This popular and widely read blog acts as a Legal Commentary on issues affecting Town & Country Planning including recent changes in planning legislation and judicial rulings in planning cases, as well as some thoughts on other issues arising in the course of my work as a Planning Lawyer. It was originally intended mainly for fellow planning professionals, but all are welcome to read it. The views expressed are my own and nobody else’s.
Pages
▼
Tuesday, 28 November 2017
Amalgamation of dwellinghouses again
Readers are no doubt aware of the High Court judgments in Richmond-upon-Thames LBC v SSETR [2001] J.P.L. 84 and R (Kensington and Chelsea RBC) v SSCLG [2016] EWHC 1785 (Admin), on which I have commented both in this blog and in my recently published book, The Essential Guide to the Use of Land and Buildings under the Planning Acts, but these rulings continue to cause difficulties in practice.
Notwithstanding the binding nature of these two judicial authorities, which have since been followed by inspectors in a number of planning appeals, I have serious reservations regarding these two judgments. A property owner should be able (with professional advice, if necessary) to know whether a particular adaptation or change to a property is or is not development within the definition in section 55, without having to carry out research to establish whether there is an underlying housing shortage in the area in question which might make the loss of housing units through amalgamation a material planning consideration that may affect the lawfulness of this amalgamation (even where there is no relevant Development Plan policy that addresses this issue).
In light of these two judgments, owners and developers are now faced with a situation in which the amalgamation of two or more dwellings in some LPA areas is not a material change of use for the purposes of section 55, because there is no underlying housing shortage in the area in question which might make the loss of housing units through amalgamation a material planning consideration, whereas in others (notably in various London boroughs), the very same change could be a material change of use, if the Richmond and Kensington & Chelsea cases are followed.
The practical difficulties that could arise in these circumstances were illustrated by two further cases, Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea v SSCLG and Noell [2017] EWHC 1703 (Admin) and Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea v SSCLG and Larham [2017] EWHC 1704 (Admin). Both were concerned with appeals against the refusal of planning permission (rather than LDC appeals) relating to proposals for the amalgamation of four and two flats respectively to form a single large dwelling in each case. The Inspector determined that the loss of residential units was acceptable, based on his calculation of housing requirements in the borough, and so he allowed both appeals. The LPA challenged those appeal decisions on the basis that the Inspector was mistaken in his calculation of the housing land supply, and both appeal decisions were quashed on this ground. Whilst these appeals turned on planning considerations of a type that is common in section 78 appeals, it is clear that similar disputes could easily arise in LDC appeals, in light of the earlier judgments in Richmond and in the 2016 Kensington and Chelsea case. These latest judgments demonstrate the uncertainty faced by property owners and developers in face of the variable planning judgements that might influence a decision as to whether the amalgamation of particular dwellings is or is not lawful by reference to section 55(2)(f).
What is needed is certainty in the law. Section 55(3)(a) makes it absolutely clear that the use as two or more dwellinghouses of any building previously used as a single dwellinghouse involves a material change of use of the building and of each part of it which is so used. It would be an easy matter for a similar sub-clause to be added to section 55(3) declaring with equal clarity that the use as a single dwellinghouse of any building [which by definition includes a part of a building] previously used as two or more dwellinghouses involves a material change of use of the building and of each part of it which is so used.
As I have explained before, but it bears repeating, my objection to the current position in light of the Richmond and Kensington judgments is solely to the legal uncertainty that has arisen as a result of these two High Court decisions. So far as I am concerned, there could be no objection in principle to the proposition that the use as a single dwellinghouse of any building previously used as two or more separate dwellings should be treated as a material change in the use of the building; but any such change in the law should take the form of an amendment to the 1990 Act, rather than depending on the less than certain intervention of the courts. Parliament passed the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, including section 55 in its current form, and if it is felt that the loss of residential units through amalgamation is a problem (particularly in some London boroughs), then it is Parliament who should amend the Act to resolve this issue.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Absolutely Martin. But why stop at dwellinghouses? It never made 'planning' sense to me that dwellings were treated differently to other uses in questions of division/amalgamation. If S55 was to be reviewed I would like to see the wider issues addressed as well.
ReplyDeleteI agree with the principle of reamalgamating properties that were originally single-family dwellings. It might result in a loss of residential units, but would seem to allow larger families to grow.
ReplyDeleteIt seems particularly harsh to imagine a young family purchasing a house in the early noughties, say, subdividing it in order to help with the mortgage, and then being unable to re-amalgamate the property as the family expands.
I was present when a case somewhat along these lines was recently presented to RBKC’s planning committee (http://bit.ly/2BAsoTL). The application was deemed by the case officer to be contrary to policy and was therefore recommended for refusal. While the committee were quick to over-rule that view, their decision seemed to centre more on their assessment of the character and integrity of the applicant, rather than adherence to any policy.
Richard W raises a very good point. If the housing need within an area is pertinent to whether amalgamation is defined as development, surely the same approach must be taken for other use classes. Smaller b1 offices being knocked through to create one much larger office. Imagine a small parade of A1 shops being internally opened up to create an A1 supermarket ? If policies within the plan are present which seek to prevent such larger scale uses, would this then not amount to development, using the Richmond rule applied to dwelling houses ?
ReplyDeleteI agree with Richard W, and also with my anonymous correspondent. In principle, this might be applied to any amalgamation or subdivision of premises (not just dwellings) if a situation exists in a particular area that could make the loss of planning units of various types (through amalgamation) or the loss of planning units of a particular size (through subdivision) a material planning consideration. One might reasonably expect the Development Plan to flag up such an issue in policy terms, but it seems that the principle could apply even where there is no relevant Development Plan policy that addresses this issue.
DeleteThis underlines the reason why I find the judgments in the Richmond and Kensington cases so unsatisfactory, because if applied more widely they would leave developers in a state of uncertainty as to whether either the amalgamation or subdivision of one or more planning units [with the exception of the subdivision of dwellings, which is covered by section 55(3)(a)] would be lawful or not, depending solely on local conditions in the area in question.
I would have no difficulty with a proposal to amend section 55 to make the amalgamation of existing dwellings a material change of use, in the same way as section 55(3)(a) does in the case of the subdivision of dwelling. Such a legislative provision would leave no-one in any doubt as to the legal position. But the potentially wide and uncertain effect of the Richmond and Kensington judgments is troubling.