The former Schedule to the UCO (now SCHEDULE 1) contains the following Use Classes:

PART B

Class B2. General industrial

Use for the carrying on of an industrial process other than one falling within the uses described in Schedule 2, Class E, sub-paragraph (g).

Class B8. Storage or distribution

Use for storage or as a distribution centre.

PART C

[This part is not affected by the amendment regulations, and so does not require further summary here. Use Classes C1, C2, C2A, C3 and C4 therefore continue unchanged.]

The new SCHEDULE 2 contains the following Use Classes:

PART A (Commercial, Business and Service)

Class E. Commercial, Business and Service

Use, or part use, for all or any of the following purposes—

(a) for the display or retail sale of goods, other than hot food, principally to visiting members of the public [formerly A1],

(b) for the sale of food and drink principally to visiting members of the public where consumption of that food and drink is mostly undertaken on the premises [formerly A3],

(c) for the provision of the following kinds of services principally to visiting members of the public [all formerly within A2] —
(i) financial services,
(ii) professional services (other than health or medical services), or
(iii) any other services which it is appropriate to provide in a commercial, business or service locality,

(d) for indoor sport, recreation or fitness, not involving motorised vehicles or firearms, principally to visiting members of the public [formerly within D2(e)].

[Although this new Use Class makes no mention of a gymnasium, the phrase “indoor sport, recreation or fitness” would appear to be wide enough to embrace such a use, which has not been specifically added to the list of sui generis uses in Article 3(6). Similarly, although swimming baths and skating rinks are specifically included in Use Class F, this use would also appear to be capable of falling within new Use Class E (under paragraph E(d)), because there is no provision that excludes the use in new Class F.2 from alternatively falling within Class E. As with several other queries of this nature, I have not yet understood the ramifications of this apparent confusion.]

(e) for the provision of medical or health services, principally to visiting members of the public, except the use of premises attached to the residence of the consultant or practitioner [formerly D1(a)],

[I cannot see why there is a need to distinguish between E(c)(ii) (which does not include health or medical services) and E(e), which comprises those services, when both are now in one and the same Use Class (Class E).]

(f) for a crèche, day nursery or day centre, not including a residential use, principally to visiting members of the public [formerly D1(b)],

(g) for—
(i) an office to carry out any operational or administrative functions [formerly B1(a)],
(ii) the research and development of products or processes [formerly B1 (b)], or
(iii) any industrial process [formerly B1(c)],
- being a use [in all three cases, as in the former Class B1] which can be carried out in any residential area without detriment to the amenity of that area by reason of noise, vibration, smell, fumes, smoke, soot, ash, dust or grit.

[One potentially problematic change is that the list of other uses that were formerly included in Use Class A1 (shops) are omitted. Without that listing, quite a few of those uses would not have come within the A1 Use Class, because they did not comprise or include (except as a purely ancillary use in some cases) the retail sale of goods. They included (among other uses) use as a post office, a travel or ticket agency, hairdressing, a funeral business, or a hire shop.

The new Use Class E does include “any other services which it is appropriate to provide in a commercial, business or service locality”, and it may be that all the uses formerly listed in Use Class A1 would now come within this category. If so, the new Use Class could be even wider than the Use Classes that it replaces, and might well embrace other services that one might reasonably expect to find in a commercial, business or service locality. These could include, for example, a nail bar, a tattoo parlour, a body toning salon, a tanning studio, etc. etc. If this interpretation is correct, then there is scope for a very wide range of uses that would previously have been regarded as sui generis.

On the other hand, there have in the past been appeal decisions in which it was held that a ‘weight loss centre’, a ‘body toning salon’, a ‘tanning shop’ and a ‘tattoo studio’ did not come into the category of “other services which it is appropriate to provide in a shopping area”, and it would seem to be entirely possible that planning inspectors might similarly determine in future (as a matter of fact and degree) that such uses do not properly fall within this category and therefore remain sui generis. The resulting ambiguity in the drafting of the new regulations is unfortunate, and is likely to cause difficulty for developers, building owners and the proprietors of businesses and also for LPAs.]

PART B (Local Community and Learning)

Class F.1 Learning and non-residential institutions

Any use not including residential use—

(a) for the provision of education [formerly D1(c)],
(b) for the display of works of art (otherwise than for sale or hire) [formerly D1(d)],
(c) as a museum [formerly D1(e)],
(d) as a public library or public reading room [formerly D1(f)],
(e) as a public hall or exhibition hall [formerly D1(g)],
(f) for, or in connection with, public worship or religious instruction [formerly D1(h)],
(g) as a law court [formerly D1(i)].

Class F.2 Local community

Use as—

(a) a shop mostly selling essential goods, including food, to visiting members of the public in circumstances where—
(i) the shop’s premises cover an area not more than 280 metres square, and
(ii) there is no other such facility within 1000 metre radius of the shop’s location,

[These uses were formerly within A1, and it would appear that they are also capable of falling within new Use Class E, because there is no provision that excludes the uses in new Class F.2 from alternatively, falling within Class E. The ramifications of this apparent confusion will only become apparent as the interpretation of these new provisions is explored in practice.]

(b) a hall or meeting place for the principal use of the local community,

[This use (formerly within D1(g)) would also appear to be capable of falling within new Use Class F.1, because there is no provision that excludes the use in new Class F.2 from alternatively falling within Class F.1. Here again, I have not yet understood the ramifications of this apparent confusion],

(c) an area or place for outdoor sport or recreation, not involving motorised vehicles or firearms [formerly within D2(e)],

(d) an indoor or outdoor swimming pool or skating rink [also formerly within D2(e)]

[So far as an indoor swimming pool or skating rink are concerned, here again, this use would also appear to be capable of falling within new Use Class E (under paragraph E(d)), because there is no provision that excludes the use in new Class F.2 from alternatively falling within Class E. This is another case in which I have not yet understood the ramifications of this apparent confusion.]

You may wonder why, following the abolition of the Use Classes in Parts A and D of the former Schedule to the UCO, the new Use Classes have been designated as E, F.1 and F.2. Well, as Polonius observed, though this be madness, yet there is method in’t. As we shall see below, the former Use Classes that have been removed from the UCO will still have a ghostly after-life. So to avoid confusion with these wraith-like entities, the new Use Classes have been given entirely new designations.

The most significant effect of the recast Use Classes is to produce much larger classes of uses that are covered by each of Parts E and F (Classes E, F.1 and F.2). In accordance with Article 3(1) of the UCO, where a building or other land is used for a purpose of any class specified in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, the use of that building or that other land for any other purpose of the same class shall not be taken to involve development of the land. This is slightly modified by paragraph (1A), so that (additionally) the use of that building or that other land, or if specified, the use of part of that building or the other land (“part use”), for any other purpose of the same class is not to be taken to involve development of the land. Section 55(2)(f) of the 1990 Act also continues to apply in this context.

So to take a few random examples, a change of use between a retail shop and a restaurant, a bank or building society (or any other kind of office, whether it was formerly in Use Classes A2 or B1(a)), a doctor’s or dentist’s surgery, a light industrial use or a crèche, day nursery or day centre, which are all now with Use Class E, will not constitute development and will not therefore require planning permission. Where any changes of use between these uses was formerly PD under the GPDO those permitted development rights will no longer be required, and any restrictions, limitations or conditions applying to such PD will no longer apply.

In the case of Class F.1, all the uses listed in this Use Class were formerly within Class D1, and so there is no change in that regard, except that the scope for changes of use that do not constitute development is slightly reduced, because the provision of medical and health services and use as a crèche, day nursery or day centre are no longer in the same Use Class (as they now fall within Class E).

The purpose and effect of Use Class F.2 is somewhat puzzling. Quite apart from the overlap of certain ‘community’ uses with similar uses in other Use Classes which I have noted above, it appears to be the intention that a use such as a community hall could have its use changed (in whole or in part) to a community shop, without needing planning permission.

The observations I have set out above represent only my first impression of the new provisions, and there may be other ramifications and unforeseen consequences that I have not yet identified.

Now, excuse me while I wrap a wet towel around my head to prevent my brain from overheating, and I’ll try to explain the transitional, savings and consequential provisions.

First of all, between 1 September 2020 and 31 July 2021, any references in the GPDO to the uses or use classes specified in the Schedule to the Use Classes Order are to be read as if those references were to the uses or use classes which applied on 31st August 2020 (i.e. before the UCO was amended by the current regs). If between those two dates, a prior approval application is made under Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO, or if an Article 4 Direction is made, modified or cancelled, it is the pre-September 2020 uses, use classes and definitions that are to apply to that application or to that Direction. If an Article 4 Direction is made before 1 September 2020, references in the Direction to pre-September 2020 uses or use classes are to continue to be read as references to those uses or use classes.

In the same way, if a planning application (including an application for PiP or an application for the approval of reserved matters) is made before 1 September 2020, referring to a pre-September 2020 use or use class, that application must be determined by reference to that pre-September 2020 use or use class. (There are one or two other minor transitional provisions which I don’t propose to go into here.)

On the other hand, where a building or other land is being used for the purpose Class A1 (Shops), Class A2 (Financial and professional services), Class A3 (Restaurants and cafes), or Class B1 (Business), that building or other land is to be treated, on or after 1st September 2020, as if it is being used for the corresponding purpose specified in Class E (Commercial, business and service) in Schedule 2.

Most readers are no doubt aware of the provision in Article 3(4) of the UCO which provided that where land on a single site or on adjacent sites used as part of a single undertaking is used for purposes consisting of or including purposes falling within use classes B1 and B2, those classes could be treated as a single class in considering the use of that land for the purposes of the UCO, provided that the area used for a purpose falling within Class B2 was not substantially increased as a result. This provision is now replaced by a similar provision which refers to the use described in Schedule 2, Class E, sub-paragraph (g) and the modified Class B2 in Schedule 1, so that those classes may be treated as a single class in considering the use of that land for the purposes of this Order, so long as the area used for a purpose falling within Class B2, or Class B2 as modified, is not substantially increased as a result.

Now, I must take a deep breath before plunging into the No.2 and No.3 amendment orders to the GPDO, with their interesting new permitted development rights. Such fun!

ADDENDUM: When writing the blog post above, I was focusing on the amendments to the Schedule to the Use Classes Order. I should also have drawn attention to Regulation 7 of the Use Classes amendment regulations. This provides that for the purposes of the Use Classes Order, if a building or other land is being used for a purpose that, on 31st August 2020, fell within any of Use Classes A1 (Shops), A2 (Financial and professional services), A3 (Restaurants and cafes), or B1 (Business), that building or other land is to be treated, on or after 1st September 2020, as if it is being used for a purpose specified within the new Class E (Commercial, business and service).

Thus, those uses that were expressly specified as being within Use Class A1 (such as, among other things, use as a Post Office, as a Travel Agent, for hairdressing, or for the direction of funerals, etc. etc.) will definitely come within Use Class E. I am sorry that I failed to spell this out.

UPDATE (28.8.20): Two minor corrections have had to be made to the drafting of the UCO amendment regs, by the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) (Amendment) (England) (No 2) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020 No.859) and ditto (No.3) Regs (SI 2020 No.895). The first correction relates to CIL, and preserves references to the Use Classes that applied when an LPA adopted a charging schedule. The second correction relates to a local community shop falling within Use Class F.2. The definition as originally drafted referred to the shop’s premises covering an area not more than “280 metres square”. The corrected version changes this to “280 square metres”.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

‘Convertibility’ of agricultural buildings

Class Q(a) in Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO permits the change of use of a building and any land within its [restrictively defined] curtilage from use as an agricultural building to a use falling within Use Class C3 (dwellinghouses). The wording of Class Q(a) does not refer to “conversion”, but it will clearly be necessary in order to bring about the permitted change of use to carry out various physical works to the building in order to enable this change of use to be made. Certain other Classes of permitted development in Part 3 (such as Class O, relating to the residential conversion of office buildings) do not permit any development comprising building operations, so that the only works that can be carried out within the scope of Class O are purely internal alterations. However, in the case of an office conversion these may be extensive, including new internal walls, new floors in some cases, considerable plumbing and electrical work, and a general re-arrangement of the internal layout of the building. These will all be covered by section 55(2)(a) of the 1990 Act, which exempts such purely internal works from the definition of development.

In the case of the residential conversion of an agricultural building under Class Q, there can in my view, be no objection to similar internal alterations and re-arrangements. In addition, Class Q(b) permits certain building operations, but paragraph Q.1(g) provides that development is not permitted by Class Q if the development would result in the external dimensions of the building extending beyond the external dimensions of the existing building at any given point, and paragraph Q.1(i) also precludes development consisting of building operations other than the installation or replacement of windows, doors, roofs, or exterior walls, the installation or replacement of water, drainage, electricity, gas or other services, to the extent reasonably necessary for the building to function as a dwellinghouse.

Notwithstanding the very wide definition of a “building” that has been adopted by the courts over the years (see Cardiff Rating Authority v Guest Keen Baldwin [1949] 1 KB 385, Skerritts of Nottingham v SSETR (No.2) [2000] 2 P.L.R 102; [2000] J.P.L. 1025 and R (Save Woolley Valley Action Group Ltd) v Bath and North East Somerset Council [2012] EWHC 2161 (Admin)), it has always been clear that the development permitted by Class Q (and by its predecessor, Class MB in the 1995 Order) does not, and was never intended to, authorise the substantial demolition and reconstruction of the pre-existing building, nor does it enable the extensive rebuilding of an insubstantial structure so as to create what would in substance be a new building.

Even before the government amended its online planning practice guidance (PPG) in March 2015, it was clear from appeal decisions that where existing structures, and the materials from which they were constructed, were so insubstantial that the buildings would require almost complete reconstruction in order to meet the requirements of the Building Regulations, the extent of the proposed building operations would inevitably be seen as going beyond the extent of the works that were envisaged by the terms of Class Q(b) [or the former Class MB(b)] as being “reasonably necessary” for the building to function as a dwellinghouse, and could also be sufficient to disqualify the building from residential conversion under Class Q(a). As I put it in A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use: “This imposes a practical constraint on the convertibility of some buildings. Works that amount to substantial demolition and reconstruction or replacement of the existing fabric would go beyond what is permitted.”; and I have cited (on page 107 in the Second Edition) two appeal decisions issued in January and February 2015 respectively which reached exactly this conclusion.

In light of this, the High Court judgment last week in Hibbitt v. SSCLG [2016] EWHC 2853 (Admin) is unsurprising. It simply confirms this well understood principle. It is not even necessary to call in aid the revised wording of the PPG in order to interpret the plain words of the GPDO. I don’t propose to go into the facts of this case. Suffice it to say that it is over-optimistic to expect that a building comprising a light steel frame supporting a corrugated iron roof, which is largely open to the elements on three sides (except for limited cladding up to a few feet from the ground in some cases) is capable of being converted to residential use without building operations that would be so extensive as to go well beyond the scope of the operations permitted by Class Q, and would amount either to substantial rebuilding of the pre-existing structure or, in effect, the creation of a new building.

For this reason, the excitement and/or consternation (depending on your viewpoint) that Hibbitt seems to have aroused in some quarters appears to me to be misplaced. This judgment does no more than to re-affirm the principle that was clearly to be derived from the wording of Class Q itself, as already applied in a number of prior approval appeals, including the two which I cited in the book.

We should be wary, on the other hand, of reading more than this into the Hibbitt judgment. What I have called “the structural issue” has in effect two limbs. The first is the fundamental point discussed above, which was dealt with by Hibbitt, but the second aspect of this structural issue is the question of how much internal work can be carried out inside the building within the scope of Class Q. It is this latter aspect of the matter that I have discussed in detail in the new Appendix D in the Second Edition of A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use. In my view, the judgment in Hibbitt does not tell us anything about this latter issue, being focused as it was (quite rightly in terms of the subject matter of the dispute that was before the court) on the fundamental issue of the ‘convertibility’ of the building, and whether works amounting in effect to substantial reconstruction of the building can be carried out within the scope of Class Q (and of Class Q(b) in particular), as the claimant attempted to argue in that case.

I don’t propose to re-rehearse here the arguments that are canvassed extensively in my Appendix D. On reflection, the problem stems not so much from the actual wording of the revised PPG, as from an unduly restrictive interpretation of those words by LPAs (and by some inspectors). I believe that in revising the PPG ministers were simply trying to explain the fundamental principle that is now confirmed (if confirmation were needed) by the judgment in Hibbitt. However, taking account of section 55(2)(a), it seems to me that there is still scope, without infringing that basic principle, and without going outside the limitations of Class Q, to carry out internal works that may be quite extensive, even including some structural alterations, provided that these are purely internal. Rather than attempting to enlarge on this proposition here, I will leave it to readers to study Appendix D in the Second Edition of A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use.(One reader has already described it as “a good read”!)

UPDATE: Readers may have seen the various comments appended to this post, discussing the effect of this judgment on existing prior approvals. Following discussions with my colleagues in Keystone Law’s planning law team, I have now published a post (16 January 2017) under the title "Can an LPA override a prior approval?” in which I have set out a revised view compared with that expressed in my original reply to comments on this issue.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Barn conversions – the structural issue (2)

After my article on this topic was posted on 4 January, another well-known planning blogger (who, with becoming modesty, does not wish to be named here) kindly drew my attention to R (Prudential Insurance Co Ltd) v. Sunderland City Council [2010] EWHC 1771 (Admin). I will come back to this judgment below, but I want first to analyse carefully the nature of the development involved under Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO and the precise scope of the planning permission granted by Article 3 in conjunction with the various Classes set out in Part 3.

Article 3(1) of the GPDO grants planning permission for the classes of development described as permitted development in Schedule 2 to the Order. In Part 3 of that Schedule, this development is specified by the various Classes set out there as “Development consisting of a change of use of a building (or, in some cases, of a building and any land within its curtilage) from a use falling within [a specified Use Class or Classes] to a use falling within [another specified Use Class]”. In certain cases, planning permission is also granted for limited building operations. I will come back to that further permission below.

When considering the planning permission for change of use granted by the various Classes in Part 3, it is important to appreciate that a change of use is a single event; it is not a gradual process or a continuing state of affairs (see Cynon Valley BC v SSW (1987) 53 P. & C. R. 68). Furthermore, it should be firmly borne in mind that, except in those few Classes where some building operations are also permitted, the permission granted is solely for the specified change of use. It follows that a development comprising a material change of use only commences when the change of use itself occurs, and (for the reasons explained in my last article, and further explored below) any incidents, including the commencement of internal alterations, that are preparatory to that change of use are of no legal significance in planning terms.

In the case of a change of use to use as a single private dwellinghouse, it is a prerequisite to such a change of use that the building must, as a question of fact, be constructed or adapted for use as a dwellinghouse as normally understood, that is to say, as a building that provides for the main activities of, and ordinarily affords the facilities required for, day-to-day private domestic existence (Gravesham B.C. v SSE (1984) P. & C. R. 142). Until that point is reached, no change of use has taken place. The judgment in Impey v SSE (1984) 47 P. & C. R. 157 established that a change of use can take place before the premises are used in the ordinary and accepted sense of the word (for example, where operations have been undertaken to convert premises for residential use and they are then put on the market as being available for letting). (This was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court in Welwyn Hatfield BC v. SSCLG [2011] UKSC 15.)

The effect and extent of the planning permission granted by the GPDO can readily be understood by reference to Class O in Part 3 (the residential conversion of offices which have been in use within Use Class B1(a)). The GPDO is completely silent on the subject of the works required to bring about this change of use. Clearly the permission does not extend to any building works to the exterior of the building, or which would materially affect its external appearance, but quite extensive works may be required to the interior (including in may cases the erection of new internal walls, and other structural elements, as well as the installation of bathrooms, toilets, kitchens, and a variety of other features and facilities) in order to enable the authorised change of use to take place. The reason that no provision is made for these in the GPDO is that they do not require planning permission in any event, by virtue of section 55(2)(a). None of the conditions attached to Class O refers to these internal works in any way.

I want to look next at the planning permission granted by Classes M(a)and M(b). Class M(a) grants permission for the residential conversion of a building currently used as a shop (A1) or for the provision of financial or professional services (A2) (or used for certain related uses). Bearing in mind the nature of such premises, it may be unnecessary in some cases to resort to the additional permission granted by Class M(b) for building operations that are reasonably necessary to convert the building to residential use. Existing doors, fenestration and other external features may not need to be replaced or supplemented, so that no external building works need necessarily be carried out in such cases.

Where works affecting the exterior are necessary in order to convert the building to residential use, the only restrictions in Class M that relate to such works are M.1(e), which prohibits development which would result in the external dimensions of the building extending beyond the external dimensions of the existing building at any given point, and M.1(f), which prohibits development consisting of demolition (other than partial demolition which is reasonably necessary to convert the building to residential use).

As discussed above, if a change of use of the building is the only development involved, there is no limit to the extent of the internal works that may be carried out, in accordance with section 55(2)(a). It cannot sensibly be argued that by also changing some doors and windows, which therefore requires additional prior approval under Class M(b), this somehow has the effect of bringing all the internal works into consideration as part of the development. It seems to me that section 55(2)(a) must continue to apply to these internal works, notwithstanding the inclusion in the development of (external) building works under Class M(b).

The conditions in paragraph M.2 include a requirement that where the development proposed is development under Class M(a) together with development under Class M(b), the developer must apply to the local planning authority for a determination as to whether the prior approval of the authority will be required as to a list of matters which include the design or external appearance of the building. But where the development proposed is development under Class M(a) only, prior approval is not then required as to the design or external appearance of the building. This is further confirmation that where building works are necessary under Class M(b), the only additional matter requiring prior approval is the design or external appearance of the building. Clearly the LPA is not concerned in any shape or form with any of the internal works that the developer proposes to carry out, nor is the LPA entitled to require any details of those works as part of the prior approval application or otherwise.

I have set out the position in relation to Class O and Class M, in order to examine the planning permission granted by Classes Q(a) and Q(b) in light of the points established in relation to these other Classes of development in Part 3. Class Q(a) grants permission for the residential conversion of a building and any land within its curtilage from a use as an agricultural building, and Class Q(b) grants permission for building operations reasonably necessary to convert the building to residential use.

In the same way as in Class M, the only restrictions in Class Q that relate to the building works authorised by Class Q(b) are Q.1(g), which prohibits development which would result in the external dimensions of the building extending beyond the external dimensions of the existing building at any given point, and Q.1(i) which prohibits development consisting of building operations other than the installation or replacement of windows, doors, roofs, or exterior walls, or water, drainage, electricity, gas or other services to the extent reasonably necessary for the building to function as a dwellinghouse, and also partial demolition to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out those authorised building operations.

Whilst this restriction is more prescriptive in its details than the corresponding restriction in Class M, there would appear to be no justification for treating purely internal alterations any differently from internal alterations carried out in connection with a change of use made under Class O or under Class M. For this reason, I would argue that even in the case of the residential conversion of an agricultural building there is no limit to the extent of the internal works that may be carried out, in accordance with section 55(2)(a). There still seems to me to be no basis on which it can be argued that where building works are proposed which require prior approval under Class Q(b), this somehow has the effect of bringing all the internal works into consideration as part of the development. As in the case of Class M, it seems to me that section 55(2)(a) must continue to apply to these internal works, notwithstanding the inclusion in the development of (external) building works under Class Q(b).

The conditions in paragraph Q.2 requiring the submission of a prior approval application are in the same terms as in paragraph M.2. discussed above, and so this too confirms that where building works are to be carried out under Class Q(b), the only additional matter requiring prior approval is the design or external appearance of the building, and that the LPA is not concerned in any way with any of the internal works that the developer proposes to carry out, nor is the LPA entitled to require any details of those works as part of the prior approval application or otherwise.

We come then, at last, to Prudential Insurance. How, if at all, does this judgment affect the argument? This was a spat between the claimant and a rival developer (Peel Holdings), with the LPA as the unfortunate ‘piggy-in-the-middle’. The claimant was seeking to quash a Lawful Development Certificate granted by the LPA to Peel Holdings in respect of a proposed development that they sought to carry out under an extant planning permission. The planning permission authorised “Conversion of one retail unit into two units, construction of new free-standing entrance canopies and formation of a goods access road at 1 Peel Centre, The Glover, Washington..”

The development of the Peel Centre as a whole had been authorised by an earlier planning permission issued by the Secretary of State under section 77 of the 1990 Act. A condition in that original permission provided that the development permitted should not be used for the retailing of 19 different classes of goods without the prior written consent of the LPA. A section 52 agreement (under the 1971 Act) had been signed some years earlier by Peel Holdings which precluded the sale of the same classes of goods.

The proposed use or development for which the LDC was granted comprised “open A1 retail use and a planning permission dated 11.12.2006 (06/04039/FUL) unfettered by the requirements of the section 52 agreement of 08.08.1988 as amended by the deed of revocation of 14.07.2006.”

The question for the Court was - What did the planning permission in respect of Unit 1, properly interpreted, authorise? The judge had no difficulty in stating straight away that the LPA was authorising the conversion of one shop into two together with, specifically, works to the exterior of the building necessary to achieve that conversion. He observed that the work necessary to achieve the conversion was necessarily to be undertaken both to the interior and exterior of Unit 1. As a matter of interpretation of the planning permission it might be thought obvious, he said, that it was authorising the carrying out of the building activity necessary to put in place what was shown on the two plans and which would result in the conversion of the unit from one shop into two [that is to say, both internal and external buildings works].

The claimant disagreed, relying on the definition of development in section 55(1) and the exemption from that definition provided by section 55(2)(a). Counsel for the claimant accepted that in this case planning permission was required for certain of the building operations which were specified in the planning application. They were the external alterations to Unit 1, the construction of new free-standing entrance canopies and the formation of a goods access road; each clearly constituted operational development within section 55 of the 1990 Act. He submitted, however, that the conversion of Unit 1 into two units was achieved solely by virtue of internal alterations to the building. He submitted that no planning permission was necessary for the internal alterations by virtue of section 55(2)(a). Accordingly, he submitted that, as a matter of interpretation, all that the planning permission in respect of Unit 1 authorised was the physical alterations to the exterior of the building.

The case for Peel Holdings was that "the conversion of Unit 1 into two units" constituted operational development, and that the conversion was inextricably linked with both the interior and exterior alterations to the building. [Note that this development did not constitute or include a material change of use. The judge accepted that the planning permission related to purely operational development. The use of the two new units was in practice governed by section 75.]

The judge accepted that there can be no doubt that the carrying out of an alteration which affects only the interior of the building does not constitute development. In his judgment, however, whether or not a proposal constitutes development within section 55 of the 1990 Act cannot be determined by looking at the individual component parts of the proposal in order to decide whether each, looked at in isolation, falls within or without section 55(1) and 55(1A) or whether they fall within the exceptions specified in section 55(2). It seemed to him to be wholly artificial to consider whether individual aspects of a development scheme, if standing alone, would or would not constitute development. He took the view that the issue of whether or not a proposal constitutes development must be considered by reference to the proposal looked as a whole and then answered either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.

Looked at in this way, there was no doubt in his mind that the proposal for which planning permission was sought in respect of Unit 1 constituted development. The planning permission which was granted authorised the carrying out of the whole of that development. In his judgment, therefore, the planning permission authorised the conversion of Unit 1 into two separate units and it authorised the works necessary to achieve that end.

The planning permission so granted did not limit the use to which the two units could be put. In those circumstances, Peel Holdings submitted, permission was granted for retail uses falling within Use Class A1. On any view of the wording of the planning permission, the permission granted was for retail units i.e. shops. In the absence of a condition limiting the use of the units to certain categories of goods, or a condition limiting that which could be sold, all the uses permitted under class A1 were permitted.

I am afraid I have considerable difficulty with this judgment, and in particular with the conclusion that it would be “wholly artificial to consider whether individual aspects of a development scheme, if standing alone, would or would not constitute development” and that “the issue of whether or not a proposal constitutes development must be considered by reference to the proposal looked as a whole”. This appears to me to be an assertion that is entirely unsupported by any reasoning, and which (although it refers in passing to counsel’s submissions with regard to section 55(2)(a)) makes no attempt to analyse the wording and effect of section 55.

A clear distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the conversational use of the word “development”, which can embrace all aspects of what is colloquially meant by that word in ordinary conversation (and this would undoubtedly include internal works), and on the other hand, the use of the word “development” in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which is precisely defined by section 55 and must be construed strictly in accordance with the rules of statutory interpretation. If parliament had intended that “development” should be interpreted more widely in some contexts than in others, it would undoubtedly have legislated accordingly in the 1990 Act (or in a subsequent amendment of that Act). There is nothing in the wording of section 55 to suggest that the effect of section 55(2)(a) only applies to internal works where those works are carried out in isolation, but that when internal works are carried out in conjunction with building operations to the exterior of the building, or which materially affect its external appearance, the development is then to be taken for the purposes of the Act as embracing those internal works as well as the external works. There is similarly nothing in the legislative wording to suggest that when internal works are carried out in conjunction with a material change of use, perhaps in fact in order to facilitate that change of use, the development is then to be taken for the purposes of the Act as embracing those internal works as well as the change of use itself. Such an interpretation would fly in the face of the clear statutory provision contained in section 55(2)(a), and with all due respect, it is not for a High Court judge to attempt to amend statute law, or to ignore its clear meaning and intention by applying a wider more colloquial interpretation to the word “development”.

There were in fact several other grounds of challenge in the Prudential Insurance case, all of which were dismissed, and it is clear that the case turned on the fact that what the LPA had granted was an unlimited planning permission for the creation of two new retail planning units, without any condition restricting the goods that could be sold in each of those two new units. They had failed to repeat the condition in the original planning permission for the development of the Peel Centre (as perhaps they should have done), and so they had been correct in issuing an LDC in the terms that had been sought by Peel Holdings.

In my view, the court’s apparent finding with regard to the scope of the development, in relation to section 55(1) and 55(2), would by itself have merited an appeal to the Court of Appeal, but the dismissal of the other grounds of challenge was less susceptible to challenge, and this no doubt explains why the judgment was not in fact appealed. Whilst this judgment cannot be dismissed as being ‘special to its facts’, the case for the claimant may not have seemed particularly meritorious to the Court when viewed as a whole, being (as I mentioned earlier) a commercial ‘spat’ between rival developers, and as someone once observed “context is everything”.

[Although this judgment was followed by the Court of Appeal in R. (Peel Land and Property Investments Plc) v Hyndburn BC [2013] EWCA Civ 1680, that case turned entirely on other issues (such as the effect of section 75), and the judgment did not discuss section 55 or any suggestion that “development” could embrace internal works in addition to external works or a material change of use. The Court of Appeal did not therefore endorse the view taken in Prudential Insurance on this issue.]

For the reasons I have explained, I do not believe that any weight can be put on the court’s approach in Prudential Insurance to the definition of development in relation to internal works. Some LPAs may be tempted to cite this judgment in support of the contention that the scope for internal works, and in particular for internal structural alterations or strengthening, is limited by the conditions attached to Class Q, and some inspectors may be persuaded to accept that argument, but if or when the matter comes before the court in a future application under section 288, I doubt whether the Court will follow Prudential Insurance when a full and careful analysis is made of the statutory wording and effect of section 55, and in particular section 55(2)(a).

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Holiday lets revisited

I don’t usually report on planning appeal decisions, but I did prick up my ears at a decision in Cambridge [3196460] which was issued on 4 March. This related to conjoined appeals against a series of enforcement notices which had alleged a change of use of 13 flats from Class C3 dwellinghouse to ‘short-term visitor accommodation’. Each flat was a separate planning unit, and so each of the enforcement notices related to an individual flat. There was no dispute that the lawful use of these flats had originally been as separate private dwellinghouses. The issue before the Inspector was whether the manner in which each of these flats was being used still fell within Use Class C3 or whether the manner in which they were now being used (i.e. to provide short-stay serviced accommodation) amounted to a material change of use in each case.

The flats had been typically let from 3-4 nights per week (as a minimum) up to approximately 10 nights. In some other cases, the flats were let for longer periods. However, the evidence showed that 77% of the lets were for one- and two-night stays. This evidence also indicated that there were over a thousand different bookings for the 13 flats over an 11-month period from March 2017 to January 2018, and that the 13 flats were occupied 80% of the time. Some of these flats had been used as short-stay serviced accommodation since November 2011, whilst others had been similarly let since July 2015. The staff or agents managing the lettings provided a basic ‘welcome pack’ with linen and towels changed on a weekly basis [which was the sole extent of the ‘servicing’ provided] and neither of the two apartment blocks in which these flats were situated had any communal facilities.

It was stressed on behalf of the appellants that the service provided in the flats was very limited and that it was not at the same service level provided for hotel guests or some other serviced apartments in Cambridge. The business was now ‘geared around corporate lets’ and it was the appellants’ intention to have less of a turnover of residents by progressively providing longer lengths of stay. The appellants referred to the differences between the apartments that were the subject of this appeal and other serviced apartments in Cambridge. In particular, they stressed that the serviced apartments (flats) that were the subject of this appeal were indistinguishable from the other ‘conventional’ flats, including other apartments in the same blocks that were the subject of Assured Shorthold Tenancy Agreements. It was therefore contended that all these flats were clearly in Use Class C3. This was on the basis that a spectrum of uses, from Class C1, through a sui generis residential (hybrid) use, to one which is clearly in Class C3 use, all share indistinguishable characteristics as residential dwellings. So the appellants’ contention was that all of the flats the subject of these appeals had remained in Use Class C3 residential use, despite the short-term lettings.

The LPA, on the other hand, contended that, in each case, there had been a material change of use of the flat. The Council acknowledged that the apartments contained all of the facilities to enable a Class C3 use to occur. However, due to the typical rental periods, the frequencies of turn-over of the accommodation and the character of use, the Council contended that the use of the apartments did not fall within Class C3 use, as defined in the Use Classes Order. The Council relied on the judgment in Moore v. SSCLG [2012] EWCA Civ 1202, on which I reported in this blog on 27 October 2012 (“ Holiday lets may be a change of use”). The Council referred to the court’s finding that ‘It was not correct to say either that using a dwelling for commercial holiday lettings would never amount to a material change of use or that it would always amount to a material change of use. Rather in each case, it would be a matter of fact and degree and would depend on the characteristics of the use as holiday accommodation’.. The Council considered that, as a matter of fact and degree, a material change of use of each of the apartments the subject of these appeals had taken place. They accepted that Class C3 dwelling houses can involve occasional changes in occupation, but they argued that there is a fundamental difference between, for example, a tenancy change and the high frequency of change in occupation that occurs with the ‘Airbnb’-type uses which had been carried out in the appeal premises.

The Council asserted that usage for short-term periods was likely to be by single individuals or couples and that the impacts of usage were both individual to each apartment block and cumulative, due to their location adjacent to each other. In considering the character of usage, the Council felt that this generated an increased likelihood of early and late arrivals; the uncertainties relating to location, uncertainties regarding access and parking; the need for specific instructions; the fact that the flats were not their homes; the fact that they are guests of the appellant company; the fact that the flats were servicing the tourism sector of the market as opposed to serving the residential market of Cambridge and that guests would not typically be invested in the local community.

Overall, the Council had concluded that the short-term letting use was somewhere between a C3 dwellinghouse and a C1 hotel use. As such, they argued, it was a sui generis use. The Council was also concerned about the transitory nature of the letting use and consequently that some visitors could demonstrate less respect and consideration for neighbours than might be the case for permanent residents. In support of this view the Council referred to reviews by some visitors which were evident from the booking website. Some of these included references to surrounding apartments being ‘incredibly noisy’; ‘noisy guests next door all night long’ and noise levels from other guests being ‘unbearable’. (On the other hand, none of the permanent residents in any of the neighbouring flats in either of the two apartment buildings had complained about any impact on their amenities.)

In assessing these appeals, the Inspector observed that the ‘Moore’ case had established the correct approach to be taken when considering whether or not a material change in use from a dwelling house (Use Class C3) to a holiday or commercial residential use (sui generis) has occurred. It was accepted by both parties that these appeals turned on whether or not, as a matter of fact and degree and based on the particular characteristics of the use of the apartments, a material change of use had occurred.

The Inspector in the ‘Moore’ case considered that there were a number of distinct differences between short term holiday accommodation and a Class C3 use. These included the pattern of arrivals and departures; any associated traffic movements; the likely frequency of party-type activities; the potential lack of consideration for neighbours and other factors which differed from a private family use of the property. Although the uses in the instant appeals could not be compared exactly with the situation in the ’Moore’ case, the Inspector considered that the potential for similar impacts on amenity were the same. The Inspector recited his various concerns in this regard.

In summary, therefore, it was the Inspector’s view that, as a matter of fact and degree, the variable nature of the transient uses of the properties had resulted in a distinctly different character of usage from that of a Class C3 use. He acknowledged that the services provided are not anywhere near a full hotel service. Nevertheless, the flats were let as separate suites of accommodation; they were let and advertised as a hotel might be and, most importantly had been let for many 1- or 2-night stays. On the basis of all of the submissions and his site visit, the Inspector concluded that the character of usage relating to all 13 appeal flats had become significantly materially different to the more permanent residential character of neighbouring flats which were subject to the Assured Shorthold Tenancy Agreements. These differences had amounted to a material change in use of each of the flats in question. It followed that in each case there had been a contravention of planning control and all the appeals were, therefore, dismissed on ground (c).

In commenting on this appeal decision, I should stress first that the Inspector was entitled to reach his own conclusions on issues of fact, and he clearly stated that his findings were made ‘as a matter of fact and degree’. The second point is that, as an appeal decision, this is not in any way legally binding, but it is nevertheless an interesting example of the way in which the relevant legal principles may be applied in practice in appeals of this nature.

This appeal raises a number of interesting points, which are not necessarily confined to holiday lets, but may apply to other alleged changes of use. The first point to be borne in mind is that, if a use remains fairly and squarely within one and the same Use Class, no amount of intensification of that use will amount to a material change of use (see, for example, Kensington & Chelsea RLBC v SSE [1981] J.P.L. 50). A problem may arise, however, if the character of the use changes in such a way as to take it outside the scope of the Use Class within which it originally fell. Decided cases include examples of changes in the use which did not alter the character of the use to such an extent as to amount to a material change of use (e.g. R (Manning) v South Lakeland DC [2005] EWHC 242 (Admin), and Herts CC v SSCLG[2012] EWCA Civ 1473) The classic case in which a change of use certainly had taken place was Wallington v SSW [1991] 1 P.L.R. 87, where the keeping of pets (which is usually a legitimate ancillary or incidental use of a single private dwellinghouse) had grown to such a degree, in that case keeping 39 dogs on the premises, as to change the character of the use in way that took it outside the scope of Use Class C3, and made it a mixed (sui generis) use as a dwelling and for the keeping of dogs. The Moore case, cited in this appeal decision, is an example of a holiday let being or becoming so different in character compared with an ordinary residential use within Use Class C3 as to amount to a change of use.

One further point, which was only touched on lightly by the LPA in presenting their case, and which does not seem to have been a factor in the Inspector’s decision here, is the possibility that a use (such as a holiday let) may, in principle, fall within the same Use Class as the pre-existing use, and yet have such an impact in planning terms as to give rise to a material change of use, even in the absence of any environmental impact as such. This possibility was first suggested by Lord Denning in Wakelin v SSE [1978] J.P.L.769, but was most clearly demonstrated in the cases of Richmond-upon-Thames LBC v SSETR [2001] J.P.L 84 and R (Kensington and Chelsea RLBC) v SSCLG [2016] EWHC 1785 (Admin). Both of those cases were concerned with the loss of housing units (through the amalgamation of dwellings) in areas where there was high demand for housing, particularly in the form of smaller units. It strikes me that the use of flats and similar residential accommodation as holiday lets, if this were to amount to more than a purely temporary interruption in their normal residential use, might well give rise to precisely the same considerations. There is, of course, legislation on this in Greater London, but LPAs elsewhere, faced with a situation similar to this enforcement case in Cambridge, might well consider the applicability of the principle established in the Richmond and Kensington & Chelsea cases, if the use of flats for holiday letting has the effect of reducing the availability of housing units to meet high demand for housing in their area.

This suggests that the government should perhaps revisit the Use Classes Order, and possibly introduce a separate and carefully defined use class for holiday lettings, so that these could no longer be embraced within Use Class C3. In the meantime, however, further cases such as Moore and this latest enforcement case in Cambridge are likely from time to time to trouble the Planning Inspectorate, and possibly the courts.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Barn conversions – the new rules re-interpreted

NOTE: For completely up-to-date and fully comprehensive coverage of this subject, we would strongly recommend readers to obtain a copy of the author’s new book - “A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

As many readers have discovered, the interpretation of the rules on prior approval of the proposed residential conversion of agricultural buildings has been much more restrictive than we had been led to expect, and it has clearly not reflected ministerial intentions.

This is largely due to the actual drafting of the provisions in Part 3, Class MB of the Second Schedule to the GPDO. These really ought to be amended, but for various reasons ministers have not found an opportunity to do so, other than a minor change in April 2014 to make it clear that the provisions of the NPPF are to be taken into account only so far as they are relevant to the specific matters to which a prior approval application relates (e.g. highways and traffic, noise, site contamination, etc.).

In an attempt to counter the unduly restrictive approach that has been taken, both by LPAs and by the Planning Inspectorate, to Class MB in particular, the government amended their on-line Planning Practice Guidance last week, on 5 March, to explain their view as to how these permitted development rights are intended to operate.

The notes below summarise some of the points that have now been incorporated in the government’s online planning practice guidance.

Limits on building operations

On this topic, the new guidance does actually reinforce the approach which has hitherto been taken in these cases.

The definition of a “building” in Article 1(2) of the GPDO includes “any structure or erection” as well as any part of a building. This may be relevant in the context of the residential conversion of agricultural buildings, as it could in principle include various buildings and structures of unconventional, and perhaps in some cases rather insubstantial, construction. The well-known judicial authorities on what constitutes a building or structure could also be relevant in this context (e.g. Cardiff Rating Authority -v- Guest Keen Baldwin [1949] 1 KB 385, Skerritts of Nottingham v. SSETR (No.2) [2000] 2 P.L.R 102; [2000] JPL 1025 and R (Save Woolley Valley Action Group Ltd) v Bath and North East Somerset Council [2012] EWHC 2161 (Admin)).

However, the works permitted under Class MB(b) are restricted to what is reasonably necessary for the building to function as a dwellinghouse, and any partial demolition must also be limited to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the building operations that are permitted by this class. This imposes a practical constraint on the convertibility of some buildings. Works that amount to substantial demolition and reconstruction or replacement of the existing fabric would go beyond what is permitted.

In their amended on-line practice guidance, the government has confirmed that it is not the intention of the permitted development right under Class MB(b) to include the construction of new structural elements for the building. Therefore it is only where the existing building is structurally strong enough to take the loading which comes with the external works to provide for residential use that the building would be considered to have the permitted development right.

In any event, the development under Class MB(b) must not consist of building operations other than the installation or replacement of windows, doors, roofs, or exterior walls, or water, drainage, electricity, gas or other services, to the extent reasonably necessary for the building to function as a dwellinghouse, and partial demolition to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the building operations listed here. Furthermore, the development must not result in the external dimensions of the building extending beyond the external dimensions of the existing building at any given point.

The inclusion of roofs and walls in the list of items that can be installed or replaced as part of the building operations permitted by Class MB might be thought to allow scope for some significant rebuilding or replacement of the existing fabric, but an appeal decision in Bedfordshire, issued in February 2015, provides clear confirmation that the extent of the proposed building operations must not go beyond what is “reasonably necessary” for the building to function as a dwellinghouse, so that substantial demolition of the building and its effective replacement would be outside the scope of the development that is permitted. This is a factor which will clearly be a material consideration in the consideration and determination of the prior approval application

The strict limitation on the works that may be carried out under Class MB(b), combined with the condition that they must not extend outside the envelope of the pre-existing building, does not allow the creation of any hard surface or other engineering works (such as the laying of gravel) to provide any hard surfaces within the curtilage for the purposes of parking, or the provision of a patio, etc. Nor is there any provision (as there is in Classes M and MA) for permitted development under Part 41, Class B that would allow any such works to be carried out. Furthermore, such works cannot be carried out under Part 1 of the Second Schedule, because such development is specifically excluded by Class MB. Planning permission will therefore be required if it is desired to incorporate any such facilities in the development, and all the usual policy considerations relating to development in the countryside will apply to the determination of such an application.

A further appeal decision in Nottinghamshire also illustrates this point. The inspector in this case held that the proposed barn conversion would involve such major changes and reconstruction as to go beyond the scope of the development permitted by Class MB(b). The building had a metal frame and walls comprising a single metal skin, plus an element of blockwork, and a roof of corrugated asbestos fibreboard. What was required to enable the adaptation of the building for residential use amounted to substantial demolition and reconstruction of the building, plus various physical alterations. This was quite clearly beyond the scope of Class MB(b).

The National Planning Policy Framework

When determining a prior approval application, the LPA must also have regard to the National Planning Policy Framework (issued by the Department for Communities and Local Government in March 2012) so far as relevant to the subject matter of the prior approval, as if the application were a planning application. The words in italics were added to the GPDO with effect from 6 April 2014.

This amendment became necessary because, when determining prior approval applications under Class J, LPAs had been interpreting paragraph N, including the words “as if the application were a planning application”, as giving them a wide discretion to take into account other policy considerations in addition to the short list of criteria set out in Class J. The amendment makes it clear that the only policies in the NPPF that can be taken into account in determining an application for prior approval are those that are relevant to the strictly limited criteria set out in respect of the specified class of development. This has been confirmed and reinforced by appeal decisions, where inspectors have been robust in excluding considerations that go outside those parameters.

This point has been further reinforced by the amendment to the government’s on-line Planning Practice Guidance, which points out that this procedure was amended in April 2014 to make clear that the local planning authority must only consider the NPPF to the extent that it is relevant to those matters on which prior approval is sought, for example, transport, highways, noise etc.

In relation to Classes MA (conversion of an agricultural building to use as a school or nursery) and MB (residential conversion of an agricultural building), in particular, the revised ministerial practice guidance explains in some detail how an LPA should approach the question as to whether the location or siting of the building makes it otherwise impractical or undesirable for the building to change from agricultural use to residential use. The practice guidance makes it clear that when an LPA considers location and siting it should not be applying tests from the NPPF except to the extent these are relevant to the subject matter of the prior approval. So, for example, factors such as whether the property is for a rural worker, or whether the design is of exceptional quality or innovative, are unlikely to be relevant. (This is explained in more detail in the note on rural development policy below.)

Limits on dwelling numbers

Paragraph MB.1(c) provides that the cumulative number of separate dwellinghouses developed within an established agricultural unit must not exceed three. There has been some confusion over the precise interpretation of this provision but, in amending their on-line Planning Practice Guidance on 5 March, the government has made it clear that it was their intention that the total number of new homes (3 dwellinghouses) should not include existing residential properties within the established agricultural unit, unless they were created by the use of this permitted development right on a previous occasion, in which case they would be counted.

The Planning Inspectorate can be expected in future to apply this guidance in determining planning appeals where this point is in issue, in contrast with a previous appeal decision in which one inspector held that the 3-dwelling limit applied to all such dwellings, and was not limited only to the number created under Class MB. The effect of that appeal decision was that any dwellings already in existence on the agricultural unit would count towards this total, so that if there were already three built under previous planning permissions, then no more could be created under Class MB.

The revised ministerial guidance in the government’s on-line Planning Practice Guidance does not, however, resolve the difficulty posed by the drafting of the Order. The interpretation of legislation does not depend on what ministers think it says or would like it to say. The courts may not, therefore, agree with the advice set out in the government’s online practice guidance, if a local planning authority were to challenge this interpretation of the 3-dwelling limit in a future case.

Rural development policy

One of the criteria to be considered by the LPA when determining an application for prior approval of proposed development under Classes MA and MB(a) (both relating to conversion of an agricultural building), but not under Class M, is whether the location or siting of the building makes it impractical or undesirable for the building to change from agricultural use to use as a school or nursery (under Class MA) or to a residential use (under Class MB(a)). This has proved to be a major stumbling block for applicants in obtaining approval of these proposed conversions of agricultural buildings. Ministers did not intend to allow LPAs such broad scope for rejecting proposals for the conversion of agricultural buildings, but the drafting of Classes MA and MB has up to now been interpreted as giving an LPA a considerable measure of freedom to refuse the application on policy grounds. At least half of all such applications for residential conversion under Class MB up to the early part of 2015 are thought to have been refused (and there was anecdotal evidence that there had been an even higher rate of refusal in some areas). Furthermore, by early 2015, 9 out of 10 of the appeals against such refusals had been dismissed by the Planning Inspectorate (a significantly higher proportion than in other types of planning appeal).

This has prompted the government to amend their on-line Planning Practice Guidance to address in particular the issue as to whether the ‘sustainability’ of the proposed development is intended to be a material consideration in determining an application for prior approval of the proposed change to residential use. The revised ministerial guidance makes it clear that the permitted development right does not apply a test in relation to sustainability of location. This is deliberate, as the right recognises that many agricultural buildings will not be in village settlements and may not be able to rely on public transport for their daily needs. Instead, the local planning authority can consider whether the location and siting of the building would make it impractical or undesirable to change use to a house.

The revised practice guidance then goes on to explain what is meant by “impractical or undesirable” for the change to residential use. Impractical or undesirable are not defined in the Order, and the LPA should apply a reasonable ordinary dictionary meaning in making any judgment. “Impractical” reflects that the location and siting would “not be sensible or realistic”, and “undesirable” reflects that it would be “harmful or objectionable”.

When considering whether it is appropriate for the change of use to take place in a particular location, an LPA should start from the premise that the permitted development right grants planning permission, subject to the prior approval requirements. That an agricultural building is in a location where the LPA would not normally grant planning permission for a new dwelling is not a sufficient reason for refusing prior approval.

There may, however, be circumstances where the impact cannot be mitigated. Therefore, when looking at location, LPAs may, for example, consider that because an agricultural building on the top of a hill with no road access, power source or other services, its conversion is impractical. Additionally, the location of the building whose use would change may be undesirable if it is adjacent to other uses such as intensive poultry farming buildings, silage storage or buildings with dangerous machines or chemicals.

When an LPA considers location and siting it should not therefore be applying tests from the NPPF except to the extent these are relevant to the subject matter of the prior approval. So, for example, factors such as whether the property is for a rural worker, or whether the design is of exceptional quality or innovative, are unlikely to be relevant.

Adopted policies in the Development Plan are also capable of being a material consideration when determining a prior approval application, but it is clear from the revised ministerial practice guidance that adopted policies on development in the open countryside, development in the Green Belt (where applicable) and sustainable development, especially taking account of the availability or non-availability of easily accessible local services and any generation of car-borne movements that might arise from this will not usually be relevant and are unlikely to be valid reasons for refusal of a prior approval application.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Going behind a prior approval

If an LPA in determining a prior approval application under a relevant part of the Second Schedule to the GPDO decides either that their prior approval will not be required or grants such prior approval, can the authority later resile from that decision on the basis that the development does not in practice qualify as PD, or (alternatively) can a third party successfully challenge the LPA’s decision on the same ground?

I have been meaning to return to this topic ever since the judgment of the High Court in R (Marshall) v E Dorset DC [2018] EWHC 226 (Admin), in which judgment was given on 13 February.

In a blog post on Monday, 16 January 2017 (Can an LPA override a prior approval?), I drew attention to the little-known judgment in R. v. Sevenoaks DC, Ex p Palley [1994] E.G. 148 (C.S.), which appeared to suggest that when an LPA gives its prior approval (or decides that its prior approval is not required), it is inherent in that determination that the authority necessarily accepts that the proposed development does qualify as PD, so that the council cannot thereafter resile from that position.

Until my attention had been drawn to Ex p Palley, it had been my view that if the proposed development does not in fact comply with the criteria for permitted development under the relevant Class in (for example) Part 3 or Part 6 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO, either because a requisite pre-existing use did not qualify under that Class of PD, or because the proposed development is not within the limitations, restrictions or conditions that apply to the relevant Class of PD, then an application for prior approval, even if the approval is given (or if the application is simply not determined within the 56-day or 28-day period – whichever is applicable) cannot make the proposed development lawful, and so it cannot be carried out as PD.

The basis for my earlier opinion was that the actual planning permission for the development is granted by Article 3(1) of the GPDO and it is this permission that is dependent on the qualifications in the GPDO being met. The LPA is not itself granting planning permission, nor in giving its prior approval is it approving the development as such; it is merely approving the specified matters that require prior approval. It follows (I had originally thought) that the giving of prior approval could not overcome the fact that the development is in any event disqualified from being PD.

During the course of discussion in comments that were posted in response to the revised view that I expressed in light of Ex p Palley, a correspondent raised with me the effect of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Keenan v Woking BC and SSCLG [2017] EWCA Civ 438. At the time, I felt that Keenan did not affect the position, because it simply seemed to me to confirm that if the development does not qualify as PD, the 56-day rule [or the 28-day rule in that case] will not operate so as to allow the proposed development to go ahead in the absence of the prior approval application having been determined within the statutory time limit. There had previously been several appeal decisions to the same effect, and I stressed this point in my book, A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use (see page 201 in the Second Edition, and for good measure, I repeated it at the bottom of page 210).

However, it seems that the effect of the decision in Keenan is of slightly wider effect than that (at least so far as PD under Part 6 is concerned), and Mrs Justice Lang’s judgment in Marshall has prompted me to look more carefully at Keenan.

In Marshall, Lang J drew attention to the disqualification in paragraph A.1 of Part 6, whereby development is not permitted by Class A if it would consist of, or include, the erection or construction of, or the carrying out of any works to, a building, structure or an excavation used or to be used for the accommodation of livestock or for the storage of slurry or sewage sludge where the building, structure or excavation is, or would be, within 400 metres of the curtilage of a protected building, but in this case the proposed building was within 400 metres of several dwellings (including the Claimant’s home) which were “protected buildings” as defined. Furthermore, paragraph A.2 makes it a condition of permitted development under Part 6 that where development is carried out within 400 metres of the curtilage of a protected building, any building, structure, excavation or works resulting from the development are not used for the accommodation of livestock (except in certain defined circumstances).

Notwithstanding this, the LPA issued a decision notice in response to the developer’s prior approval application under Part 6, which stated that “The development, therefore, constitutes permitted development in accordance with the provisions of Part 6 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (as amended) and is subject to the standard conditions.” In dealing with this point, Lang J followed the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Keenan, and in particular the words of Lindblom LJ that, in order to be lawful, the development proposed had to fall squarely within the description of “permitted development” in the relevant Class.

In particular, Lindblom LJ observed in Keenan that the GPDO did not impose on the LPA a duty to decide whether or not the development in question was, in fact, permitted development under Class A of Part 6, albeit that the guidance in paragraph E14 of Annex E to PPS7 might have been read as encouraging it to do so. Nor did it confer upon the authority a power to grant planning permission for development outside the defined class of permitted development. The sole and limited function of this provision was to enable the LPA to determine whether its own “prior approval” would be required for those specified details of that “permitted development”. If the authority were to decide that its “prior approval” was not required, the condition would effectively have been discharged and the developer could proceed with the “permitted development” – though not, of course, with any development that was not “permitted development”. If, however, the authority failed to make a determination within the 28-day period, again the developer could proceed with the “permitted development”, but again not with any development that was not “permitted development”. The developer would not at any stage have planning permission for development that was not, in fact, “permitted development”.

As Lang J put it in Marshall (referring to Keenan), the ‘prior approval’ conditions do not even come into play unless the proposed development falls “squarely within the description of Permitted development” in the relevant Class, and she emphasised that Keenan also decided that the LPA, when deciding a prior approval application under the terms of the GPDO [at least under Part 6, but see below], is not empowered, either expressly or implicitly, to decide whether or not the proposed development comes within the description of the relevant Class in the GPDO.

This confirms the view which I had originally expressed myself as to the effect of the legislation. Clearly, therefore, in the context of Part 6, Ex parte Palley can have no application.

Whilst I accept the logic of both the Keenan and Marshall judgments, I still have a niggling doubt at the back of my mind, which those two judgments do not entirely resolve. Both of these cases involved agricultural development under Part 6, and I fully accept Lindblom LJ’s views, quoted by Lang J in her judgment in Marshall, so far as Part 6 applications are concerned. However, the actual legislative wording of Part 3 does seem to imply that in the case of prior approval applications under that Part of the Second Schedule to the GPDO, the LPA when deciding a prior approval application under the terms of Part 3 is empowered, either expressly or impliedly, to decide whether or not the proposed development comes within the description of the relevant Class in Part 3.

In relation to Part 3, paragraph W. –(1) provides that the following provisions apply where under this Part a developer is required to make an application to a local planning authority for a determination as to whether the prior approval of the authority will be required. Under paragraph W. -(3), the LPA may refuse a prior approval application where, in the opinion of the authority, the proposed development does not comply with (or the developer has provided insufficient information to enable the authority to establish whether the proposed development complies with) any conditions, limitations or restrictions specified in this Part as being applicable to the development in question.

I think I would have to concede that paragraph W. –(3) empowers the LPA only to refuse the prior approval application if the development does not qualify as PD but, arguably, this might reasonably be taken to imply that if the LPA either grants its prior approval or determines that its prior approval of the specified matters is not required, then the authority may be taken to have accepted that the development does qualify as PD, and in those circumstances Ex p Palley (as discussed in the earlier blog post to which I have drawn attention above) would come into play.

Ex p Palley was, of course, decided some years before the House of Lords’ decision in R v East Sussex CC ex p Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd [2002] UKHL 8, in which it was held that the clear terms of the modern legislation (sections 191 and 192 of the 1990 Act in their currently amended form) provide the only means of confirming the lawfulness of an existing or proposed use or development. Such a determination cannot be construed from the outcome of other procedures, nor can a finding of lawfulness be made or implied informally. However, that is a rather different point from the one raised here. We are dealing here with a planning permission granted by Art. 3(1) of the GPDO, subject only to prior approval of certain matters by the LPA (or their determination that their prior approval is not required), rather than with an informal opinion or implied certificate as to the lawfulness of the proposed development in connection with which prior approval has been granted.

In principle, the qualification of a proposed development as PD would appear to be an issue that is entirely separate from the grant of prior approval (and this was the view I initially expressed). However, it appears on closer examination (particularly bearing in mind the wording of paragraph W -(3)) that the prior approval could reasonably be taken, for the reason advanced above, to involve a determination by the LPA that the restrictions, limitations and conditions applicable to that Class of PD in Part 3 are met, and that the proposed development accordingly qualifies as PD.

It is in light of this factor that the judgment in Ex p. Palley may become relevant where prior approval has been given under Part 3, because the determination by the LPA is arguably a judgment by them (in accordance with paragraph W. –(3)) of a matter of fact and degree that can only be challenged on Wednesbury grounds by way of an application for judicial review. The point of the judgment in Ex p. Palley is that, because (having regard to the wording of paragraph W -(3)) the LPA may be taken to have considered and determined whether the development does in fact qualify as PD, this issue is not merely “a matter of precedent fact".

I cannot guarantee that this argument would necessarily be accepted if it were to come before the High Court or the Court of Appeal, but in view of the fact that this argument rests on a legislative provision in Part 3 (which is absent from Part 6), rather than relying on a reference to ministerial practice guidance, as was the case in Keenan, it would appear that a Part 3 case might well be distinguishable from the judgments in Keenan and in Marshall (concerned as they were with the differently worded provisions of Part 6). I suspect we shall just have to sit back and wait for someone to take a punt on this point.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

LPA bitten by 56-day rule

In my book, A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use, I stressed the absolute necessity of an LPA’s notifying their determination in respect of a prior approval application within the time limit laid down (56 days in the case of Part 3), and I carefully explained the detailed rules for establishing both the start date and end date of the 56-day period. Yet some LPAs still seem to get it wrong, especially if a public holiday occurs just after the application is received.

Just to remind you, there are no dies non for the purpose of calculating the 56-day period. The 56-day period (and similar time limits for determining other prior approval applications under the GPDO) continue uninterrupted throughout weekends and public holidays, and it is essential that LPAs should take this into account when working out how long they’ve got in which to make a determination and to communicate it to the applicant.

I was recently sent an appeal decision in Wellingborough [3248384] in a case where the prior approval application under Part 3, Class R had been delivered to the LPA by hand at 10.07 a.m. on Christmas Eve. It was deposited in a letter box for incoming mail at the council’s office. However, the letter box had been emptied earlier that morning, and was not then opened again until 2 January. At the time of delivery, the council’s office was, nevertheless, open for business. It closed for Christmas at 4.00 p.m. that day. The Council sought to argue that the application should be deemed to have been received on 2 January, not 24 December, and that the 56-day period should be calculated accordingly.

Their contention was that this office is only accessible to the public by appointment, and that if customers wish to drop off planning application forms, documents or samples, they are requested to call the planning department on the relevant phone number. Furthermore, they said, the Council’s Christmas opening hours were displayed on the letter box and also advertised on the Council’s website throughout December, making it clear that the council’s offices were closed from 4pm on Christmas Eve to 1 January 2020, and would not re-open until 2 January.

Rules relating to the delivery of documents outside a council’s business hours relate only to delivery by electronic means. [For those rules, see Article 2(9) of the GPDO and section 336(4A) of the 1990 Act, summarised in paragraph 13.8.1 of Chapter 13 in the Third Edition of my book.] There are no rules in the GPDO governing the physical delivery of documents at times when the council’s offices are closed, but this does seem to be a ‘grey’ area (unless someone can remind me of a general rule as to the service of documents that would cover this). Subject to that parenthetical proviso, it seems to me that the legal position might not have been entirely clear if (in this case) the physical delivery of the prior approval application had been made by depositing it in the council’s letter box at, say, 4.15 p.m. on Christmas Eve, after the office had closed. However, that point did not arise in this case, because delivery in the council’s letter box took place almost six hours before the office closed for the holiday.

The Inspector was entirely clear in his finding that there was nothing to prevent or prohibit the applicant from hand posting the application in the letter box at the council’s office on Christmas Eve. Responsibility rested with the council to ensure that applications it receives, including those received immediately prior to a holiday period, are processed within the statutory time limit. Weekends and bank holidays or other public holidays did not ‘stop the clock’, nor could it be suspended during the extended closure of the council’s office in this case. Day 1 of the 56-day period in this case was therefore 25 December, and the council had accordingly failed to notify the applicant as to whether prior approval was required or was given or refused within 56 days of its having received the application on 24 December.

The Inspector nevertheless pointed out that the proposed development could only lawfully proceed if it was in fact permitted development having regard to the relevant conditions and limitations imposed on the planning permission granted by the GPDO. There appears, however, to have been no contention on the LPA’s part that the development would not be compliant with the restrictions, limitations or conditions applying to Class R. Furthermore, (due to the council’s being out of time to determine the prior approval application) it was no longer necessary to consider whether prior approval as to the transport and highways, and noise impacts of the development would or should be required.

The appellant applied for, and was granted, a full award of costs. The appellant had sought on at least two occasions to persuade the council that it was out of time, but the council persisted in denying this. In the circumstances, it was unlikely that the council would have granted an LDC if the appellant had made a section 192 application. So it was clear that the applicant had no viable option but to appeal under section 78, despite having taken all reasonable steps to avoid such a situation. As a result, the applicant had been put to the cost of an appeal that should have been avoided by the LPA’s acceptance that the 56-day period had elapsed. This amounted to unreasonable behaviour resulting in unnecessary or wasted expense, and an award of costs was therefore justified.

This should be an object lesson to all LPAs. In order to avoid running out of time for determining a prior approval application, they should make a working assumption that physical delivery of an application (discovered in their letter box on returning to the office after a weekend or public holiday) was effected before the closure of the office for the weekend or before that holiday period, and ensure that the timescale within which the application must be determined is calculated on that basis, so that the application is in practice determined within that shortened period.

© MARTIN H GOODALL