Monday, 6 August 2018
This blog is concerned with planning law and practice, but there is no escaping the fact that there is a far more important subject that is hanging over all of us, and I make no apology for returning to it now.
In these dog days of August, I cannot help brooding on the utter mess that the government has got itself into over Brexit. This prompted me to re-read the items I have previously written on this subject. The first two of these, dated 7 March and 17 June 2016, were on planning and environmental issues, but in view of the importance of the subject, I have allowed myself to stray into the general political arena on a further five occasions so far, on 1 July and 31 December 2016, and on 4 and 30 May and 30 December 2017. Nothing that has occurred in the interim has led me to change any of the views that I expressed in those brief articles.
As I observed in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, After last Thursday’s result, there is a great deal of head scratching going on, in an effort to understand the mind-boggling ramifications of the decision to leave the EU. As many of us were well aware, this is going to be far more complicated than the Brexiteers pretended, and the effects will include more than a few unintended consequences. The task of unravelling all these complexities is daunting, and I suspect may even prove to be impossible. Don’t be surprised if the government (of whatever composition or complexion) eventually decides that the only practical solution is for the UK to remain a full member of the European Union after all!
In May 2017, I observed that Theresa May seemed to have no idea of what negotiation actually involves, nor any realistic understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses on both sides (a fundamental prerequisite for anyone entering into any form of negotiation). One has to understand that Brexit potentially presents an existential threat to the European Union. If Britain is seen to get an advantageous deal enabling us to keep significant benefits that derive from our current membership of the EU, this could conceivably encourage similar moves in some of the other member countries. The EU (and its collective membership) cannot countenance such a risk, and so they are bound to resist any such settlement. This is not an unreasonable stance. If a member of a Golf Club no longer wishes to pay the subscription and be bound by the club’s rules, then they must simply leave; they cannot expect to have continued access to the bar and restaurant, or to be allowed to retain any of the other benefits that they have previously enjoyed as members.
It is daft to complain that the EU is being ‘intransigent’ or ‘inflexible’ in taking this stance, and it is even more ridiculous to suggest that they should be seeking ‘imaginative solutions’ to allow Britain to retain many of the advantages we currently enjoy as members of the EU. As Theresa May has observed on more than one occasion, “Brexit means Brexit.” But it will bring with it all the consequences that flow from our no longer being members. This is why the recent peregrinations of Mrs May and other members of her cabinet around Europe in a futile effort to beg and cajole national leaders such as Merkel and Macron to change the collective position of the EU on this issue have been so pathetic. These efforts were obviously doomed to failure from the start, and they only serve to emphasise the weakness of the UK’s negotiating position.
It is even more unrealistic for ministers such as Dr Liability Fox or the rookie Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, to seek to warn or threaten the EU that they may be forcing us to leave without a deal. It’s rather like a bank robber rushing into a bank, holding a gun to his head, and shouting “Hand over the money, or I’ll shoot myself”. It is not likely to be very persuasive. The argument goes that the UK’s crashing out of the EU without a deal would be damaging to the EU as well as to us. This is true, but the economic damage for the EU would be limited, and would be spread among 27 nations, whereas the damage to the UK is likely to be catastrophic. The argument that German car manufacturers won’t want to lose their British market is unlikely to sway them, when they export so much more to the rest of the world. You may recall that Boris Johnson tried the same argument with regard to Prosecco, until the Italians pointed out that they cannot even meet existing demand, and so could face the potential loss of their British market with equanimity.
Incidentally, while we are on the subject of international trade, various EU members do a vast amount of trade with the rest of the world outside the EU, under advantageous trade agreements which the EU has negotiated on behalf of its members. This makes a complete nonsense of the Brexiteers’ parrot cry that they want Britain to be free to make its own trade deals, and to trade freely throughout the world. Britain as an EU member is already free to trade around the world on very advantageous terms. It is improbable that the UK could negotiate better terms individually with other countries than we currently enjoy by virtue of our membership of the EU. Any replacement trade agreements will take years to negotiate, and are very unlikely to be on terms as good as those that the EU has already negotiated on our behalf as members. (And no; we couldn’t just expect to carry on trading with other nations on the same terms. It would be back to the negotiating table to start talks with those other nations from scratch). The same applies to the suggestion that we could “just trade on WTO terms”. The clue is in the name (“World Trade Organisation). We are not currently members, and would have to apply to join; membership is not automatic. And we would have to abide by a fairly detailed rule book, in much the same way as we do with the EU. So much for “recovering our sovereignty” and “taking back control”!
Even May and most her cabinet recognise that crashing out of the EU with no deal would be disastrous for us. What lay behind the half-baked Chequers ‘agreement’ was the government’s slow motion collision with reality, as they gradually realised that a Hard Brexit would be too awful to contemplate. Only the Loony Right – the Brextremists on the Tory backbenches - are still maintaining the pretence that everything would be fine in these circumstances.
The fact remains, however, that the possibility of our crashing out of the EU with no deal at all is now becoming a real risk, and the government seems to be a hostage to political forces which it is in no position to resist or control. The Moggites of the ERG realise that, whilst they could probably muster enough letters to the Chairman of the 1922 Committee to force a Tory Party confidence vote in the Prime Minister, they wouldn’t get enough votes in the resulting ballot to unseat her. However, they do have enough votes in the Commons to defeat or amend government legislation more or less at will, and we saw this in the votes on the Trade and Customs bills last month, where the government was forced to accept damaging amendments to this legislation which significantly undermined the Chequers agreement (as the ERG intended it should), as well as significantly weakening the UK’s negotiating position in continuing discussions on a ‘post-Chequers’ deal with the EU. In September, it is to be hoped that the House of Lords will remove these amendments, and insert the amendments seeking membership of the Single Market and Customs Union which were defeated in the Commons in July, and battle will once again be joined this Autumn when the bills return to the Commons from the Lords.
I had hoped by now that enough Tory MPs would finally have woken up to the damage that a ‘No deal’ Brexit would do to the national economy, that they would at last take their political courage in their hands and force the government to accept a more sensible approach to Brexit; but the 12 or 15 Tory ‘rebels’ have repeatedly been pusillanimous in the face of threats and blandishments from the whips, and have failed to follow up their stated opposition to the government’s approach to Brexit by votes in the lobby. Whether they will do so in the coming months must be doubtful on past performance, unless the looming disaster finally impresses itself on them and on enough of their more conformist colleagues to persuade them to defy the government whips, and put a stop to the headlong rush towards the edge of the cliff.
I very much fear that we are in fact in a complete impasse, with the government unable to go forward or back, and with the official opposition equally conflicted in the absence of any proper leadership from Jeremey Corbyn. The Labour Party is self-absorbed in its own internal struggle, of which the current crisis over alleged anti-semitism in the party is only a symptom. It is, in effect, a proxy war in which the extreme Left is fighting to consolidate its complete hold over the party. If they succeed, it does not bode well for the electoral prospects of the party in a future General Election. Nor does it offer much hope of opposing a Hard Brexit. The Labour Left has always been Eurosceptic, seeing the EU as a capitalist plot against the workers, continued membership of which would prevent the “Socialism in One Country” of which they dream.
The Left is in fact wrong on both of these points. Workers’ rights are more effectively protected by the EU than they would be in a post-Brexit Britain, and there is nothing whatsoever in EU rules that would prevent Labour from carrying out the programme proposed in its last election manifesto if we were to remain members of the EU. There is every possibility, on the other hand, that a car-crash Brexit would have such a dire effect on our economy that it would be financially impossible for Labour to carry out its planned programme. Labour’s true interests lie in opposing Brexit, if only the party’s present leadership had the gumption to see this.
All of which leaves me profoundly depressed over Brexit and over the political position in this country generally. I have absolutely no idea how things will work out in the coming months, but I fear that the summer recess is merely the calm before the gathering storm. Whether this will lead to an early General Election, or even to a second referendum, is anybody’s guess. The only prediction that I would hazard is that if there were to be a General Election this Autumn, the result would very likely be another hung parliament, the arithmetic of which would be utterly unpredictable. But I don’t hold out much hope for the mooted ‘Government of National Unity’. Its acronym inevitably reminds me of the old Flanders & Swann song (“…….And I wish I could g-nash my teeth at you……..”)
Ah well, it’s back to the boring business of town and country planning, and maybe if the heat were to subside a little we could enjoy what’s left of the Summer.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Thursday, 19 July 2018
On Monday, 26 June 2017, I reported on the judgment of the High Court (Lang J) in the case of Steer v SSCLG  EWHC 1456 (Admin), in which a very wide interpretation of the “setting” of a listed building was adopted by the Court for the purposes of section 66 of the Historic Buildings Act. However, that decision has now been overturned by the Court of Appeal sub nom. - Catesby Estates Ltd v Steer  EWCA Civ 1697. The Secretary of State also appealed in a conjoined appeal, and Historic England was heard in the appeals as an Intervener. Judgment in the Court of Appeal was given by Lindblom LJ, with whom the other two judges agreed without comment.
The original High Court judgment led to some concern among planning professionals, and one correspondent in this blog observed that while Historic England would be pleased, virtually the whole land surface of the England could be argued to be the setting of some heritage asset or other, including buried archaeology! He suggested that a balanced and proportionate approach is required, but was not entirely sure this was it.
Lindblom LJ summarised the point at issue in a single sentence, namely whether the Inspector whose decision was challenged erred in law in his understanding of the concept of the “setting” of a Grade I listed building.
The site is farmland, about 1.7 kilometres to the south-east of Kedleston Hall, which is a Grade I listed building, and about 550 metres from the Grade I listed Kedleston Hall registered park and garden and the Kedleston Conservation Area, whose boundary on its south-eastern side extends to the edge of the park. About 1.5 kilometres to the north of the site are the Grade II* listed Kedleston Hotel and the Quarndon Conservation Area. The site itself was part of the manorial land owned by Sir Nathaniel Curzon, the first Lord Scarsdale, when, in 1761, he set about reconstructing his house and laying out the park. The land was beside the main road from Derby, by which most visitors to Kedleston Hall would arrive. From it one could see the park. And from the park there were views of the house. Kedleston Hall is widely acknowledged to be of exceptional historic and architectural interest, and is described in Pevsner as “one of the most magnificent apartments of the C18 in England” and “the most splendid Georgian house in Derbyshire, in extensive grounds”. The park was largely the creation of the architect Robert Adam.
In an effort to summarise this briefly, I will not quote from the materials cited by the court, but reference was made to the definition of the “Setting of a heritage asset” in the “Glossary” to the NPPF and to the guidance document entitled “The Setting of Heritage Assets – Historic Environment Good Practice Advice in Planning: 3” (“GPA3”), a revision of which was published in July 2015. (A second edition was published in December 2017, but it was the first edition that was current at the time of the original appeal.)
At the inquiry, there was a significant body of evidence, from Historic England, the National Trust, the Gardens Trust, the Development Control Archaeologist at Derbyshire County Council, and the experts called on behalf of the local community, Kedleston Voice, that the appeal site was part of the setting of both the Grade I listed Hall and the park, as well as the conservation area, even though the proposal would not intrude upon views to and from the Hall. The thrust of that evidence was that the appeal site was part of the setting of the Hall because it had formed part of the estate, managed historically as an economic and social entity, and it remained in its historic agricultural use, with hedges and mature trees characterising the field boundaries. From the Hall and the park, the surrounding rural context was important in preserving a sense of a parkland landscape at the centre of a managed rural estate, rather than in a suburban context. The site was on the primary visitor route to the Hall and Park and so visitors would experience the historical narrative, and the concentric influence of the Hall on its landscape, as they traversed the agricultural estate, then entered the enclosed, designed park and gardens, enjoying the drama of anticipation as a great English country house was revealed to them.
In approaching this main issue, the Inspector found it “difficult to dissociate landscape impact from heritage impact”. He observed that it was “not unreasonable to look at landscape quality and impact in purely physical or visual terms and to consider historical value and significance separately, in the context of the impact on the Hall and Park”. He concluded that (“setting aside for the moment the historical association with the Hall and Park”), the appeal site exhibited no features that could qualify it as a valued landscape in the terms of paragraph 109 of the NPPF. There was, he said, “no reason why, in physical or visual terms, harm to the landscape should compel dismissal of the appeals”, and “[the] question of its historical value may be addressed in relation to the settings of Kedleston Hall and its registered Park and Garden”.
Turning to “The settings of the heritage assets and the statutory and policy context”, the Inspector addressed himself to the definition of setting in the NPPF (the “surroundings in which a heritage asset is experienced”) and observed that the extent of a setting “is not fixed and may change as the asset and its surroundings evolve”. Setting is not itself a heritage asset but elements of a setting “may make a positive or negative contribution to the significance of an asset”. The Inspector pointed out that paragraphs 126-141 of the NPPF make it clear that, in considering a development proposal, what has to be assessed is the effect there would be, not on the setting, but on the significance of the heritage asset concerned.
Again, for the sake of brevity, I shall not attempt to summarise the Inspector’s observations upon considering the setting of each heritage asset, in turn. In his overall conclusions on the main issue, the Inspector acknowledged that “Kedleston Hall and its Park are heritage assets of the greatest importance” and that “[any] harm to their significance must carry very great weight in the balance against the public benefits of the appeal proposals required by paragraph 134 of the NPPF”. He held, however, that there was “no harm to the significance of the Hall and only very modest harm to the significance of the Park and Conservation Area”. There was a substantial tree screen planted in the 1960s and since substantially extended, but even if this tree screen were to be removed or opened out,“the harm to the significance of the Hall would be very limited indeed and the harm to the Park still no more than modest”. Against that harm the Inspector considered that there was “the very great public benefit of market and affordable housing which is much needed, especially in Amber Valley but also in Derby City”. This was, said the inspector, “more than sufficient to tip the balance in favour of the appeal proposals”. Applying the policy for the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” in paragraph 14 of the NPPF, the Inspector concluded that there was “no doubt that the adverse impacts of either development would not significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits from providing much-needed housing”.
Putting it briefly, the judge at first instance felt that the Inspector had taken too narrow a view of the “setting” of the listed building. However, Lindblom LJ observed that, although the “setting” of a listed building is a concept recognized by statute, it is not statutorily defined. Nor does it lend itself to precise definition (see R. (Williams) v Powys CC  EWCA Civ 427, at paragraphs 53 to 58). Implicit in section 66 of the Listed Buildings Act, however, is that the setting of a listed building is capable of being affected in some discernible way by development, whether within the setting or outside it. Identifying the extent of the setting for the purposes of a planning decision is not a matter for the court, but will always be a matter of fact and planning judgment for the decision-maker. And as Sullivan L.J. said in R. (Friends of Hethel Ltd.) v S Norfolk DC  1 W.L.R. 1216, “the question whether a proposed development affects, or would affect the setting of a listed building is very much a matter of planning judgment for the local planning authority”.
In Williams Lindblom LJ, in the visual context that applied in that case, had distinguished between the “site” of a scheduled monument and its “setting”, which, he said, “encompasses the surroundings within which the monument may be experienced by the eye”. He went on to say that the circumstances in which the section 66(1) duty has to be performed for the setting of a listed building will vary with a number of factors – typically, “the nature, scale and siting of the development proposed, its proximity and likely visual relationship to the listed building, the architectural and historic characteristics of the listed building itself, local topography, and the presence of other features – both natural and man-made – in the surrounding landscape or townscape”, and possibly “other considerations too”, depending on “the particular facts and circumstances of the case in hand”. To “lay down some universal principle for ascertaining the extent of the setting of a listed building” would, he thought, be “impossible”. But – again in the particular context of visual effects – Lindblom LJ had observed in that case that if “a proposed development is to affect the setting of a listed building there must be a distinct visual relationship of some kind between the two – a visual relationship which is more than remote or ephemeral, and which in some way bears on one’s experience of the listed building in its surrounding landscape or townscape”.
Lindblom LJ stressed, however, that this does not mean that factors other than the visual and physical must be ignored when a decision-maker is considering the extent of a listed building’s setting. Generally, of course, the decision-maker will be concentrating on visual and physical considerations, as in Williams. But it is clear from the relevant national policy and guidance to which he had referred, in particular the guidance in paragraph 18a-013 of the PPG, that the Government recognizes the potential relevance of other considerations – economic, social and historical. These other considerations may include, for example, “the historic relationship between places”. Historic England’s advice in GPA3 was broadly to the same effect.
It has also been accepted by the Court of Appeal in previous cases that the effect of development on the setting of a listed building is not necessarily confined to visual or physical impact. As Lewison L.J. said in R. (Palmer) v Herefordshire Council  EWCA Civ 1061, “[although] the most obvious way in which the setting of a listed building might be harmed is by encroachment or visual intrusion, it is common ground that, in principle, the setting of a listed building may be harmed by noise or smell”. In that case the potential harm to the setting of the listed building was by noise and odour from four poultry broiler units.
Lindblom LJ identified three general points which emerge. First, the section 66(1) duty, where it relates to the effect of a proposed development on the setting of a listed building, makes it necessary for the decision-maker to understand what that setting is – even if its extent is difficult or impossible to delineate exactly – and whether the site of the proposed development will be within it or in some way related to it. Otherwise, the decision-maker may find it hard to assess whether and how the proposed development “affects” the setting of the listed building, and to perform the statutory obligation to “have special regard to the desirability of preserving … its setting …”.
Secondly, though this is never a purely subjective exercise, none of the relevant policy, guidance and advice prescribes for all cases a single approach to identifying the extent of a listed building’s setting. Nor could it. In every case where that has to be done, the decision-maker must apply planning judgment to the particular facts and circumstances, having regard to relevant policy, guidance and advice. The facts and circumstances will differ from one case to the next. It may be that the site of the proposed development, though physically close to a listed building, has no real relationship with it and falls outside its setting, while another site, much further away, nevertheless has an important relationship with the listed building and is within its setting. Under current national planning policy and guidance in England, in the NPPF and the PPG, the decision-maker has to concentrate on the “surroundings in which [the heritage] asset is experienced”, keeping in mind that those “surroundings” may change over time, and also that the way in which a heritage asset can be “experienced” is not limited only to the sense of sight. The “surroundings” of the heritage asset are its physical surroundings, and the relevant “experience”, whatever it is, will be of the heritage asset itself in that physical place.
Thirdly, the effect of a particular development on the setting of a listed building – where, when and how that effect is likely to be perceived, whether or not it will preserve the setting of the listed building, whether, under government policy in the NPPF, it will harm the “significance”.
Applying those points to the Inspector’s decision in this case, Lindblom LJ did not find that the Inspector had erred in any of the ways that had been alleged. The Inspector recognised the relevance of those considerations to the setting of the listed building, to the impact of the development upon that setting, and its impact on the “significance” listed building as a heritage asset. He did not concentrate on physical and visual factors to the exclusion of everything else. It was clear from his decision letter that the Inspector was aware of the need to take into account not merely the visual effects of the development but also its effects on the historic value of the Hall, the park and each of the other heritage assets he had to consider.
Lindblom LJ therefore differed from the judge’s view that the inspector “adopted a narrow interpretation of setting … inconsistent with the broad meaning given to setting in the relevant policies and guidance … before him”. In his opinion the Inspector understood the relevant policies and guidance correctly, and applied them lawfully in assessing the likely effects of the development on the setting of each heritage asset. The appeal was therefore allowed, and the Inspector’s original decision was restored.
On reading this detailed and carefully reasoned judgment, it does not appear to me that Lindblom LJ was taking a significantly different view of the legal principles governing the “setting” of a listed building than those developed in previous cases. Clearly, a variety of factors are capable of being taken into account in assessing the setting of a listed building and the impact of proposed development on that setting, and not just physical or visual factors. However, if the first instance judgment may have given the impression to some people that the setting of a listed building is potentially limitless, then this decision of the Court of Appeal will serve to correct that impression. This judgment confirms that it is a question of balance, having regard to all the circumstances. The most important point is that this is ‘a matter of fact and degree’, and is thus a matter for the decision-maker, rather than the court. It would seem to me, therefore, that an Inspector’s decision with regard to the setting of a listed building would have to be Wednesbury unreasonable before it can be impugned as representing an error of law.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Tuesday, 10 July 2018
It was only at the end of April that I was reporting the appointment of the new Housing & Planning Minister, Dominic Raab, and yet here we are, not yet half way through July, noting his departure for pastures new to become Brexit Secretary [surely a thankless task in the current circumstances!] in place of David Davis, following Davis’s dramatic resignation late on Sunday night.
Dominic Raab’s replacement at MHCLG is Kit Malthouse (whom I confess I had not heard of until now). He is a comparative new boy, having been elected to parliament as recently as 2015 as the member for North-west Hampshire. He has recently been serving as a junior minister in the Department of Work and Pensions.
Prior to becoming an MP, Malthouse had been one of Boris Johnson’s appointed Deputy Mayors, where he was responsible for the development of business and enterprise in Greater London. He had also been a councillor in the City of Westminster, rising to Deputy Leader as well as holding the finance brief in the council’s cabinet.
As for his professional background – yes, he was one of the living dead; he became a chartered accountant.
So what does Malthouse know about housing and planning? Your guess is as good as mine. And maybe it doesn’t matter, as MHCLG’s civil servants will just get on with what they’ve always done, no matter who their ministers are. With a ministerial revolving door like this, it hardly matters who actually holds the various ministerial briefs in the office, or whether they know anything about the subjects for which they have nominal ministerial responsibility.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Monday, 9 July 2018
Readers may recall that I drew attention on Tuesday, 3 April (“Class Q revisited”) to changes to Part 3 (Class Q) of the Second Schedule to the GPDO (residential conversion of agricultural buildings) that were made by the latest amendment order, with effect from 6 April 2018.
These changes included the amendment of the definition of development permitted by Class Q which still seem to have passed some people by. The objective of this amendment seems to have been to reinforce those provisions in Class Q that were intended to make it clear that where the residential conversion of an agricultural building involves building operations, the prior approval application must include those building operations.
The drafting of Class Q in the 2015 GPDO differed from the corresponding provisions in Class MB in the 1995 Order, and was obviously intended to make it clear that a prior approval application should embrace both the change of use under Class Q(a) and the building operations under what was then Class Q(b).[
I originally drew attention in a blog post on Tuesday, 21 November 2017 (“Prior approval application under Class Q(a) only”) to a continuing misunderstanding of the 2015 Order that seemed to be widespread, and was even shared by some Planning Inspectors. But quite clearly there was a significant number of readers who were not prepared to accept that applications could no longer be made under Class Q(a) alone, unless no building operations would be required (or, even more unlikely, unless the building operations would fall outside Class Q(b) altogether and would therefore be the subject of a separate planning application).
Since April of this year, there are two alternative prior approval applications – Class Q(a) for change of use only, or Class Q(b) which now embraces both the change of use and associated building operations. Prior approval applications under Class Q should no longer be made under both Class Q(a) and Class Q(b), because this would now involve pointless duplication. Where an application under both Q(a) and Q(b) was required in the past, only a prior approval application under Class Q(b) is now required.
I also explained in my blog post on 3 April the other amendments to Class Q which make it clear that an application under Class Q(b) (but not Q(a)) must be made where building operations relying on permitted development rights will be required. In these circumstances, making an application under Class Q(a) is no longer an option.
This is confirmed by a further revision of Paragraph 105 of the online PPG on 15 June, in light of the changes brought about by the 2018 amendment order in April of this year. The beginning of this paragraph now explains that the permitted development right under Class Q allows either the change of use (a), or the change of use together with reasonably necessary building operations (b) [emphasis supplied].
I won’t re-rehearse the arguments I have put forward earlier in support of my interpretation of the revised wording in Class Q, but it seems that this latest revision to ministerial planning practice guidance does say more or less the same thing.
While we are looking at the PPG, Paragraph 106 (which explains that the PD rights under Class Q are precluded where works to erect, extend or alter a building for the purposes of agriculture under agricultural permitted development rights have been carried out on the established agricultural unit since 20 March 2013) has been corrected by deleting the words: “or the installation of additional or replacement plant or machinery". The intention of the legislation, which paragraph 106 seeks to explain, is to preclude PD under Class Q where permitted development has been carried out since 20 March 2013 under either Class A(a) or Class B(a) in Part 6 of the Second Schedule the GPDO.
The inclusion in previous versions of paragraph 106 of a reference to the installation of additional or replacement plant or machinery was a mistake, because those items fall within the PD allowed by Part 6, Class B(b), which (unlike Classes A(a) and B(a)) is not precluded.
As one reader observed - “and this is meant to represent a simplification of the planning system ?(!!!)
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Friday, 29 June 2018
DHCLG has embarked on a review of the use and operation of the planning appeal inquiries procedure, claiming to make it quicker and better [pause here for collective groan]. The review will examine the process in its entirety and is expected to make recommendations that DHCLG hopes will significantly reduce the time taken to conclude planning inquiries, while maintaining the quality of decisions. [Well, it might, or it might not.]
The review will examine the rules and processes of the entire process involving inquiries, particularly focusing on major housing schemes, which for obvious reasons the government is very anxious to speed up. The role of the various players (developers, LPAs and objectors, etc.) in influencing the progress of the appeal process will be part of this. Whilst the avowed objective of the review is simply to examine whether the inquiry procedure can be made more ‘efficient’ and therefore quicker, so as to improve the handling by PINS of appeal processes generally, there is inevitably a potential threat that an attempt may be made to restrict the ability of parties to put their cases as fully and fairly before the inspector as they might wish. Issues of procedural fairness could arise.
The Review is intended to involve all parties in the inquiry processes, including appellants, local planning authorities, third parties including statutory consultees, lawyers, Planning Inspectors, and other PINS staff. It is intended to focus on the role of inquiries in major housing applications, with wider application to all inquiries. Comparisons may be made with other appeal and review processes.
In particular, ministers intend that the review should consider the circumstances in which the public inquiry procedure is favoured by appellants and whether a different procedure may be more appropriate [a further attempt to restrict the availability of the inquiry procedure?], the purpose of the inquiry procedure and whether current practice fulfils this purpose, the rules and procedures governing inquiries, the custom and practice during inquiries (including making recommendations for improvements, in particular what it would take to halve the total time currently taken from start to finish) and, finally, the specific implications for the Planning Inspectorate and appellants of any recommendations to change the inquiries procedure, including implications for other appeal procedures.
The review is being led by Bridget Rosewell OBE, and will report to the Secretary of State by the end of this year. It has not yet been made clear how participants will be involved in the review, but interested parties should begin thinking how to respond to the review. Early representations by planning professionals and others would no doubt be advisable, in view of the fact that the report is expected to be in the hands of the Secretary of State in barely six months from now.
UPDATE [9.7.18]: I am grateful to Tony Thompson MRTPI, MRICS, Head of the Planning Appeal Inquiries Review Team at MHCLG for some further information on this review.
In terms of engagement, as a first step, they plan to issue a call for evidence later this month and would welcome responses from all those who are interested, particularly from those who have first-hand experience of the inquiry process.
Any planning professionals who would like to be added to the list of those informed when the call for evidence is issued, should contact MHCLG to register their interest. The call for evidence is in any event likely to be widely publicised in the professional press, and so even if you do not request personal notification when the call for evidence is issued, everyone will have an opportunity to contribute their views. As Tony Thompson says, views based on practical professional experience of the appeal process will be of particular value to the review team.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Tuesday, 12 June 2018
Paragraph W (12) in Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO provides that the development permitted under Part 3 must be carried out in accordance with the details approved by the LPA. Where prior approval is not required (or where the 56-day period has expired without the applicant having been notified of the LPA’s determination of the prior approval application) the development must be carried out in accordance with the details provided in the prior approval application. In both cases, the requirement for the development to comply with these details applies “unless the local planning authority and the developer agree otherwise in writing”.
The question has arisen as to what formalities, if any, are required in order to obtain the LPA’s agreement to any variation. The reference to such agreement simply being “in writing” seems to me to indicate that a formal application, such as a fresh prior approval application or a planning application (for example under section 73) is not required. However, some LPAs seem to have taken a different view.
My own view is reinforced by a parallel provision in Part 16 (relating to telecoms development). Paragraph A.3(8) in Part 16 provides that the development must, except to the extent that the local planning authority otherwise agree in writing, be carried out in accordance with the details approved in the prior approval, and in any other case, in accordance with the details submitted with the application. Paragraph A.3(9) then goes on to explain that “The agreement in writing referred to in sub-paragraph (8) requires no special form of writing, and in particular there is no requirement on the developer to submit a new application for prior approval in the case of minor amendments to the details submitted with the application for prior approval”.
Now, I appreciate that Inspectors have resisted attempts to import the provisions of one Part of the Second Schedule into another Part by analogy, but if no formality is required in seeking agreement to minor variations under Part 16, then I see no reason why any formality should be required in seeking similar agreement under Part 3.
If the GPDO had been properly drafted, the wording I have quoted from paragraph A.3(9) in Part 16 should also have appeared in paragraph W(12) in Part 3, and this is not the only example of a failure to ensure uniformity in the provisions in different Parts of the Second Schedule to the GPDO. The opportunity should be taken to correct such anomalies in the drafting of the Order. In the meantime, it is to be hoped that common sense will prevail, and that LPAs will not be difficult about accepting informal requests for the variation of approved or submitted details. The only requirement is that the actual agreement between the LPA and the developer should be “in writing”.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Friday, 4 May 2018
On Wednesday 1 November 2017, I drew attention to the case of Lambeth LBC v SSCLG  EWHC 2412 (Admin). The case concerned a permission granted under section 73 which, in allowing a relaxation of one of the conditions in the original planning permission, had failed to reimpose one of the restrictions that had been contained in the original planning permission. It is well settled law that a permission under section 73 takes effect as a fresh permission, so that where this occurs any conditions that were not reimposed fall away.
The problem for Lambeth in this case was that, although in the section 73 permission they had referred in the description of the development to variation of the condition so as to allow a wider range of non-food retail uses, they had not included a condition in this new permission that expressly ruled out the retail sale of food. The landowner sought an LDC under section 192 that it would now be lawful to sell an unrestricted range of retail goods (including food). The LPA refused to grant the LDC, arguing that the section 73 permission was not intended to have this unrestricted effect, but an appeal was allowed against that refusal. The LPA sought to challenge this appeal decision in the High Court, but their claim was dismissed as noted in my previous blog post on this topic. The council then took the case on to the Court of Appeal, which gave judgment on 20 April -  EWCA Civ 844.
Lambeth, in attempting to establish that the relevant restriction still applied, could not challenge the well-established legal effect of section 73, and were therefore driven back on seeking to interpret the section 73 permission more restrictively than appeared on its face.
I don’t propose to go into this case in any detail. Briefly, the council’s arguments were that the section 73 decision notice itself should be interpreted in a restrictive manner and, second, that a condition preserving the restrictive effect of the original planning permission could be implied in the permission. The LPA’s argument was that the section 73 permission should be interpreted as if it contained the missing condition, to the effect that “the use shall be carried on in accordance with the conditions attached to the 2010 permission as stated to have been varied by this permission.” My interest in this case lies solely in this argument over implied conditions.
It has always been my view that the obiter remarks of Lord Carnwath JSC in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers  UKSC 74 do not allow the implication of an entirely new condition in a planning permission which had been entirely omitted from that permission, as opposed to the implication of a term in a condition which the permission already contains so as to give effect to the true intention of that condition. This argument was put to the Court of Appeal by Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC in Lambeth. The Court accepted this submission, and agreed with the judge at first instance that a new condition cannot be implied as the LPA had argued.
This judgment is therefore further confirmation (if it were needed) that the effect of what was in any event an obiter observation in Trump International is limited to ‘correcting’ an existing condition, so as to give proper effect to its intention. The obvious example is a condition requiring approval of certain matters by the LPA which does not in terms require that, upon such approval being given, the development must then be carried out in accordance with those approved details. Clearly, in light of Trump International, a term can be implied in this condition requiring compliance with these approved details. Without such an implied term, the condition would not achieve its intended purpose.
© MARTIN H GOODALL.
Monday, 30 April 2018
Following Amber Rudd’s resignation as Home Secretary yesterday evening, Sajid Javid has been appointed as her successor. The resulting vacancy at MHCLG has been filled by James Brokenshire, who returns to the cabinet after a short period out of office due to ill health. He had previously been Northern Ireland Secretary. Now aged 50, James Brokenshire has been in the Commons since 2005. He is a solicitor, who (before he ceased to practice on pursuing his political career) specialised in company and corporate law. So far as I am aware, he has had no experience relating to housing or planning.
Whatever one may think about his suitability for the post to which he has now been appointed, I am sure we all very much hope that he has now put behind him the health problem that forced his resignation at the beginning of the year, and wish him a full and permanent return to good health.
James Brokenshire says he is honoured to have been asked by the Prime Minister to serve as Secretary of State at the Ministry of Housing Communities & Local Government, and has stressed his determination to pursue the Ministry’s tasks, especially the building of new homes. No doubt his performance, and that of the Ministry will be judged primarily by the extent to which the government’s house-building targets are achieved (or by what margin those targets turn out to have been missed by 2020).
The reshuffle of cabinet posts does not appear to have led to any changes in the ranks of ministers below cabinet level, and so it remains to be seen whether any changes will be made in the MHCLG ministerial team. So, at least for the time being, it looks as if Dominic Raab will remain in post as the Housing & Planning Minister, having been in his current post only since January. He too is a qualified solicitor, but practised as a solicitor for only a short time before pursuing a diplomatic career, with a particular interest in human rights. He entered parliament in 2010.
The latest change in the leadership of the Ministry is very unlikely to bring about any change in the policies and projects on which MHCLG is already embarked, so what we have just seen is simply a game of musical chairs, the only difference being that the game started with Amber Rudd giving up her seat at the cabinet table, rather than being left out after the music stopped.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Thursday, 19 April 2018
If an LPA in determining a prior approval application under a relevant part of the Second Schedule to the GPDO decides either that their prior approval will not be required or grants such prior approval, can the authority later resile from that decision on the basis that the development does not in practice qualify as PD, or (alternatively) can a third party successfully challenge the LPA’s decision on the same ground?
I have been meaning to return to this topic ever since the judgment of the High Court in R (Marshall) v E Dorset DC  EWHC 226 (Admin), in which judgment was given on 13 February.
In a blog post on Monday, 16 January 2017 (Can an LPA override a prior approval?), I drew attention to the little-known judgment in R. v. Sevenoaks DC, Ex p Palley  E.G. 148 (C.S.), which appeared to suggest that when an LPA gives its prior approval (or decides that its prior approval is not required), it is inherent in that determination that the authority necessarily accepts that the proposed development does qualify as PD, so that the council cannot thereafter resile from that position.
Until my attention had been drawn to Ex p Palley, it had been my view that if the proposed development does not in fact comply with the criteria for permitted development under the relevant Class in (for example) Part 3 or Part 6 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO, either because a requisite pre-existing use did not qualify under that Class of PD, or because the proposed development is not within the limitations, restrictions or conditions that apply to the relevant Class of PD, then an application for prior approval, even if the approval is given (or if the application is simply not determined within the 56-day or 28-day period – whichever is applicable) cannot make the proposed development lawful, and so it cannot be carried out as PD.
The basis for my earlier opinion was that the actual planning permission for the development is granted by Article 3(1) of the GPDO and it is this permission that is dependent on the qualifications in the GPDO being met. The LPA is not itself granting planning permission, nor in giving its prior approval is it approving the development as such; it is merely approving the specified matters that require prior approval. It follows (I had originally thought) that the giving of prior approval could not overcome the fact that the development is in any event disqualified from being PD.
During the course of discussion in comments that were posted in response to the revised view that I expressed in light of Ex p Palley, a correspondent raised with me the effect of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Keenan v Woking BC and SSCLG  EWCA Civ 438. At the time, I felt that Keenan did not affect the position, because it simply seemed to me to confirm that if the development does not qualify as PD, the 56-day rule [or the 28-day rule in that case] will not operate so as to allow the proposed development to go ahead in the absence of the prior approval application having been determined within the statutory time limit. There had previously been several appeal decisions to the same effect, and I stressed this point in my book, A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use (see page 201 in the Second Edition, and for good measure, I repeated it at the bottom of page 210).
However, it seems that the effect of the decision in Keenan is of slightly wider effect than that (at least so far as PD under Part 6 is concerned), and Mrs Justice Lang’s judgment in Marshall has prompted me to look more carefully at Keenan.
In Marshall, Lang J drew attention to the disqualification in paragraph A.1 of Part 6, whereby development is not permitted by Class A if it would consist of, or include, the erection or construction of, or the carrying out of any works to, a building, structure or an excavation used or to be used for the accommodation of livestock or for the storage of slurry or sewage sludge where the building, structure or excavation is, or would be, within 400 metres of the curtilage of a protected building, but in this case the proposed building was within 400 metres of several dwellings (including the Claimant’s home) which were “protected buildings” as defined. Furthermore, paragraph A.2 makes it a condition of permitted development under Part 6 that where development is carried out within 400 metres of the curtilage of a protected building, any building, structure, excavation or works resulting from the development are not used for the accommodation of livestock (except in certain defined circumstances).
Notwithstanding this, the LPA issued a decision notice in response to the developer’s prior approval application under Part 6, which stated that “The development, therefore, constitutes permitted development in accordance with the provisions of Part 6 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (as amended) and is subject to the standard conditions.” In dealing with this point, Lang J followed the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Keenan, and in particular the words of Lindblom LJ that, in order to be lawful, the development proposed had to fall squarely within the description of “permitted development” in the relevant Class.
In particular, Lindblom LJ observed in Keenan that the GPDO did not impose on the LPA a duty to decide whether or not the development in question was, in fact, permitted development under Class A of Part 6, albeit that the guidance in paragraph E14 of Annex E to PPS7 might have been read as encouraging it to do so. Nor did it confer upon the authority a power to grant planning permission for development outside the defined class of permitted development. The sole and limited function of this provision was to enable the LPA to determine whether its own “prior approval” would be required for those specified details of that “permitted development”. If the authority were to decide that its “prior approval” was not required, the condition would effectively have been discharged and the developer could proceed with the “permitted development” – though not, of course, with any development that was not “permitted development”. If, however, the authority failed to make a determination within the 28-day period, again the developer could proceed with the “permitted development”, but again not with any development that was not “permitted development”. The developer would not at any stage have planning permission for development that was not, in fact, “permitted development”.
As Lang J put it in Marshall (referring to Keenan), the ‘prior approval’ conditions do not even come into play unless the proposed development falls “squarely within the description of Permitted development” in the relevant Class, and she emphasised that Keenan also decided that the LPA, when deciding a prior approval application under the terms of the GPDO [at least under Part 6, but see below], is not empowered, either expressly or implicitly, to decide whether or not the proposed development comes within the description of the relevant Class in the GPDO.
This confirms the view which I had originally expressed myself as to the effect of the legislation. Clearly, therefore, in the context of Part 6, Ex parte Palley can have no application.
Whilst I accept the logic of both the Keenan and Marshall judgments, I still have a niggling doubt at the back of my mind, which those two judgments do not entirely resolve. Both of these cases involved agricultural development under Part 6, and I fully accept Lindblom LJ’s views, quoted by Lang J in her judgment in Marshall, so far as Part 6 applications are concerned. However, the actual legislative wording of Part 3 does seem to imply that in the case of prior approval applications under that Part of the Second Schedule to the GPDO, the LPA when deciding a prior approval application under the terms of Part 3 is empowered, either expressly or impliedly, to decide whether or not the proposed development comes within the description of the relevant Class in Part 3.
In relation to Part 3, paragraph W. –(1) provides that the following provisions apply where under this Part a developer is required to make an application to a local planning authority for a determination as to whether the prior approval of the authority will be required. Under paragraph W. -(3), the LPA may refuse a prior approval application where, in the opinion of the authority, the proposed development does not comply with (or the developer has provided insufficient information to enable the authority to establish whether the proposed development complies with) any conditions, limitations or restrictions specified in this Part as being applicable to the development in question.
I think I would have to concede that paragraph W. –(3) empowers the LPA only to refuse the prior approval application if the development does not qualify as PD but, arguably, this might reasonably be taken to imply that if the LPA either grants its prior approval or determines that its prior approval of the specified matters is not required, then the authority may be taken to have accepted that the development does qualify as PD, and in those circumstances Ex p Palley (as discussed in the earlier blog post to which I have drawn attention above) would come into play.
Ex p Palley was, of course, decided some years before the House of Lords’ decision in R v East Sussex CC ex p Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd  UKHL 8, in which it was held that the clear terms of the modern legislation (sections 191 and 192 of the 1990 Act in their currently amended form) provide the only means of confirming the lawfulness of an existing or proposed use or development. Such a determination cannot be construed from the outcome of other procedures, nor can a finding of lawfulness be made or implied informally. However, that is a rather different point from the one raised here. We are dealing here with a planning permission granted by Art. 3(1) of the GPDO, subject only to prior approval of certain matters by the LPA (or their determination that their prior approval is not required), rather than with an informal opinion or implied certificate as to the lawfulness of the proposed development in connection with which prior approval has been granted.
In principle, the qualification of a proposed development as PD would appear to be an issue that is entirely separate from the grant of prior approval (and this was the view I initially expressed). However, it appears on closer examination (particularly bearing in mind the wording of paragraph W -(3)) that the prior approval could reasonably be taken, for the reason advanced above, to involve a determination by the LPA that the restrictions, limitations and conditions applicable to that Class of PD in Part 3 are met, and that the proposed development accordingly qualifies as PD.
It is in light of this factor that the judgment in Ex p. Palley may become relevant where prior approval has been given under Part 3, because the determination by the LPA is arguably a judgment by them (in accordance with paragraph W. –(3)) of a matter of fact and degree that can only be challenged on Wednesbury grounds by way of an application for judicial review. The point of the judgment in Ex p. Palley is that, because (having regard to the wording of paragraph W -(3)) the LPA may be taken to have considered and determined whether the development does in fact qualify as PD, this issue is not merely “a matter of precedent fact".
I cannot guarantee that this argument would necessarily be accepted if it were to come before the High Court or the Court of Appeal, but in view of the fact that this argument rests on a legislative provision in Part 3 (which is absent from Part 6), rather than relying on a reference to ministerial practice guidance, as was the case in Keenan, it would appear that a Part 3 case might well be distinguishable from the judgments in Keenan and in Marshall (concerned as they were with the differently worded provisions of Part 6). I suspect we shall just have to sit back and wait for someone to take a punt on this point.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Monday, 9 April 2018
Readers will recall that I deferred commenting on this issue until the case of Braintree BC v SSCLG had been to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard on 14 March, and judgment was handed down on the 28th -  EWCA Civ 610. The judgment of the High Court rejecting the LPA’s challenge to an inspector’s appeal decision was upheld, although the Court of Appeal’s reasons differed slightly from those given by Mrs Justice Lang at first instance -  EWHC 2743 (Admin). The case turned on the interpretation of ministerial guidance in paragraph 55 of the NPPF, which advises that “local planning authorities should avoid new isolated homes in the countryside” unless there are special circumstances (of which examples are cited in that paragraph). The point for the court was therefore a short one, in relation to the use of the word “isolated” in this context.
In rejecting the original planning application, the LPA had made the point that, in accordance with paragraph 55, housing in rural areas should be located where it will enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities. The site in this case, the LPA said, is located in the countryside beyond any defined settlement boundaries and in a location where there are limited facilities, amenities, public transport links and employment opportunities. They asserted that the proposal would introduce new housing development beyond the defined settlement limits and would be contrary to the objectives of securing sustainable patterns of development and the protection of the character of the countryside. Development at this location, they said, would undoubtedly place reliance on travel by car.
In an appeal against the refusal of planning permission, the Inspector listed among the four principal issues “…….. whether the appeal proposal constitutes sustainable development in the countryside”. On this issue, the Inspector concluded: “Accessibility to services, facilities and employment from the site other than by car would be poor. On the other hand, the development would make a modest contribution to meeting housing need. In addition, subject to appropriate conditions, there would not be material harm to the character and appearance of the surrounding area or to the setting of listed buildings. A minor economic benefit would arise from developing the site and the economic activity of those occupying the dwellings. There would be conflict with policies CS5 and RLP2 but those policies are out-of-date and are worthy of limited weight. Applying the test set out in [NPPF] paragraph 14, I find that there are not adverse impacts of granting permission which would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against [NPPF] policies as a whole. Nor are there specific policies in the [NPPF] which indicate that the development should be restricted. The proposal would amount to sustainable development. Permission should be granted in accordance with the [NPPF’s] presumption in favour of sustainable development.”
In light of this, the Court considered whether the inspector misinterpreted and misapplied the policy in paragraph 55 of the NPPF. However, Lindblom LJ stressed that in considering the interpretation of planning policy, whether in the development plan or in statements of national policy, the court must avoid the mistake of treating the policy in question as if it had the force or linguistic precision of a statute – which it does not – and must bear in mind that broad statements of policy do not lend themselves to elaborate exegesis. The court’s task is simply to discern the objective meaning of the policy as it is written, having regard to the context in which the policy sits. On the other hand, the application of policy is for the decision-maker, on a true understanding of what the policy means, but with freedom to exercise planning judgement as the policy allows or requires – subject to review by the court on Wednesbury principles alone. The court will not lightly accept an argument that an inspector has proceeded on a false interpretation of national planning policy or guidance. Nor will it engage in – or encourage – the dissection of an inspector’s planning assessment in the quest for such errors of law. Excessive legalism in the planning system is always to be deprecated. The Court therefore agreed with the respondents’ submission that its task is to construe the words of the policy itself, reading them sensibly in their context. This is not a sophisticated exercise, and it need not be difficult. It is, in fact, quite straightforward. Planning policies, whether in the development plan or in the NPPF, ought never to be over-interpreted. As this case showed, over-interpretation of a policy can distort its true meaning – which is misinterpretation.
Lindblom LJ made three important points. First, paragraph 55 is expressed in general and unprescriptive terms. It does not dictate a particular outcome for an application for planning permission. It identifies broad principles and indicates a broad approach. LPAs are advised what “should” be done. The policy is not expressed as containing a “presumption”, and the paragraph should not be read as creating one. Rather, it indicates to authorities, in very broad terms, how they ought to go about achieving the aim stated at the beginning of paragraph 55: “[to] promote sustainable development in rural areas”. It does not set specific tests or criteria by which to judge the acceptability of particular proposals. It does not identify particular questions for a local planning authority to ask itself when determining an application for planning permission. Its tenor is quite different, for example, from the policies governing the protection of the Green Belt, in paragraphs 87 to 92 of the NPPF. The use of the verb “avoid” in the third sentence of paragraph 55 indicates a general principle, not a hard-edged presumption.
Second, the policy explicitly concerns the location of new housing development. The first sentence of paragraph 55 tells authorities where housing should be “located”. The location is “where it will enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities”. The concept of the “vitality” of such a community is wide, and undefined. The example given in the second sentence of paragraph 55 – “development in one village” that “may support services in a village nearby” – does not limit the notion of “vitality” to a consideration of “services” alone. But it does show that the policy sees a possible benefit of developing housing in a rural settlement with no, or relatively few, services of its own. The third sentence of the paragraph enjoins authorities to avoid “new isolated homes in the countryside”. This is a distinction between places. The contrast is explicitly and simply a geographical one. Taken in the context of the preceding two sentences, it simply differentiates between the development of housing within a settlement – or “village” – and new dwellings that would be “isolated” in the sense of being separate or remote from a settlement. Although certain special exceptions are mentioned, what is perfectly plain is that, under this policy, the concept of concentrating additional housing within settlements is seen as generally more likely to be consistent with the promotion of “sustainable development in rural areas” than building isolated dwellings elsewhere in the countryside. In short, settlements are the preferred location for new housing development in rural areas. That, in effect, is what the policy says.
The third point is that the adjective “isolated”, which was the focus of argument before the Court, is itself generally used to describe a location. It is not an unfamiliar word. It is commonly used in everyday English. It carries the ordinary sense of something that is “… [placed] or standing apart or alone; detached or separate from other things or persons; unconnected with anything else; solitary” (see Oxford English Dictionary, second edition). In Lindblom LJ’s view, in its particular context in paragraph 55 of the NPPF, the word “isolated” in the phrase “isolated homes in the countryside” simply connotes a dwelling that is physically separate or remote from a settlement. Whether a proposed new dwelling is, or is not, “isolated” in this sense will be a matter of fact and planning judgment for the decision-maker in the particular circumstances of the case in hand.
What constitutes a settlement for these purposes is left undefined in the NPPF. The NPPF contains no definitions of a “community”, a “settlement”, or a “village”. There is no specified minimum number of dwellings, or population. It is not said that a settlement or development boundary must have been fixed in an adopted or emerging local plan, or that only the land and buildings within that settlement or development boundary will constitute the settlement [Emphasis added]. In Lindblom LJ’s view, a settlement would not necessarily exclude a hamlet or a cluster of dwellings, without, for example, a shop or post office of its own, or a school or community hall or a public house nearby, or public transport within easy reach. Whether, in a particular case, a group of dwellings constitutes a settlement, or a “village”, for the purposes of the policy will again be a matter of fact and planning judgement for the decision-maker. In the second sentence of paragraph 55 the policy acknowledges that development in one village may “support services” in another. It does not stipulate that, to be a “village”, a settlement must have any “services” of its own, let alone “services” of any specified kind.
The Court was satisfied that this reading of the policy in paragraph 55 fits the broader context of the policies for sustainable development in the NPPF and guidance in the PPG. In Lindblom LJ’s opinion, the language of paragraph 55 is entirely unambiguous, and there is therefore no need to resort to other statements of policy, either in the NPPF itself or elsewhere, that might shed light on its meaning. In particular, the Court did not accept the appellant’s argument that the word “isolated” in paragraph 55 must be understood as meaning either (a) “physically isolated” or (b) “functionally isolated” or “isolated from services and facilities”; that the decision-maker must therefore address two questions – first, whether the proposed new dwelling would be physically separate or remote from any other dwelling, and secondly, whether it would be isolated from services and facilities; and that if the proposed development would be either separate or remote from other dwellings or separate or remote from services and facilities, it offends the policy. This would be a strained and unnatural reading of the policy. In Lindblom LJ’s view, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to gloss the word “isolated” by reading an additional phrase into paragraph 55 whose effect would be to make the policy more onerous than the plain meaning of the words it actually contains. No such restriction is apparent in the policy, or implicit in it.
In the circumstances, there was no need for “special circumstances” to be identified to justify a development of “new isolated homes in the countryside”. This was not such a development. The Court therefore concluded that the inspector did not misinterpret or misapply the policy in paragraph 55 of the NPPF. His understanding of the policy was accurate, and his application of it impeccable.
It is clear from this judgment that the prescriptive and restrictive interpretation that some LPAs have sought to put on paragraph 55 of the NPPF is inappropriate, and that a more ‘broad brush’ approach is required when considering the application of this policy. Lindblom LJ’s observations on the boundaries of a settlement are particularly interesting, and clearly envisage a more flexible approach in this regard than the rigid adherence to designated settlement boundaries that LPAs commonly seem to adopt. This guidance from the Court of Appeal on the approach to be taken to the interpretation of paragraph 55 is extremely helpful, and it is to be hoped that it will put an end to sterile disputes about the acceptability of developments that are outside a designated development boundary.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Tuesday, 3 April 2018
Those of you who have followed this blog over a long period will be aware that from time to time I have published examples of shroud advertisements displayed on buildings that are undoubtedly major heritage assets in cities such as Venice, Paris and Brussels. The point of publishing these views is to demonstrate that our European friends do not share our squeamishness about erecting temporary shroud advertising around buildings that are undergoing major refurbishment.
I was in Paris again last week, and found several more examples of shroud advertising displayed on such buildings while major building works are being carried out. The first example is on the South Front of the Palais du Louvre.
Next, we have shroud advertisements displayed on the buildings facing onto the Place de la Concorde, and also on the return frontage to the Rue Royale.
Only a few metres further north, at the end of the Rue Royale, is the Church of the Madaleine, where this shroud advertising is displayed:
As it says on the advertisements themselves, En application de l’article L621-29-8 du code du patrimoine, les recettes perçues par le propriétaire du monument pour cet affichage sont affectées au financement des travaux, which seems an eminently sensible arrangement.
The essential point is that these shroud advertisements are purely temporary, and are displayed for only so long as the works continue. To take a previous example, on Wednesday, 16 April 2014, I illustrated a shroud advertisement at the north-east corner of the Place des Vosges.
The works covered by that shroud have long since been completed, and so this important historic building can now be seen in its fully restored state, after the advertisement had made a significant contribution to the restoration works. This is what it looked like last week (and no doubt for the past several years):
If such advertisements can be displayed on the shrouds around important historic buildings in World Heritage Sites like these while they are under repair, there is no reason whatsoever why we should not allow similar advertising in this country.
There was an encouraging example of an advertisement control appeal being allowed recently for precisely this type of advertising, but having to rely on obtaining advertisement control consent, possibly on appeal, is too chancy and too time-consuming for most advertisers to contemplate. What is required instead is an amendment of the Control of Advertisements Regulations to give deemed consent for this type of advertising. The deemed consent would be purely temporary, limited to the duration of the works or 12 months (whichever is shorter), and would be subject to the advertisement not being wider or higher than the building covered by the shroud. For the avoidance of doubt, it should perhaps be provided that this deemed consent would not authorise the erection of any separate hoarding or other structure, and the deemed consent would require the immediate removal of the advertisement upon the expiry of the temporary period of that consent. To avoid LPAs making difficulties, there should be no requirement for prior approval, nor should the subject matter or design of the advertisement or advertisements be subject to any control under the terms of this deemed consent.
So come on, Raab; let's get on with it! This government prides itself on sweeping away red tape, so let’s see an appropriate amendment to the Control of Advertisements Regulations to give deemed consent for shroud advertisements in these circumstances without further ado.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
It always seems to take a little time for the dust to settle after an amendment to the GPDO has been made before people begin to get their heads around the changes and what they really mean.
I have now had the chance to review the changes to Class Q in more detail, and have also read some intriguing comments on the Planning Jungle website which suggest that a significant loophole has been created as regards the cumulative total of development that is now permitted under this class.
First, there is an issue that has been a subject of discussion in this blog recently, as to whether a prior approval application can be made under Class Q which relates only to Class Q(a), while postponing to a subsequent application any prior approval application in respect of necessary building operations. Class Q was reworded in the 2015 GDO as made, compared with the wording of Class MB in the 1995 Order, and in my view this was intended to make it clear that a prior approval application could no longer be made under Class Q(a) alone, except in those cases (if any) where no building operations affecting the external appearance of the pre-existing building would be required in order to carry out its residential conversion [or where such building operations will be dealt with by a separate planning application, if they go outside the permissible limits of Class Q(b)]. It seems, however, that some inspectors were nevertheless persuaded that a prior approval application could be made under Class Q(a) alone, even where a subsequent prior approval application would be required under Class Q(b).
One aspect of the further re-wording of Class Q in the latest amendment order, on which I have not previously commented, is a change to the definition of the permitted development that can be carried out under this Class. This now provides that the development permitted is EITHER (a) a change of use of a building and any land within its curtilage from a use as an agricultural building to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses), OR (b) development comprising BOTH the change of use permitted by paragraph (a), AND building operations reasonably necessary to convert the building to residential use. Thus Class Q(b) is no longer confined to building operations alone, but embraces the change of use as well as necessary building operations.
A prior approval application under Class Q(a) will therefore serve no useful purpose, except in those rare cases where all the necessary conversion works are purely internal [or where more extensive building operations, beyond the scope of Class Q(b), are intended]. If building operations affecting the external appearance of the property will be required under the terms of Class Q(b), the Class Q(b) application will necessarily include consideration of all the matters listed in paragraph Q.2(1) relating to the change of use, and not simply the one item in sub-paragraph (f) (the design or external appearance of the building). It is therefore clear that an application must be made under Class Q(b) [not Class Q(a)] where building operations within the scope of Class Q(b) will be required, and in accordance with paragraph W(2) this prior approval application must in any event be accompanied by a written description of the proposed development, which must include any building or other operations. It is only if no building operations within the scope Class Q(b) will be required, or if the intended building operations are outside the scope of Class Q(b), so as to require a separate planning application for those works, that a prior approval application under Class Q(a) will be appropriate.
Turning to the number and floorspace limits in the newly substituted paragraph Q.1(b), (c) and (d), the cumulative number of separate larger dwellinghouses (i.e. between 100 sq m and 465 sq m each) developed under Class Q must not exceed 3 within a single agricultural unit. However, the cumulative floorspace of the existing building or buildings changing use to a larger dwellinghouse or dwellinghouses under Class Q must not exceed a total of 465 sq m. So you can’t build three 465 sq m dwellings on the same agricultural unit. The average size of the larger dwellinghouses (if the maximum of three were to be converted) could be no more than 155 sq m, but they might comprise perhaps one at 110 sq m, one at 140 sq m and one at 215 sq m, or any other combination not exceeding 465 sq m in total, and not exceeding a total of three in number.
In the case of smaller dwellinghouses (i.e. not exceeding 100 sq m each) the cumulative number of these developed under Class Q must not exceed 5. But it is important to bear in mind that the total of all dwellinghouses converted under Class Q on the same agricultural unit cannot in any event exceed five. Thus the absolute maximum floorspace that can be converted to residential use is going to be 465 + 400 = 865 sq m, comprising no more than 5 dwellings in total, of which no more than three can exceed 100 sq m in size, and none of them can individually exceed 465 sq m. You can cut the cards whatever way you like, but you cannot create more than 865 sq m of residential floorspace in total (including mezzanine floors) and the maximum number of dwellings you can create cannot exceed five in total. In practice, it seems unlikely that there would be just one large dwelling of 465 sq m and four of 100 sq m; a more likely scenario would be three dwellings totalling 465 sq m in aggregate plus 2 x 100 sq m = 665 sq m.
I don’t think there can be much doubt that this was what was intended by the revised legislation, but I have not addressed the intriguing drafting error that has apparently been identified by Planning Jungle. The way that Part 3 works is that each Class first defines what the permitted development consists of, and then goes on (in paragraph Q.1, in the case of Class Q) to define the circumstances in which development is not permitted. So far so good, and my paraphrase above summarises the provisions of that paragraph. However, at the end of Class Q, there is now a new paragraph, Q.3 - “Interpretation of Class Q”. This defines “larger dwellinghouse” as a dwellinghouse developed under Class Q “which has a floor space of more than 100 sq m and no more than 465 sq m.” It follows that a dwellinghouse with a floorspace greater than 465 sq m falls outside the definition of a “larger dwellinghouse” entirely. But the provisions of paragraph Q.1 refer only to “a larger dwellinghouse or dwellinghouses” [as so defined] and do not place any limitation on the floorspace of any dwellings that do not fall into the definition of either “a smaller dwellinghouse” or “a larger dwellinghouse”. There remains an overall limit of five dwellings in total (not limited or defined by reference to their size), but it is argued by Planning Jungle (and I do not disagree with this, even though I am sure it was not intended by the draftsman) that Class Q as now revised appears to permit up to five dwellings of unlimited size on a single agricultural unit, subject (of course) to their being converted from pre-existing agricultural buildings, within the terms of Class Q.
In fairness, it is acknowledged that there is paragraph Q.1(d), which provides that development is not permitted “if the development under Class Q ……… would result in …….. a larger dwellinghouse or larger dwellinghouses having more than 465 square metres of floor space”. However, as pointed out in Planning Jungle, the reference in paragraph Q.1(d) to “a larger dwellinghouse or larger dwellinghouses” brings us back to the difficulty of the definition in paragraph Q.3, which on the face of it clearly confines the definition of “a larger dwellinghouse” to “a dwellinghouse developed under Class Q which has a floor space of ………. no more than 465 square metres”. Watch out for a further amendment order correcting this anomaly in the fairly near future!
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Wednesday, 21 March 2018
I imagine that most of my professional readers will be aware by now of the Town and Country Planning (Fees for Applications, Deemed Applications, Requests and Site Visits) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017 No.1314) which came into effect in mid-January.
Article 2 has increased application fees generally by 20% (rounded up to whole pounds) as the government had previously announced.
Article 5(2) of these amendment regulations has removed the fee exemption previously contained in Article 5 of the 2012 fee regs which had relieved applicants of any liability to pay an application fee where they were applying for planning permission due either to the removal of a permitted development right by an Article 4 Direction or to its removal by a condition attached to a planning permission.
The fee increase in respect of applications for prior approval under the GPDO is dealt with separately by Article 5(3) of the new regulations (as it was by the previous version of these regulations when prior approval applications were introduced). The recent amendments to these fees generally do no more than increase the fees by 20%, but the fee for prior approval under Part 4 (temporary buildings and uses) is the same [now £96] whether or not any building operations are involved (under Class E, in connection with temporary film-making). Unless I had previously mis-read the original fees regulations, this is in contrast to the earlier rule that a fee of £172 was payable for a combined application for both operational development and building operations under Part 4, Class E.
The £96 fee is now also payable for applications under Part 7 (non-domestic extensions, alterations etc), and Part 14 (renewable energy) in addition (as before) to those made under Part 6 (agricultural and forestry) and Part 11 (heritage and demolition).
Having waded through these amendment regulations, as well as various other amendment regulations on other subjects recently, I am bound to say that it would make life far easier for everyone who has to interpret, apply and operate under this detailed subordinate legislation if, instead of simply amending the earlier statutory instrument by reference, the government were to replace the previous version entirely. Whilst this might involve reprinting large wodges of text which had not in fact been amended, it would make the exercise of understanding the regulations as a whole a great deal easier for all concerned.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Monday, 12 March 2018
There has been much speculation as to whether the government would extend the PD right under Class P (for the residential conversion of buildings used for storage within Use Class B8). An absolute deadline for the commencement of residential use required all developments of this type to be completed no later than 15 April 2018, failing which this PD right would lapse.
However MHCLG has now announced a one-year extension of this deadline. I don’t know yet whether the government has laid an amending Order to give effect to this extension, or if not how soon they expect to do so, but they have left this extension of time extremely late, and have no doubt caused much anxiety and inconvenience to property owners and developers by failing to make up their minds earlier about extending this deadline.
In the same announcement, the Ministry has confirmed their intention (which they had previously canvassed) to extend the PD right under Class Q to enable either up to three dwellings to be created on a single agricultural unit (as now), but subject to a slightly increased cumulative floorspace limit of 465 square metres (compared with the previous cumulative limit of 450 sq m), or alternatively up to five dwellings, each of which would be limited to no more than 100 sq m. Within these limits, it seems that developers will be allowed to ‘mix and match’ their development, provided that no more than three of the new dwellings exceed the 100 sq m limit (but still subject to the overall limit of five dwellings).
I think we shall need to see the actual wording of the amendment order to understand exactly how these new limits will work, especially in relation to a combination of larger and smaller dwellings.
The government has also announced a proposed enlargement of PD rights for the erection of agricultural buildings on larger agricultural holdings under Part 6, which will enable buildings of up to 1,000 sq m to be erected (in place of the current limit of 465 sq m). Again, precise details will need to be checked when the amending order to the GPDO is made.
UPDATE (13.3.18): I am grateful to Steve Jupp for pointing out that the amending order is the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) Order 2018 (SI 2018 No.343), which was made on 8 March and takes effect on 6 April.
I haven’t had time yet to get my head round the detailed drafting amendments but, for the purposes of Class Q, a “larger dwellinghouse” is defined as a dwellinghouse developed under Class Q which has a floor space of more than 100 square metres and no more than 465 square metres, and a “smaller dwellinghouse” is defined as a dwellinghouse developed under Class Q which has a floor space of no more than 100 square metres.
Subject to this definition, in the case of a larger dwellinghouse within an established agricultural unit the cumulative number of separate larger dwellinghouses developed under Class Q must not exceed 3; nor must the cumulative floor space of the existing building or buildings changing use to a larger dwellinghouse or dwellinghouses under Class Q exceed 465 square metres. Similarly, in the case of a smaller dwellinghouse within an established agricultural unit, the cumulative number of separate smaller dwellinghouses developed under Class Q must not exceed 5; nor must the floor space of any one separate smaller dwellinghouse exceed 100 square metres.
The development under Class Q (together with any previous development under Class Q) within one and the same agricultural unit must not result in either or both of the following—
(i) a larger dwellinghouse or larger dwellinghouses having more than 465 square metres of floor, and/or
(ii) the cumulative number of separate dwellinghouses exceeding 5.
So far as Class P is concerned, this is now amended so that the PD right under this class is only disapplied if the prior approval date falls on or after 10 June 2019 (so the deadline has been extended for around 14 months) and there is now also a condition that the development must be completed within a period of 3 years starting with the prior approval date.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Friday, 9 March 2018
I quite frequently receive queries from correspondents that could very easily be answered by referring to one or other of my two books - A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use (currently in its Second Edition) and The Essential Guide to the Use of Land and Buildings under the Planning Acts, and I often answer these questions by drawing the enquirer’s attention to the relevant passage in one or other of these two books.
This suggests to me that there are still some of you out there who haven’t yet bought either or both of these two books, who would benefit greatly by having access to them, either on your bookshelf, or by accessing the electronic version on your computer. I have been told by readers that they have found these two books a huge help in guiding them through the law and practice relating to the use of land and buildings and changes of use. At least two correspondents told me that the book paid for itself within a week of their receiving it, by providing the answer to particular problems that they had encountered and to which they had been unable to find the answer from other sources.
The two books are complementary to each other, and together they provide a very full explanation of the issues that affect the use of land and buildings and changes of use. Having the electronic version of the books is clearly the modern way of accessing the text quickly and conveniently, and so Bath Publishing are currently making a special offer, which will give you a free copy of the electronic version of both books when you buy the printed editions of the two books together. This offer therefore gives you £200-worth of conveniently accessible and extremely valuable information on these important subjects for a combined price of only £100 (compared with a total cost of £150 if you were to buy the print/digital bundle for each book separately).
If you click on the Down arrow on the right-hand side in either of the drop-down lists below each book title which you can see in the left-hand margin of this page, you will find the details of this offer, and can order online through that link. Don’t miss out; you will find these two books an invaluable resource, which will save you much time and frustration in discovering the answers to the problems and conundrums that so frequently arise in this area of planning law and practice.
© MARTIN H GOODALL
Tuesday, 27 February 2018
The Housing Ministry (formerly De-CLoG) has at last revised its advice on the convertibility of agricultural buildings under Part 3, Class Q, in the Second Schedule to the GPDO.
Readers will recall that paragraph 105 of the online PPG, as revised in March 2015, stated rather starkly that It is not the intention of this permitted development right to allow rebuilding work which “would go beyond what is reasonably necessary for the conversion of the building to residential use”, so that “it is only where the existing building is already suitable for conversion to residential use that the building would be considered to have the permitted development right”, but did not enlarge on this gnomic utterance, leaving it open to some rather imaginative interpretation by LPAs.
I had always been clear, and I think it was generally accepted even before this revision to paragraph 105 was made in 2015, that the works permitted under Class Q(b) are restricted to what is reasonably necessary for the building to function as a dwellinghouse, and any partial demolition must also be limited to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the building operations that are permitted by this class. This imposes a practical constraint on the convertibility of some buildings, especially if they are of rather insubstantial construction. Works that amount to substantial demolition and reconstruction or replacement of the existing fabric would go beyond what is permitted. (See paragraph 9.7 in Chapter 9 of my first book, A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use - page106 in the Second Edition.)
Unfortunately, quite a few LPAs seized on the revised guidance in March 2015 as an opportunity to refuse prior approval for various residential conversions of agricultural buildings which, in my view, did not involve such extensive work as to take the development outside the scope of Class Q(b), even taking into account that revised guidance.
Internal works were one particular bone of contention, and I argued strongly that such works should be seen as being entirely removed from the definition of development by virtue of section 55(2)(a) in the 1990 Act, so that they did not in any event form part of the development that was permitted by Class Q(b), and were thus not caught by the restrictive wording of paragraph 105 of the PPG.
The Housing Ministry has now at last conceded this point in the following wording, added to paragraph 105 on 22 February: “Internal works are not generally development. For the building to function as a dwelling it may be appropriate to undertake internal structural works, including to allow for a floor, the insertion of a mezzanine or upper floors within the overall residential floor space permitted, or internal walls.” These are not prohibited by Class Q
In the revised wording of paragraph 105, the Ministry has also referred to the High Court judgment in Hibbitt v SSCLG  EWHC 2853 (Admin) as an example of a discussion of the difference between conversions and rebuilding. However, I have always taken the view that Hibbitt simply confirmed the well understood principle mentioned above. As I put it in a blog post on the convertibility of agricultural buildings on 14 November 2016, it was not even necessary to call in aid the wording of the PPG, as revised in March 2015, in order to interpret the plain words of the GPDO. But I warned that we should be wary of reading more than this into the Hibbitt judgment. What I called “the structural issue” has in effect two limbs. The first is the fundamental point, which was dealt with by Hibbitt (i.e. Does the development consist simply of necessary building operations, or does it comprise substantial demolition and reconstruction of the previous structure?).
The second aspect of this structural issue - the question of how much internal work can be carried out inside the building within the scope of Class Q, which has now been clarified by the latest revision of paragraph 105 last week, was one that I had found it necessary to discuss in great detail, and at great length, in Appendix D to the Second Edition of A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use, but the latest revision of paragraph 105 has now made most of that debate unnecessary.
It is still my view that the judgment in Hibbitt does not tell us anything about this latter issue, being focused as it was (quite rightly in terms of the subject matter of the dispute that was before the court) on the fundamental issue of the ‘convertibility’ of the building, and whether works amounting in effect to substantial reconstruction of the building can be carried out within the scope of Class Q (and of Class Q(b) in particular), as the claimant attempted to argue in that case.
It is very much to be hoped, however, that the latest revision to paragraph 105 of the PPG will finally put a stop to any further arguments about internal structural works carried out to agricultural buildings before or during their residential conversion under Class Q.
© MARTIN H GOODALL